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Posted By USFN,
Monday, May 13, 2024
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Schneiderman & Sherman, PC (USFN Member – MI, MN) announced the opening of their newest office in Minnesota, located at 1602 Selby Ave., # 8, St. Paul, MN 55104. The Minnesota location supports their expanding regional market presence and marks the firm’s first law office outside of the State of Michigan. Spring 2024 USFN Report
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#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Monday, May 13, 2024
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Halliday, Watkins & Mann, P.C. (USFN Member – UT, AL, AK, CO, ID, MN, MS, MT, NE, ND, SD, WY) recently merged with Eric H. Lindquist, P.C., L.L.O., a prominent Nebraska-based law firm specializing in mortgage default cases. The strategic merger brings together two powerhouse firms with over 70 years of combined experience assisting mortgage default clients across 12 states. Spring 2024 USFN Report
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#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Monday, May 13, 2024
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Gross Polowy LLC (USFN Member – NJ, NY) is pleased to announce the promotions of two of its Senior and Supervising Attorneys. Douglas Weinert was promoted to Managing Attorney of Risk Management. Weinert began his tenure with Gross Polowy from the beginning in January 2012 and most recently served as a Senior Attorney. Within his scope as Managing Attorney, he will continue to oversee firm and client Risk Management, as well as the Attorneys in the First Legal, Motions and Title Curative departments. Brian Goldberg was promoted to Managing Attorney of Trials & Loss Mitigation. Goldberg also joined Gross Polowy in January 2012 and most recently served as a Supervising Attorney. As Managing Attorney, he will continue to oversee Trials, Court Appearances, Settlement Conferences and Home Retention while also managing the attorneys in those departments. 
Spring 2024 USFN Report
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Posted By USFN,
Monday, May 13, 2024
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Wilson & Associates, PLLC (USFN Member – AR, MS, TN) is excited to announce attorneys Courtney McGahhey and Nicole Murray were sworn into the Mississippi Bar recently. McGahhey is a partner in the Foreclosure Department focusing on non-judicial foreclosures. She received her education from the University of Arkansas (B.A. 2005) and the University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law (J.D. 2008, High Honors). She was admitted to the Arkansas Bar in 2008, the Texas Bar in 2009, the Tennessee Bar in 2016, and the Mississippi Bar in 2024. Murray is an associate partner in the Foreclosure Department. She earned her B.A. in Educational Studies at Warner University (2010, Magna Cum Laude), and earned her J.D. from the University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law (2017, Suma Cum Laude). She was admitted to the Arkansas Bar in 2017, the Mississippi Bar in 2024, and is a member of the American Bar Association and the Arkansas Bar Association. 
Spring 2024 USFN Report
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Posted By USFN,
Wednesday, May 8, 2024
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By Blair Gisi, Esq. SouthLaw, PC * USFN Member (IA, KS, MO, NE)
In Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc'y v. Campbell,
2021 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 330, the Kansas Court of Appeals issued a ruling
that provides a bright line rule under K.S.A. §60-241.
60-241. Dismissal of
actions. (a) Voluntary dismissal.
(1) By the
plaintiff.
(A) Without a court
order. Subject to subsection (e) of K.S.A. §60-223, K.S.A. §60-223a and K.S.A. §60-223b, the plaintiff may dismiss an
action without a court order by filing:
(i) A notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves
either an answer or a motion for summary judgment; or
(ii) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who
have appeared. When the dismissal is by stipulation, the clerk of the court
must enter an order of dismissal as a matter of course.
(B) Effect. Unless
the notice or stipulation states otherwise, the dismissal is without prejudice.
But if the plaintiff previously dismissed any federal- or state-court action
based on or including the same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as an
adjudication on the merits.
That
bright line or “two-dismissal” rule is: “[I]f a plaintiff has once dismissed an
action, a dismissal by notice of a second action based on or including the same
claim, amounts to an adjudication on the merits. As such, the second dismissal effectively
creates a res judicata bar to a third
action.” Campbell at 6.
In
this case, the Appellate Court stated that the district court relied upon
“judicial magic” in concluding the second foreclosure case, which was dismissed
by a Court Order, was legally equivalent to a notice of dismissal. Given this
false equivalency relied upon by the district court and given the procedural
disposition of the case at dismissal which would prevent dismissal by notice,
“the dismissal of that [second] action must have been by court order, obviating
the application of the two-dismissal rule.”
Campbell at 11.
While it may be arguable that
certain circumstances leading to the dismissal of a pending foreclosure action,
e.g., reinstatement or a loan modification, may create a new cause of action
with new or distinguishable grounds for foreclosure, the mere act of filing a
second Notice of Dismissal on the same loan against the same borrowers may
create grounds for those borrowers to argue that any subsequent foreclosure is
precluded under the statute cited above.
To avoid the risk of protracted litigation
associated with this issue, the best practice for dismissing subsequent
foreclosure cases against the same loan and borrower(s) is to seek leave to
dismiss via a Motion and Order to Dismiss, ultimately reviewed and approved by
the presiding judge. Obtaining an Order of Dismissal significantly reduces the
risk of a res judicata bar to
foreclosing, as the Campbell case
makes clear, “. . . the [dismissal by notice] rule comes into play only if the second dismissal is by
notice.” At 8 (emphasis in original).
Seeking an Order of Dismissal may include additional filing and attorney fees;
however, those fees will be significantly less than litigating this issue and
potentially losing the right to foreclose. Copyright © 2024 USFN USFNews - May 15, 2024
* Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient
Tags:
#Foreclosures
#Kansas
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Posted By USFN,
Wednesday, May 8, 2024
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By Adam Diaz, Esq. Diaz, Anselmo & Associates, PA * USFN Member (FL, IL, IN, KY, OH, WI) The 4th District Court of Appeals reversed its opinion in Desbrunes v. U.S. Bank, N.A., as
Trustee, which held that a Personal Representative is a necessary party to
a foreclosure on homestead property. The new ruling correctly held that
when a borrower passes away the property transfers to heirs without the need of
a probate proceeding. The Court specifically found that since “[p]ersonal representatives have no
jurisdiction over nor title to homestead . . . .” the property would not be an
asset to the estate and subject to administration. The Court noted in a
footnote that it was unaware of the status of the property when it issued the
initial decision, but after review of the Rehearing, and Amicus Briefing, this
issue can be fully addressed. The Court did not make a distinction
regarding foreclosure proceedings being in rem or how the rules would
apply to non-homestead property which leaves a potential grey area in the
law. However, the briefings do go into depth on how probate law would
address non-homestead property.
The
Court’s shift is significant for the Mortgage Industry, as it no longer
requires a Lender in Florida to initiate a probate proceeding in order to
obtain clear title when foreclosing. The original ruling put an
unnecessary burden on Lenders which would have caused significant delay in
expense to the foreclosure process. USFN participated in an Amicus Brief in March 2024 in the Desbrunes v. U.S. Bank, N.A., as Trustee petition to the 4th DCA. Kudos to Adam Diaz with Diaz and Associations for their outstanding work on this brief. Advocacy Advisory - May 8, 2024 USFNews - May 15, 2024
* Denotes firm as a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient
Tags:
#AmicusBriefs
#Florida
#foreclosures
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Posted By USFN,
Wednesday, April 10, 2024
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By Courtney McGahhey, Esq.
Wilson
& Associates, PLLC *
USFN Member (AR, MS, TN)
Most attorneys practicing in non-judicial foreclosure states
are well aware of the United States Supreme Court decision in Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus, LLP,
139 S. Ct. 1029 (2019). In Obduskey¸ the Court held that a law firm that
only sends communications to debtors to enforce a security instrument in non-judicial
foreclosure proceedings is not a “debt collector” under the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), provided that the notices sent are
antecedent steps required under state law to enforce a security instrument. Id.
at 1039.
Recently, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Arkansas weighed in on the topic in Reppy v. Cenlar FSB, Inc., No. 5:23-cv-05227, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
40574 (W.D. Ark. 2024). In this case, the court allowed the plaintiff’s FDCPA
claims to survive a motion to dismiss filed by the foreclosing law firm,
despite the foreclosing law firm’s arguments in reliance on Obduskey.
Plaintiffs John and Karen Reppy filed suit in November 2023
in state circuit court in Benton County, Arkansas, against Cenlar FSB Inc.,
Citimortgage, Inc. and Mickel Law Firm, P.A.
The claims against Mickel Law Firm (“Mickel”) were for alleged
violations of the Arkansas Statutory Foreclosure Act, the Arkansas Fair Debt
Collections Practices Act, and the FDCPA.
With regard to the FDCPA, plaintiffs alleged that the FDCPA notice
mailed by Mickel violated the FDCPA. Plaintiffs argued that the mailed notice
falsely identified the owner of the debt, falsely identified the successor
creditor, falsely identified the deadline for plaintiffs to dispute the debt,
and overshadowed the plaintiff’s right to dispute the debt. Plaintiffs also
argued the FDCPA notice failed to provide an itemization date; amount of the
debt on the itemization date; an itemization of the current amount of the debt
reflecting interest, fees, payments, and credits since itemization; and the
current amount of the debt. Reppy v. Cenlar FSB, Inc., No.
04CV-2023-3100 (2023 Ark. Cir.).
The case was subsequently removed to federal court, and in December
2023, Mickel filed a motion to dismiss all claims against it. Among the arguments made by Mickel included
an argument that it was not a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA and
therefore not liable to the plaintiffs. Mickel relied upon the ruling in Obduskey, arguing to the court that that
it was engaged in no more than non-judicial foreclosure proceedings, and thus
not a debt collector under the FDCPA. However,
Mickel also stated in its brief that it sends FDCPA notices “out of an
abundance of caution, and because its clients request Mickel to do so, but it
is not required to do so…”.
A couple of points are worth noting here. One is that the
mailing of a FDCPA notice is not required by the Arkansas Statutory Foreclosure
Act. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 18-30-101 to 117. Second, is that Mickel’s brief in
support of its motion to dismiss did not include an argument that it should be
afforded the safe harbor protections provided by 12 CFR Section 1006.34(d)(2). Collectors
can receive a safe harbor for compliance with the validation information
content and format requirements contained within the CFPB’s model validation
notice found at 12 CFR § 1006 Appendix B. No
argument was made by Mickel that its FDCPA notice was substantially similar to
the CFPB’s model notice.
The court in its Memorandum Opinion and Order made note that
the ruling in Obduskey does not
extend to a law firm who sends communications not required by the Arkansas non-judicial
foreclosure law required to be sent to debtors.
The court pointed to Mickel’s own statement that it mailed the FDCPA
letter “out of an abundance of caution.”
The court further found that several aspects of Mickel’s FDCPA letter
demonstrated an “animating purpose” of inducing payment by the plaintiffs. Under the animating purpose test, for a
communication to be in connection with the collection of a debt, an animating
purpose of the communication must be to induce payment by the debtor. Heinz
v. Carrington Mortgage Servs., LLC,
3 F 4th 1107, 1112 (2021). The
court referenced the fact that the letter explicitly stated “THIS IS A
COMMUNICATION FROM A DEBT COLLECTOR. THIS IS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT AND
ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED MAY BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE.” The court went on to point out that the
letter described ways the plaintiffs could make payments to Mickel in
satisfaction of the debt, and that the letter offered the debtor certain
check-the-box options, including one stating, “I enclosed this amount: $__________.”
Ultimately, the court found the plaintiffs plausibly alleged
that the animating purpose of the FDCPA letter was to induce payment of a
debt. Thus, the plaintiff’s FDCPA claim
survived Mickel’s motion to dismiss.
This case is still pending before the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Arkansas, and we recommend closely monitoring the case. Copyright © 2024 USFN USFNews - April 17, 2024 * Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient
Tags:
#FDCPA
#Obduskey
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Posted By USFN,
Wednesday, March 27, 2024
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Florida
Appellate Court Finds Lenders Must Administer Probate Proceedings in Order to
Obtain a Valid Foreclosure Judgment
By Adam Diaz, Esq.
Diaz
Anselmo & Associates, PA*
USFN Member (FL, IL,
IN, KY, OH, WI)
Florida’s 4th Appellate
District reversed a foreclosure judgment for a lender with a groundbreaking
decision creating new required steps to foreclose the interest of a deceased
party. The Court’s decision in Desbrunes v. US Bank Nat’l Ass’n, as Tr. for
Structured Asset Sec. Corp. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-AM1, 2024 WL 591432, at *1 (Fla. 4th DCA Feb. 14, 2024) represents a
detrimental break in Florida jurisprudence that has governed foreclosure
proceedings for decades.
The facts of Desbrunes
are like many typical foreclosure proceedings involving a deceased party. US
Bank National Association, as Trustee for Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2006-AM1 (“Plaintiff”) filed a one
count action for foreclosure naming Francois Desbrunes as a defendant.
Desbrunes actively litigated the case, but ultimately passed away before the
entry of the judgment, wherein his counsel filed a suggestion of death.
The plaintiff sought to
Amend the Complaint. The purpose of the amendment was to drop Desbrunes as a
party, add known and unknown heirs, as well as appoint a Guardian Ad Litem.
This is the standard process in Florida.
However, Desbrunes’
counsel, who was no longer representing any party, filed a Motion to Abate
pursuant Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.260(a), requesting the Court require the plaintiff
to administer a probate in order to continue the action. The Trial Court denied
the motion because Desbrunes’ counsel was not a party to the case, but did not
rule on whether a probate is a required task to obtain a valid judgment.
The Trial Court granted
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and an heir, Ronald Desbrunes, appealed the
ruling. The heir argued on appeal the denial of the Motion to Abate should have
been granted. The 4th District Court of Appeal only considered the arguments
regarding 1.260. The Court held that the plaintiff improperly substituted
Desbrunes with the heirs pursuant to Rule 1.260(a) despite the fact the plaintiff
never moved for substitution under the Rule. The 4th held that only an estate
can be substituted in for a deceased party citing non-foreclosure cases
involving money judgments.
The 4th went further to
find any judgment where a probate was not opened would be a “nullity.” This
language causes the most concern as it would open completed cases to attack.
Due to the severity of this ruling a rehearing was filed.
The opinion failed to
account for Florida Probate law which governs the transfer of title upon a
title holder’s death. Under Florida Law when a property is homestead, the
property will pass entirely outside of the estate. See Buettner v. Fass,
21 So. 3d 14, (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). This transfer is codified within
Florida Statutes s. 732.401, 731.102, 732.103. Therefore, a deceased borrower’s
estate never holds title and would not be a necessary party to the foreclosure.
See Citibank, N.A. v. Villanueva, 174 So. 3d 612, 613 (Fla. 4th DCA
2015) (“The fee simple title holder is an indispensable party in an action to
foreclose a mortgage on property.”) (citations omitted)
The Firm, on behalf of
USFN, also filed an Amicus Curie brief, along with ALFN and Legal League. The
purpose of the Amici was to bring to the attention of the Court that if the
opinion is not revised, or reversed, it will significantly impact the mortgage
industry, and cause severe consequences this Court may not have anticipated or
intended.
Currently, the
rehearing is under review with the Court. Copyright © 2024 USFN USFNews - April 3 * Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient.
Tags:
#amicusbriefs
#Florida
foreclosures
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Posted By Kristi Payne,
Friday, March 8, 2024
Updated: Tuesday, March 19, 2024
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By Timothy Ziegler,
Esq.
Frenkel
Lambert Weiss Weisman & Gordon, LLP*
USFN Member (NY, FL, NJ)
Governor Phil Murphy signed into
law New Jersey Assembly Bill 5664, the “Community Wealth Preservation Program,”
on January 12, 2024. The bill, which became effective immediately, amends and
supplements N.J.S.A. 2A:50-64 and N.J.S.A. 22A:4-8 and affects most aspects of
sheriff’s sales. The main gist of the statute is that it provides specific
parties with certain advantages over other potential bidders. Foreclosed upon
defendants, next of kin of the foreclosed upon defendants, tenants, or
nonprofit community development corporations (hereinafter collectively referred
to as “Preferred Purchasers”) are
given a first and second right of refusal to purchase the property for an
“upset price.” Preferred Purchasers, plus any individuals who intend to occupy
the property, are also given advantages, including reduced deposit requirements
and extended time to complete the sale.
Foreclosing plaintiffs are now
required to provide an upset price, which is defined as “the minimum amount
that a foreclosed upon property shall be sold for in a sheriff’s sale as
determined by the foreclosing plaintiff.” The upset price must first be provided
at least four weeks prior to the scheduled sale date and then again on the day
of the sale. The upset price may change between the initial notice and the day
of sale, but it shall not increase by more than three percent absent certain
defined circumstances.
The upset price is now a key component of the
sheriff’s sale process, as the Preferred Purchasers, if certain requirements
are met, have the opportunity to purchase the subject property at the upset
price prior to the sheriff opening the bidding. If that right is exercised, the
Preferred Purchaser is only required to provide a 3.5 percent deposit and will
be given 90 business days to pay the balance of the upset price to the
sheriff.
If a
Preferred Purchaser does not exercise their right to purchase, the sheriff will
conduct an auction for the property. If the successful bidder at the auction is
an individual who intends to occupy the property for 84 months, they will also
enjoy the benefit of only having to pay a 3.5 percent deposit and will likewise
have 90 business days to pay the balance of their bid to the sheriff. If the
property is purchased in this matter, the bidder will be required to occupy the
property for at least 84 months.
For any bidder who is not a
Preferred Purchaser or does not intend to occupy the property for 84 months, they
will be required to pay a 20 percent deposit with the balance due pursuant to
the sheriff’s conditions of sale, which is generally 30 calendar days.
The upset
price and revised bidding rules are not the only changes to the sale process. The
law also adds new requirements and responsibilities for foreclosing plaintiffs
and their counsel. Foreclosing plaintiffs are now required to send the notice
of sale to the defendant as well as to the subject property, and the notice
must be mailed in an envelope which “plainly states on its exterior that the
envelope is a notice for the sale of the foreclosed upon residential property.”
The plaintiff is also required to disclose the occupancy of the property, and
if vacant, provide access to the property to the successful bidder.
These
sweeping changes leave many questions unanswered.
Who is responsible for the property
during the 90 business days that a purchaser has to complete the sale? Not only
will this extended timeframe increase foreclosure timelines, but tax, utility,
and insurance bills will continue to come due, and the property will continue
to need maintenance. If the foreclosing plaintiff continues to pay these
amounts, there is no mechanism in the statute for recoupment if the purchase is
completed. On the other hand, if the purchase is not completed, an election to
not pay the reoccurring costs would leave the plaintiff open to potential tax
sales, maintenance violations. and possible damage to a now uninsured property. These potential costs and risks are new
factors that must be considered by lenders.
Is the requirement to add
additional language to the outside of the envelope compatible with the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”)? The FDCPA not only prohibits
communication with unauthorized third parties, 15 U.S.C.§ 1692(c)(b), but also
prohibits using language on the outside of the envelope when communicating with
the consumer, 15 U.S.C.§ 1692f (8). If the laws do conflict, federal preemption
will require compliance with the FDCPA over that of the state law.
What happens to junior mortgages if
a Preferred Purchaser exercises their right to purchase at the upset price? The
law is silent as to junior liens and how they may be affected. If no sale was
held, it would follow that the junior mortgages would remain as valid liens on
the property. Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2140, the United States
requires a judicial sale in actions where it is named as a defendant. Therefore,
liens held by the United States, which include mortgages held by the Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development, would remain attached to the property. Thus,
junior mortgage holders will need to be vigilant in monitoring how senior
foreclosure matters are resolved as their liens may survive the action.
Inquiries have been made to members
of the New Jersey legislature and there has been indication that further
amendments may be forthcoming to address some of the aforementioned concerns.
However, no new legislation has been introduced as of the date of this article
and any clarification may first come through the courtroom. Copyright © USFN 2024 USFNews - March 20
* Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient.
Tags:
#Foreclosures
#NJ
#Sheriffsales
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Posted By USFN,
Wednesday, February 28, 2024
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Court holds foreclosure statute of
limitations had not expired and other claims were barred by res judicata
by HillaryR. McCormack, Esq.
Halliday,Watkins & Mann, P.C.*
USFN
Member (UT, AK, AL, CO, ID, MN, MS, MT, ND, NE, SD, WY)
Utah Code §
57-1-34 requires anyone seeking to foreclose an obligation secured by a deed of
trust by either commencing a judicial foreclosure action or initiating a
nonjudicial foreclosure by recording a notice of default, within the “period
prescribed by law.” The “period prescribed by law” is found in Utah Code § 70A-3-118(1),
which prescribes a six-year statute of limitations running from the due date or
dates stated in the note, or if a due date is accelerated, within six years
after an accelerated due date. However, in Lewis v. U.S. Bank Trust, N.A., as Trustee
for LSF9 Master Participation Trust, --- P.3d ---, 2024 WL 57521, 2024
UT App 3, the Utah Court of Appeals clarified that when notices of default are
canceled, the statute of limitations is effectively paused, thus preserving a
beneficiary’s right to foreclose at a later date. Prolific litigants should
also be wary of claim preclusion barring future suits when they could have and
should have brought those claims in a prior suit.
Brian
Lewis (“Lewis”) purchased property in Mona, Utah in August 2014. However, when
Lewis bought the property, it was already encumbered by a 2008 deed of trust in
favor of U.S. Bank Trust, N.A., as Trustee for LSF9 Master Participation Trust
(the “Trust”), which was in default. A notice of default had been recorded in
April 2010, but then canceled on May 1, 2014. That same day, a new notice of
default was recorded before eventually being canceled on April 30, 2020.
When
Lewis learned of a pending foreclosure sale to be held in September 2016, he
filed suit in state court against the foreclosing parties seeking to quiet
title and prevent any future foreclosure, arguing the statute of limitations to
foreclose had expired. The case was removed to the United States District Court
for the District of Utah. See Lewis v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., No.
2:16-cv-01252, 2018 WL 485967 (D. Utah Jan. 18, 2018). The federal district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the foreclosing parties, holding
that the statute of limitations began when the newest notice of default
recorded on May 1, 2014, and had not expired when a foreclosure sale was
scheduled in September 2016. Lewis appealed to the 10th Circuit Court of
Appeals, but his appeal was dismissed for lack of prosecution. See Lewis v.
Caliber Home Loans, Inc., No. 18-4020, 2018 WL 3996494, at *1 (10th Cir. May
3, 2018).
Continuing
a tortured litigation history, days after his appeal’s dismissal, Lewis filed a
new complaint in state court against the Trust, again seeking to quiet title in
his favor and enjoin the Trust from claiming any interest in the property. The Trust
removed the case to federal court, to which Lewis objected and amended his
complaint in state court. The state court determined it did not have
jurisdiction due to removal, but the federal court eventually remanded the case
to state court based on lack of diversity jurisdiction.
After
further maneuvering, including motions to dismiss, another amendment to the
complaint to include claims for quiet title based on laches and unjust enrichment,
an interlocutory appeal, and the Trust electing to pursue a judicial rather
than nonjudicial foreclosure which was then consolidated into the already pending
case, the Trust filed two separate motions for summary judgment and a Notice of
Errata to address a watermark inadvertently filed with one of the motions. The
Trust’s first motion argued that Lewis’ quiet title and unjust enrichment
claims were barred by res judicata. The second motion argued the Trust was
entitled to a foreclosure judgment and order of sale, and the statute of
limitations had not expired. Lewis, through counsel, only responded to the
quiet title motion, leaving the judicial foreclosure motion unopposed. Lewis’
counsel argued she had not realized there were two separate motions, but the
court rejected the contention and granted both the Trust’s motions. The court
entered judgment, and later declined to set it aside after Lewis filed a motion
under Rule 60(b)(1) of Utah’s Rules of Civil Procedure. Lewis appealed.
On appeal,
the Court of Appeals held the claim preclusion branch of res judicata barred
Lewis from recovery on his quiet title and unjust enrichment claims. Lewis’
quiet title claim involved the same property and was a continuation of his yearslong
efforts to avoid foreclosure. Although the legal theory behind his quiet title
claim in the most recent suit was new (laches), the underlying claim and those
in previous litigation arose from the same transaction. Similarly, his unjust
enrichment claim, premised on the idea that his maintenance and improvement of
the property benefited the Trust since he began improving the property in 2015,
could have been raised in his prior 2016 suit. So, because the quiet title and
unjust enrichment claims could have been raised in previous litigation, res
judicata barred them in the current suit.
Lewis also
argued on appeal that the district court incorrectly concluded the statute of
limitations to foreclose had not run. Lewis contended that the default occurred
when payments were missed in 2009, but foreclosure was not initiated until 2016,
when he learned of a scheduled trustee’s sale. However, the Court of Appeals
relied on its precedent in Deleeuw v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, 2018 UT
App 59, 424 P.3d 1075 holding that the “period prescribed by law” for
commencing a foreclosure as required by Utah Code section 57-1-34 was the
six-year statute of limitations found in Utah Code section 70A-3-118(1). This
six-year statute of limitations runs from the due date or dates stated in the
note, or if a due date is accelerated, from the accelerated due date. The Court
of Appeals also cited its precedent in Daniels v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust,
2021 UT App 105, ¶ 3, 500 P.3d 891 and Johnson v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC,
2020 UT App 127, ¶ 21, 475 P.3d 946 (Utah 2021) in holding that recording a
notice of default is an act of acceleration, causing the statute of limitations
to begin running. However, the Court of Appeals clarified that canceling a
notice of default halts the statute of limitations, whereas recording a new
notice re-accelerates the due date and thus restarts the limitations period.
The 2010 notice of default recorded against the property was canceled on May 1,
2014, and a new notice recorded that same day before that new notice was itself
canceled on April 30, 2020. Each cancellation halted the limitations period,
whereas each notice recording started the period anew. Therefore, the
limitations period had not run when the Trust filed its judicial foreclosure. Lewis
also argued on appeal that the Trust’s judicial foreclosure claim was a
compulsory counterclaim in his 2016 suit, which has yet to be addressed in
Utah. However, the Court of Appeals declined to consider the argument because
it was unpreserved, leaving the issue unsettled.
The Court
of Appeals also rejected Lewis’ contention that it was an abuse of discretion
for the lower court to have denied his Rule 60(b) motion because his counsel
failed to understand there were two pending summary judgment motions requiring
response. The Court of Appeals held that Lewis failed to establish the
requisite due diligence necessary for relief from the judgment due to mistake
or inadvertence under 60(b), because failing to read documents in full was
unreasonable and made him ineligible for relief. Therefore, the lower court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the 60(b) motion when there was no proper
basis for relief from the judgment.
Going
forward, mortgagees may feel more confident in foreclosures where there has
been no acceleration, and that they may effectively pause the statute of
limitations by canceling a notice of default. However, because the Court of
Appeals declined to address whether judicial foreclosure was a compulsory
counterclaim to earlier, borrower-initiated litigation, mortgagees and their
counsel will want to keep a close eye on whether a Utah appellate court revisits
and weighs in on this issue in a future case. Copyright © USFN 2024 USFNews - March 6
* Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient
Tags:
#statuteofLimitations
#UT #foreclosure
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Posted By USFN,
Friday, February 16, 2024
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McCalla Raymer Leibert Pierce, LLC (USFN Member – CT, FL, GA, IL, AL, CA, KY, MS, NV,
NJ, NY, OH, OR, PA, TX, WA) announced that it has expanded into Pennsylvania.
The firm is now offering residential and commercial foreclosure, litigation,
bankruptcy, eviction and REO services across the state. Additionally, Lisa Lee and Judi Romano have joined the firm. Lee will serve as the Chief Marketing Officer for
the firm and will continue her term as USFN President. Romano has joined as a partner
in the Pennsylvania foreclosure group. Both industry veterans will be based in the
firm’s new Philadelphia office and will be integral in the oversight of the
Pennsylvania practice. 
2024 USFN Winter Report
Tags:
#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Friday, February 16, 2024
|

Carlisle
Law (USFN Member – OH, IN, KY) has opened offices in Indiana and
Kentucky. Carlisle Law Principal Jerry Higgins
is in the Indiana office, and practices in both Indiana and Kentucky. The Firm
is also proud to announce it has added the following attorneys who work in the
Indiana and Kentucky offices: Marsha Dailey
(IN and KY); Derek Harvey (IN and KY); Terra Meek
(KY and the United States Bankruptcy Courts for ED and WD of KY and ND and SD
of IN) and Samantha
Nix (KY). 2024 USFN Winter Report
Tags:
#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Friday, February 16, 2024
|

Rosenberg
& Associates, LLC (USFN Member – DC, MD, VA) welcomed
Bernice Saka
as a new associate attorney. Saka holds a Bachelor of Arts in English
Literature and a Bachelor of Arts in Art History from Roanoke College (2019, cum
laude) and received her Juris Doctor from Mississippi College School of Law
(2023). She is a member of the Academic Honor Society, Phi Beta Kappa, and the
English Honor Society, Sigma Tau Delta. Saka is licensed to practice law in the
District of Columbia and works out of the firm’s Bethesda, Maryland office, practicing
real estate law with a focus on foreclosure.
2024 USFN Winter Report
Tags:
#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Thursday, February 15, 2024
|
By Alexander Craddock and NateBraun
NetDirector
USFN Associate Member
With the latest generation of phishing and social
engineering assisted by the newest AI technologies, information security is
more important than ever for small businesses. According to the Acronis
Cyberthreats Report, H2 2023, AI-enhanced phishing attacks affected
over 90% of organizations surveyed and resulted in a 222% increase in email
attacks in 2023 when compared to the same time period in 2022.
This risk is especially great for any business dealing in
PII (Personally Identifiable Information), financial data, or legal – for the
default servicing industry, this is the triple threat that makes security a
high priority across the organization. One of the best strategies to ensure
data security is data segregation.
The goal is to ensure that only the individuals who are
authorized to view certain data sets have access to them – and that while that
access is secure, it remains easy and convenient for the team members who need
the data to do their job.
It’s easiest to envision a complete data segregation
strategy by visualizing the way a layered, segmented security protocol works on
physical documents. The familiar layers of security are present for most hard
copies of documents in the physical world. An example:
·
a property gateway (potentially with a security
guard) exists, verifying access to the property. ·
the building entrance uses a badge reader or
biometric scan, and a secondary badge entrance would provide further segregated
access to a particular wing. ·
within the wing, even fewer key cards would
grant access to certain hallways or individual rooms. ·
a certain key is required to unlock a particular
cabinet full of sensitive files. In this example, there are up to six layers of security
present between the “outside world” and the sensitive information, each of
which limits access in steps. Could an outside unknown malicious actor get
access to a document in the file cabinet (without the use of “Hollywood
writers”)? The short answer is no. In this scenario, the only people who could
do harm are a very limited number of internal employees, restricted by the many
layers of access and significantly narrowing down potential threats.
What if one of those layers is compromised, like the lock on
the cabinet? Even with one or two less layers of security, the documents
themselves are still secure from outside access. Risk probability decreases
exponentially after each layer of security in place.
An equivalent layered segregation process is the best
approach to ensure a secure environment for digital data. For example:
·
A VPN gateway functions as the property access,
with as many as eight factors of verification in this “frontline” defense: a
username and password, with multifactor authentication (MFA) tokens matching
the PC/Device, IP Address/location, a one-time PIN from Authenticator, mobile
device registration for authenticating devices, and FaceID on the authenticated
device.
·
Firewall/security rules work as the building key
card: after VPN connection is established, the VPN client with an Endpoint
Security Profile can determine what access is allowed based on the user’s
account and group membership; denying or granting specific IP/port access.
·
Application authentication represents key card
access to specific rooms and hallways, and is separately managed in a similar
way to the VPN (factors include Internal WebUIs, File Shares, RDP, SSH, and a
different username/password requiring a new MFA)
·
Finally, the file cabinet lock is represented by
specific application access. After authentication in the previous steps, what
data is available to that authenticated user in the specific application? This
is the final step to ensuring the right data is readily available to users who
need it, and can also determine read/write permissions, modification
availability, etc.
Final questions to consider around data segregation include:
Q: How many layers does our company need?
A: One layer, even with MFA, is no longer enough. Companies
should have at minimum two layers each with their own multifactor
authentication before classified/protected information can be reached.
Q: Which technologies are most important to secure?
A: Endpoint security for physical devices (laptops, phones,
etc.) through which employees can access classified information is most
important. Authentication and file transfers for Unified Messaging technologies
(email, IM, phone, online conference, voicemail) is second most important. Web
based interfaces, applications, and connections would be third on the list.
These are the big three that absolutely need their own layers of
security, including MFA. Copyright © 2024 USFN USFNews - Feb. 21
Tags:
#Briefing
#Cybersecurity
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Posted By USFN,
Thursday, February 15, 2024
|
by Tina Crivello
Brock & Scott, PLLC *
USFN Member (CT, NC, RI, AL, FL, GA, KY, MA, MD, ME, MI, NH, NJ, OH,
PA, SC, TN, VA, VT)
USFN kicked off the new year with a Briefing on one of the
industry’s most timely and critical topics for today and the foreseeable future
– Cyberattacks & How to Respond. On January 23, a panel of industry leaders,
including attorneys, fintech leaders, and insurance experts, provided attendees
key insight into the state of cyberattacks and what we can do now to prevent
and prepare.
Cyberattack prevention as the first line of defense should
be at the forefront of everyone’s efforts. Ronny Loew, ProCirrus Technologies,
Inc., and Jan Duke, a360inc, shared the top elements of a prevention plan which
includes a three-prong approach of user education, using application controls,
and increasing awareness throughout an organization. Loew reminded attendees,
“Eighty-two percent of the issues that are occurring are due to the human
element.” Security training and simple, yet effective, controls such as
multifactor authentication can help prevent many attacks. Just as important is
email security, patching and updating of anything connected to the network or
internet, and cybersecurity services such as endpoint monitoring. Duke
suggested to ensure that phishing training campaigns in organizations are
relevant to users, “so it’s something that really will try to appeal” to
employees. She encourages organizations to have town hall meetings to discuss
the dangers and “make it real” to employees, so they hear it from the top of
how important this is.
Wendy Lee, of Sagent, covered highlights of communication plans
once an incident has unfortunately occurred. She stressed the importance of
pre-planning a crisis communication plan and how the onslaught of communication
will be handled. Most critical is understanding federal law, state breach
notification laws, contractual obligations, as well as executive buy-in and
control. Lee shared a story about a recent settlement related to failure to
disclose timely to victims of a cyberattack and stressed how critical it is to meet
the notification requirements. Federal requirements, such as the Securities and
Exchange Commission’s (SEC) four-day time limit, may not directly impact your
business, but it could impact a company you do business with if they are a
publicly traded company. Customers may require reporting in one day due to the
SEC’s requirement for reporting events “that could have a material
impact.” Evaluating materiality in a 24-hour window may be almost impossible, which
means potentially reporting an incident whether it’s known yet if there is a
material impact. Big companies today are making the required filing regardless
of potential material impact to ensure adherence to the law.
Key points to include in a crisis communication plan
include:
· Understanding who to notify – victims, state Attorneys
General, or other government entities ·
Knowing when to notify the above ·
Adhering to specific requirements about the
notice contents ·
Following any state specific form of requirement
– in writing, electronic, or by phone
Perhaps even before, or at minimum at the same time, as sending
any other notices, Harrison Tropp of SGP Advisors, recommended immediately
notifying your cyber insurance carrier or broker. Carriers have designated
claims hotlines through which you are assigned an adjuster who will begin
assembling the claim team. This may include the insurance adjuster and broker,
a legal expert, a data security firm, and law enforcement. They will help a
company figure out next steps. In cases of ransomware, this will almost always
include immediately paying the ransom so companies can regain access to systems
as expeditiously as possible. Tropp notes it’s critical to have draft
communication ready to go should an event happen. It is also important to have an
action plan in place and test it regularly. He also highlighted how the
underwriting process, “especially in the default space has gotten increasingly
more difficult.” During the underwriting process, insurance companies may run
certain tests on a company’s systems and if they don’t meet the requirements they
will refuse to underwrite.
Brian Nicholas, Esq., McCalla Raymer Leibert, Pierce, LLC, stressed
the importance of running a test of a company’s action plan and key questions
to ask. First response type questions may include, “How do you know if the
attack is real?” and “Who should you contact first?,” among others. Second to
answering those questions is knowing what your cyber insurance policy covers,
how it helps, and how to activate coverage. In today’s online world, Nicholas
recommends having a hard copy of your policy and response plan available to key
members of your organization. Finally, Nicholas posed the question of how we
reduce the risk of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) exposure. “The
biggest risk is loss of that confidential information.” Understanding how
companies keep or expunge that data, especially when considering, for many,
adhering to state bar guidelines.
Nate Braun, of NetDirector, provided pointers on risk
reduction with data segregation and segmentation. Network segmentation, which
is the grouping and isolation of information systems by function and
classification through use of controls, virtual environments, and disk
encryption, are just a few steps an organization can take to protect data. Braun
cleverly compared network security to being akin to physical security and showed
how the multiple check points needed to access a physical file in a cabinet are
analogous to the multifactor authentication steps needed when accessing data on
a network.
The briefing was concluded by moderator Elizabeth DeSilva,
Esq., and Brian Nicholas discussing what it really means to run a “table-top”
drill. Nicholas explained it is just like your disaster recovery drills, where
you run through the steps as if it had been a real event. It’s important to
throw a few “curveballs” into the drill as well. What happens if your CIO is on
vacation? If your email is down, do you have a secondary system or plan in
place to communicate with employees and clients?
USFN is committed to helping the industry combat
cybersecurity issues and will continue to bring members together to learn and
share experiences and expertise surrounding this critical topic. In the meantime, bookmark USFNevents.org and plan to join us for these upcoming virtual programs: - March 12: USFN Briefing: Show Me the Judicial Foreclosure
- May 7: USFNgage: Artificial Intelligence
Copyright © 2024 USFN USFNews - Feb. 21 * Denotes Member is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence Recipient
Tags:
#Briefing
#Cybersecurity
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Posted By USFN,
Friday, February 2, 2024
|
By Robert Wichowski, Esq.
Brock & Scott, PLLC *
USFN Member (CT, NC, RI, AL,
FL, GA, KY, ME, MD, MA, MI, NH, NJ, OH, PA, SC, TN, VT, VA)
The Maine Law Court has issued its long-awaited decision in
the case of JP Morgan Acquisition Corp. v. Camille J. Moulton (2024 ME 13).
This decision comes on the heels of Charles D. Finch v. U.S. Bank (see USFN article here) and it is one in which USFN, among other industry
participants, filed an amicus brief in support of the lender’s position.
This case involves the foreclosure of a residential mortgage
in which the trial court found that the foreclosing plaintiff’s demand letter did
not comply with 14 MRSA §6111 (Maine’s demand letter statute). In Maine, until
the decision of the Finch case, proceeding to foreclosure with a demand
letter that did not strictly comply with each and every requirement of 14 MRSA
§6111 would result in a judgment in favor of the borrower, which was deemed an
adjudication on the merits of the case. Such an adjudication, pursuant to the
prior cases of Pushard v. Bank of America, N.A., 2017 ME 230 and Fed.
Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Deschaine, 2017 ME 190, and on res judicata
principals, resulted in a “free house” for the borrower and an inability of the
mortgagee to collect any sums on the note or enforce the mortgage.
As previously written by USFN, the Finch case
represented a sea change in Maine foreclosure law, holding that res judicata
did not apply where a non-compliant notice was the basis for the adverse result
because, according to the language of the statute, a compliant notice is a
condition precedent to enforcement of the mortgage and acceleration of the
debt. After the decision in Finch, a judgment in favor of a borrower
based upon a defective notice is no longer an adjudication on the merits of the
case. Thus, res judicata does not operate
to preclude future claims.
Although the Finch decision was argued prior to this
case, the Maine Law Court, having both cases pending before it at the same
time, solicited amicus curie briefs on the questions of whether the Court
should reconsider its precedent that a failure to comply with 14 MRSA §6111
renders the note and mortgage unenforceable as well as whether the Deschaine
and Pushard cases should be overruled. In response, several amicus
curiae briefs were submitted, and partially on the basis of those briefs, both
decisions in Finch and Moulton were decided.
In this case, the notice of default was deemed non-compliant
with the statute because there was a sum of money being held in suspense as a
partial payment that was not accounted for on the demand, which resulted in the
amount to cure in the notice being listed as higher than it really was. The
trial court entered judgment in favor of the borrowers and further ordered that
Moulton “holds title to the real property at issue, unencumbered by the
mortgage and the promissory note.” The court also awarded her reasonable attorneys’
fees and costs. Although the Law Court did not take issue with, or disturb the
trial court’s ruling that the notice of default was not compliant with 14 MRSA
§6111 or the award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, the Law Court vacated the
portion of the judgment that declared that Moulton holds title to the real
property at issue free of the note and mortgage. In doing so, the Court held
that such a judgment does not preclude the lender from bringing a future
foreclosure claim based on a future default, nor does it discharge the entire
mortgage or effect a transfer of title.
Although this case, coupled with the Finch opinion,
represents a step away from the severe foreclosure climate in Maine for lenders
as well as the “court as a casino” effect that the Deschaine and Pushard
cases created, it will not end strict scrutiny on notices of default and could
even result in an increase in trial courts finding that notices are
defective.
Failure
to comply with § 6111 still may have drastic consequences. Not only does the lender
need to recommence a foreclosure, starting with a new demand letter and be
subject to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, the second
foreclosure case can only proceed as to future defaults. Unless the first
foreclosure case also contained a separate count for breach of contract (suit
on the note), which is often not an option due to bankruptcies and statutes of
limitation, a lender must waive the prior unaccelerated amounts past due.
The takeaways from Moulton
are that foreclosure complaints should include a separate count for amounts due
under the note, when possible, and that § 6111 remains a strict compliance
statute.
We do recommend consulting with local counsel to confirm the
validity of notices of default. Certain
cases should also be evaluated upon referral for a possible contract claim. Copyright © USFN 2024 USFNews - February 7 * Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient
Tags:
#AmicusBriefs
#FreeHouseTrend
#Maine
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Posted By Kristi Payne,
Tuesday, January 16, 2024
Updated: Monday, January 22, 2024
|
By Sonia J. Buck, Esq.
Brock &Scott, PLLC *
USFN Member (CT, NC, RI, AL, FL,
GA, KY, MA, MD, ME, MI, NH, NJ, OH, PA, SC, TN, VA, VT)
In
Finch v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 2024 ME 2; ____ A.3d ____, the Maine Law Court issued a 4-3 decision on January 11, 2024, overruling its prior “draconian” holding in Pushard v. Bank of Am., N.A. (2017
ME 230, 175 A.3d 103), which required a lender to discharge its mortgage following a foreclosure judgment in favor of the defendant mortgagor predicated
on a faulty 14 M.R.S. § 6111 notice of default. Id. at ¶6. Under Pushard, if a judgment was entered in favor of the mortgagor because the lender made an error in its notice of default, the mortgagor would be entitled to a “free house”
under res judicata principles. The mortgagee would thereafter be precluded from any subsequent foreclosure action and the mortgage would be unenforceable. The Law Court in Finch concluded, however, that a mortgagor is not automatically entitled
to a discharge of the mortgage when a lender fails to comply with a necessary element to the foreclosure, namely, a demand letter that strictly complies with 14 M.R.S. § 6111.
The
Law Court now properly recognizes the issuance of a conforming demand letter to
be a condition precedent to the foreclosure action. If the notice was
non-confirming, acceleration of the debt is a legal impossibility. In a
well-written and well-reasoned majority opinion, the Law Court now acknowledges
it was incorrect in Pushard insofar as it held that the mortgagee had
accelerated the note, “despite the plain statutory prohibition on acceleration
without compliance.” Finch at ¶2. Finch now makes it clear that “a
failure to meet a precondition to the commencement of a suit does not have
claim-preclusive effect.” Finch at ¶49.
As
background, in Pushard, the plaintiff initiated a foreclosure action
against the borrowers and lost. Pushard at 107; ¶4. As was the case in Finch,
the trial court in Pushard concluded that the bank failed to meet its
burden on critical elements of foreclosure. Id. The Court therefore
entered a foreclosure judgment in favor of the defendants. Id. One of
the elements the Bank failed to satisfy was the requirement of a notice of
default that strictly complies with statutory requirements under 14 M.R.S. §
6111. Id. Citing the borrower-friendly line of foreclosure precedent
since § 6111 was revamped in 2009, the Law Court in Pushard ruled that strict
compliance with § 6111 is required and that failing to comply results in a
judgment for the defendant. Such a judgment invokes res judicata principles and
precludes the mortgagee from later enforcing the note and the mortgage in a subsequent
foreclosure action. The Pushard Court further held that a discharge of
the mortgage is required, because the “note and mortgage are unenforceable and
[the borrowers] hold title to their property free and clear of the Bank’s
mortgage encumbrance.” Id. at 115–16; ¶36 (citing Federal National
Mortgage Association v. Deschaine, 170 A.3d 230, 236 (Me. 2017)). The
result was extremely harsh, in that even a small typographical error or other de
minimis mistake in the demand letter resulted in a free home for borrowers,
notwithstanding the borrowers’ (often long-standing) default on the loan and an
otherwise informative notice of default and right to cure.
After
winning in the foreclosure action, the Pushards, like Finch, subsequently initiated
an action against the bank seeking (among other things): “(1) a discharge of
the mortgage and (2) an order enjoining the Bank from enforcing the note and
mortgage and compelling the Bank to record a release of the mortgage.” Pushard
at 108; ¶5. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial
court found for Bank of America, correctly holding that the foreclosure
judgment does not preclude a subsequent foreclosure claim because the bank did
not accelerate the payments on the note. Pushard at 106; ¶1. The Law
Court, however, in what now is being declared an error, reversed the trial
court’s decision in Pushard and required that Bank of America discharge
the Pushards’ mortgage. Id.
For
over seven years, the Pushard rule has been the law in Maine, putting
lenders, servicers, and law firms in a position of extreme risk in the event of
any errors, even minor or inconsequential ones, in the demand letter, despite
substantial compliance and providing the borrowers with the necessary
information (in other words, complying with the spirit and intent of § 6111, as
amended in 2009). At long last, the Finch decision strikes a balance of
equities between the parties with respect to the effects of a prior judgment
against the mortgagee, while still requiring strict compliance with § 6111.
The
procedural posture in Finch was much like that of Pushard. In
2015, U.S. Bank’s foreclosure action against Chares D. Finch resulted in a
judgment in Finch’s favor, on the grounds that the bank’s demand letter failed
to strictly comply with § 6111. Finch at ¶3. Relying on res judicata and
“free and clear title” principles outlined in Pushard, Finch then filed
a complaint for a declaratory judgment in Superior Court in an attempt to force
U.S. Bank to discharge its mortgage, given the judgment in Finch’s favor. Id.
The Superior Court entered judgment in Finch’s favor, and U.S. Bank appealed. Id.
The
Law Court vacated the Superior Court’s declaratory judgment in favor of Finch and
remanded the case for an entry in favor of U.S. Bank. U.S. Bank’s mortgage
remains enforceable. Finch at ¶52. In overruling aspects of Pushard
through Finch, the Law Court relied on the clear language of § 6111: “the
mortgagee may not accelerate maturity of the unpaid balance of the obligation
or otherwise enforce the mortgage because of a default consisting of the
mortgagor's failure to make any required payment … until at least 35 days after
the date that written notice … is given by the mortgagee.” Finch at ¶2;
6 (citing 14 M.R.S. § 6111). Based on the precondition to acceleration set
forth in § 6111, for “claim preclusion purposes, the fact that the Bank could
not accelerate the note balance or enforce the mortgage means that the Bank’s
claim for the full amount due on the note and for foreclosure of the mortgage
was not and could not have been litigated.” Finch at ¶7. If no justiciable
litigation on the note or the mortgage is allowed due to failure of a condition
precedent set forth in § 6111, no claim preclusion can occur.
The
Finch Court noted that it erred with its premise in Pushard that
acceleration can be “triggered” by a foreclosure action being filed without the
lender having any right to do so under the statute: “Our premise that a lender’s
filing of a foreclosure action automatically accelerates the note cannot be
squared with the plain language of § 6111.” Finch at ¶25-27. The Finch
Court also noted that it erred in not distinguishing Pushard from Johnson v. Samson
Constr. Corp.,1997 ME 220, 704 A.2d 866, which is distinguishable in at
least two material ways. Finch at ¶26. In Johnson, the foreclosure was dismissed with prejudice as a sanction. Whether or not the lender ever had the right to accelerate the note
was not an issue in Johnson.
Id. Further, Johnson involved a business loan on a non-residence such that the non-acceleration language and condition precedent set forth in § 6111 did not apply. Id. Therefore, the lender in Johnson was not prohibited
from acceleration, such that the amount due was not only accelerated but the note and mortgage were also litigated. Id.
Despite
the heavy-handed dissenting opinion, lamenting
that principles of stare decisis are being eviscerated and that the Finch
decision is a “retreat from the principles of judicial restraint,” (Finch
at ¶90), the majority thoroughly reconciled its Finch decision with stare
decisis principles, including consistency, anomaly, workability, reliance, and policy. It noted for example, that Johnson is still good law in its holding that a dismissal with prejudice in one foreclosure action, as a sanction for misconduct,
barred a second foreclosure. Finch at ¶26. The Law Court further held that this decision was not a departure from current Maine jurisprudence, but a re-alignment to return Maine law back to consistency with prior rulings and with every other
jurisdiction in the country.
In addition, strict compliance with § 6111 is only one element required to be proven for a foreclosure
judgment to be issued to a mortgagee. There remain eight essential elements:
1.
The
existence of the mortgage, including the book and page number of the mortgage,
and an adequate description of the mortgaged premises, including the street
address, if any;
2.
Properly
presented proof of ownership of the mortgage note and the mortgage, including
all assignments and endorsements of the note and the mortgage;
3.
A
breach of condition in the mortgage;
4.
The
amount due on the mortgage note, including any reasonable attorney fees and
court costs;
5.
The
order of priority and any amounts that may be due to other parties in interest,
including any public utility easements;
6.
Evidence
of properly served notice of default and mortgagor's right to cure in
compliance with statutory requirements;
7.
Proof
of default of or completion of mediation; and
8.
If
the homeowner has not appeared in the proceeding, a statement, with a
supporting affidavit, of whether or not the defendant is in military service in
accordance with the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.
Chase Home
Finance, LLC v. Higgins, 2009 ME
136, ¶11, 985 A.2d 508, 510-511. If a mortgagee fails to
prove the foreclosure case due to failure of any of the other elements, where
the note was accelerated, there might still be a res judicata impact on any
subsequent foreclosure.
Much remains to be seen in this line of jurisprudence. Foremost, J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. v. Moulton
, Law Court Dkt. No. Oxf-21-412 (argued Nov. 1, 2022) remains pending before the Law Court. Like
Finch, the Moulton case also involves a demand letter that failed to comply with the strict requirements of § 6111 and resulted in judgment for the defendant, again holding that the note and mortgage were unenforceable. The
Finch case will undoubtedly be further discussed and analyzed in the highly anticipated Moulton decision. Even if Moulton retains the strict compliance component in interpreting § 6111, the Law Court should provide guidance
on what constitutes strict compliance. For example, what level of itemization of the amounts due will be required? Might § 6111 interpretation provide room for de minimis errors, where the notice of default substantially complies and addresses
the spirit of the statute? It also remains to be seen what impact Finch (and soon-to-be Moulton)
will have on the body of foreclosure case law in Maine going forward. What
is certain is that Finch represents a long overdue shift in Maine
foreclosure law and a course-correction by our Law Court and marks a victory
for lenders in what has historically been a borrower-friendly foreclosure
environment in Maine courts.
Copyright © USFN 2024
USFNews - January 24
* Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient
Tags:
#foreclosure
#freehouse
#Maine
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Posted By USFN,
Wednesday, January 3, 2024
|
By Kim Pogue Jenkins,
Esq.
Baer & Timberlake,P.C.*
USFN Member (OK)
USFN’s most recent Diversity,
Equity, and Inclusion Briefing Series on December 12, 2023, focused on The DEI
Outlook for 2024 and Forward: How to Navigate the Changing Climates. The
three panelists presenting were Greg Campbell, a partner at Aldridge Pite, LLP,
who spoke about the current state of DEI; Emily Bartekoske, a Senior Partner at
SouthLaw, P.C., who addressed lesser-known DEI categories; and Marisa Myers Cohen,
shareholder at McCabe, Weisberg & Conway, LLC, who presented DEI recruiting
tips and tricks. All in all, while there have been some recent setbacks to corporate
DEI initiatives, it is still a priority for employees and employers. Here’s a
brief recap of what our panelists shared during the Briefing.
Current State of DEI
Greg Campbell began by
acknowledging slowing DEI momentum over the past year, in contrast to the 2020 surge
of companies implementing DEI policies and departments. One reason for the 2020
wave was the death of George Floyd and the attention it brought to DEI. Another
reason was pandemic legislation, like the CARES Act, which made money available
to fund DEI programs. From July 2020 to July 2021, job postings with DEI in the
title jumped 92%.
However, since last July,
DEI job postings dropped by 38%. What could account for the shift? Financial
factors, such as the end of the CARES Act, recession, slower growth, and higher
interest rates. The bottom line remains a major consideration for businesses, along
with attracting the best talent, fostering innovation, and employee retention. Legal
pressure is another factor. The Supreme Court ruling in Students for Fair Admissions
v. Harvard held that the policies at Harvard and the University of North
Carolina violated the Equal Protection Clause by considering race in admissions.
While this ruling only affected universities, many businesses and law firms believed
that they might be targeted next, and they were correct. American Alliance of
Equal Rights sent threatening letters to seven top law firms demanding that they
halt their diversity fellowship programs, saying they exclude qualified white
and Asian students. Additionally, at least five state Attorneys General have
sent letters to the top 100 law firms in the country demanding a reevaluation
of DEI policies. Many companies have started ditching their DEI programs to
avoid potential legal trouble or are laying off their DEI-focused positions in
these challenging economic times.
Companies who rescind their
DEI programs may lose talent, as employees question if the company ever really
intended to be inclusive or if they just wanted to appear that way when it was
socially beneficial.
Campbell then switched gears
to address why some are hesitant to speak out about DEI issues. Reasons include
a fear of doing or saying the wrong thing or a fear of negative repercussions
from co-workers. He also addressed “reverse belonging,” when a person does not
feel like they can join a group or event if they are not in an underrepresented
category. He stressed that anyone who is an ally is welcome in USFN DEI events
and programs, and he urged those interested in DEI to continue to engage and
learn, read articles in USFN publications, and attend webinars like this one.
Lesser-known DEI Categories
Emily Bartekoske began
this presentation by acknowledging the widespread action on categories like sex,
sexual orientation, gender identity, race, ethnicity, or religion before noting
that DEI is also applicable to lesser-known categories. These can include cognitive
diversity, age, education, language, physical ability, class diversity,
invisible disabilities, geographical location, socioeconomic status, and family
status.
The first focus was on
age. We typically think about discrimination against older workers but we also
need to avoid making hurtful generalizations about younger generations. We
often look at this issue through a defensive lens, to avoid a lawsuit, but this
presentation encouraged us to instead use a lens of inclusion. We can and
should actively celebrate and encourage the unique skill sets that differing
age groups bring.
How can firms and
servicers implement this suggestion and create a welcoming and inclusive
environment for all employees? First, by updating company policies and by providing
anti-bias training that doesn’t promote stereotypes. They can also encourage
multigenerational collaboration on projects, and mentoring programs which go in
both directions: older workers mentoring younger workers, and vice versa.
Physical ability was also
addressed. Again, firms should look through the lens of inclusivity. Ask
employees if they are facing any challenges in this area at work. Consider that
many physical challenges are not visible. A person may have trouble lifting or standing.
They may suffer from chronic pain or an autoimmune disorder. Think about these challenges
when planning events. A golf outing as a reward is fun for some, but it can
also exclude some members from participating. Businesses can also offer nontraditional
accommodation, like extended breaks or flexible schedules.
Cognitive Diversity is defined
as the variety of ways in which people think, process information, problem-solve,
and make decisions. Neurodiversity includes ADHD, autism spectrum disorder, or dyslexia.
Fifteen to twenty percent of people are neurodivergent. Businesses want to make
employees feel welcome and included, and to maximize their learning and
productivity. To accomplish this, they must identify the learning styles of
employees and accommodate them in training and communication. They should also
review their hiring process to remove unnecessary steps that can cause stress
for many. Consider providing interview questions ahead of time to reduce anxiety
and allow for better preparation. Providing nontraditional accommodations like quiet
workspaces, headphones, or low-sensory areas where an overwhelmed person can go
to self-regulate, can greatly benefit neurodivergent employees. Finally, check in
regularly to make sure employees are not headed toward burnout. Acceptance of
diversity should be promoted from the top down to eliminate stigma.
DEI Recruiting Tips and
Tricks
Companies that maintain a
sustained commitment to DEI will reap the rewards and intangible benefits by
attracting high-quality job seekers. Businesses should collect employee data and
then compare the statistics to those demographics in your state or county to
know how they are doing on DEI.
Companies should make
sure that they are looking both at the current employees and those who will be
hired. Job descriptions should be free from targeting certain ages and free
from exclusionary language. Recognize bias in the hiring process and
advertising of jobs.
Ask yourself and your
team questions such as does this position really need a college degree or a lot
of work experience?
Make sure interviewers are
not asking improper questions about age, national origin, sexual orientation, or
family status. If possible, have a diverse team of interviewers, ideally including
other employees and not just management or top-level executives. Using an
interview script can help to eliminate both implicit and affinity bias.
Implicit bias is a negative attitude, of which one is not consciously aware, against
a specific social group. Affinity bias is the tendency to act favorably toward
people who have grown up in a similar manner as the interviewer. Avoid questions
like “Do you golf?” While this question might create a connection between the
interviewer and interviewee, it may also have the reverse effect due to
affinity bias.
In summary, businesses
should capture the appropriate data, look at it through the various lenses, and
remember that a commitment to DEI will help them both hire and retain talent,
and provide an inclusive and welcoming workspace.
Save the Date: NEW
USFNgage Series
The Four Pillars of
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion
Tuesday, Feb. 13, 1-2:30
pm CT
In these brand-new
virtual webinar programs, USFNgage sessions will be set up as a Zoom meeting
format where speakers will engage directly with participants face-to-face. Participants
should come prepared to enable their video, unmute themselves, and to engage
with our speakers and fellow participants through group conversations and
smaller breakout discussions. Registration for this event will open soon.
Copyright © USFN 2024 USFNews - January, 10, 2024
* Denotes firm is a 2023 Award of Excellence recipient
Tags:
#diversityandinclusion
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Posted By USFN,
Friday, December 1, 2023
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CaseMax (USFN Associate Member)
and Provana (USFN Associate Member)
announce a new partnership to provide an automated solution for bankruptcy
e-filing, designed
to minimize errors and accelerate submission times. This collaboration has
yielded a powerful workflow, reducing document errors typically associated with
the routine task of e-filing for bankruptcy proceedings.
Tags:
#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Friday, December 1, 2023
|

Scott & Corley, PA (USFN Member – SC) is
proud to announce that Reginald "Reggie" P. Corley, and Ronald “Ron” C. Scott, have been
recognized in the 2024 edition of BEST LAWYERS
in AMERICA® (Woodard-White Inc.) for the State of South
Carolina. This year marks Reggie Corley's seventh consecutive year as a
selection for Mortgage Banking Foreclosure Law, and for Ron Scott, it
marks his 15th
consecutive year from his inaugural selection in the category which was
initially created by BEST LAWYERS in 2010. 
Tags:
#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Friday, December 1, 2023
|

Wilson
& Associates, PLLC (USFN Member – AR, MS, TN) is proud of the
recognition and accomplishments received by several of its attorneys. Nakisha Miller
was recently promoted
to Associate Partner. Aaron Squyres received the Arkansas Bar
Association’s Presidential Award of Excellence in June. Jennifer Wilson-Harvey was named one of Arkansas’
Best Lawyers in AY Magazine in the category of real estate law and was also
recognized in the 2024 edition of Best Lawyers © for Mortgage Banking
Foreclosure Law. 
Additionally,
Wilson & Associates held its fourth annual CLE Program in September with
almost 50 attorneys in attendance. This is an innovative program designed to
provide firm attorneys as well as any other attorneys with their CLE hours,
while also benefiting the local legal community. Proceeds from registration
fees are donated to the Arkansas Bar Association.
Tags:
#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Thursday, November 30, 2023
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By William D. Meagher, Esq.
Trott Law, P.C.*
USFN Member (MI, MN)
The Michigan Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion
offering some finality to the evolving process for claiming surplus proceeds
from a tax sale. In its “for publication” opinion In re Petition of Muskegon
County Treasurer for Foreclosure, the Court upheld the statutory framework
that was enacted to effectuate constitutional compliance under the Michigan
General Property Tax Act (“GPTA”). This does not directly impact servicers in
the typical sense. However, it is significant in that it clearly sets a firm timeline
should it be necessary to try to recover losses from a property inadvertently
lost to tax sale.
It is important to understand what brought about the current
process. Prior to 2020, the GPTA did not provide a mechanism by which former property
owners could recover surplus proceeds after a property was foreclosed for
delinquent taxes and subsequently sold at auction to a third party, for an
amount exceeding the tax delinquency. Instead, the surplus, if any, was
retained by the Foreclosing Governmental Unit (“FGU”).
There were numerous challenges to the pre-2020 practice under
the GPTA provisions, largely focusing on it consisting of an unconstitutional
taking, among other things. The Michigan Supreme Court issued its opinion in
one such case, Rafaeli, LLC v. Oakland County on July 17, 2020. The Rafaeli
case confirmed the ability of the FGU to foreclose for delinquent taxes and
take title to the property. However, the opinion further held that there was no
right to retain surplus proceeds after selling the property to satisfy the
outstanding taxes, interest, penalties, and fees. The surplus proceeds were
required to go to the prior owner since to do otherwise constitutes a
government taking under the Michigan Constitution entitling plaintiffs to just
compensation.
After the decision in Rafaeli, the Michigan
Legislature amended the GPTA to include section 78t, codifying certain rights
as recognized by the Michigan Supreme Court in Rafaeli. In its most
simplistic terms, this amendment created a statutory process for former holders
of a legal interest in a property at the time of tax foreclosure to seek any
remaining proceeds from the sale of the property at auction after having
satisfied the delinquent property taxes. The statutory process imposes many
deadlines for certain filings, one of which is a bit odd in its timing.
Foreclosure for delinquent taxes occurs in March, with the
redemption on the tax foreclosure judgment generally expiring on March 31,
vesting title into the name of the FGU. The property is then auctioned for sale
in July, September, and November. It is this post-foreclosure auction sale that
may generate recoverable surplus proceeds. One unique and somewhat troubling
issue in the statutory scheme is the requirement for an interested owner to submit
a claim via Form 5743 by July 1 immediately following the effective date of the
tax foreclosure of the property. The process therefore requires an interested party
to file a claim before it is even known whether there will be surplus
proceeds from the property auction.
In re Petition of Muskegon County Treasurer, the
interested property owners owned properties that were foreclosed for taxes on
March 31, 2021. All properties subsequently sold at auction for significantly
more than the tax amounts owed. None of the owners filed claim forms by July 1,
2021. The FGU opposed the various motions due to the late claim filings. The
trial court ruled that the statutory timeline was clear and unambiguous and had
to be enforced as written.
On appeal, the interested prior owners made many, largely
constitutionally based arguments. The most significant of which, as it pertains
to the mortgage servicing industry from a practical perspective, was that the statutory
scheme was not the sole remedy and that the annual July 1 deadline for filing a
notice of intent was unenforceable.
The Court ruled that the language of Section 78t is
unambiguous and that it “is the exclusive mechanism for a claimant to claim and
receive any applicable remaining proceeds.” Further, the Court noted that, “although
the Takings Clause is self-executing, it must be read within the context of
statutory protections available to a property owner.” The Court determined that
the GPTA imposes a reasonable, minimal burden on former owners to advise the FGU
of their intent to exercise their right to claim any remaining proceeds. So
long as the statutory scheme adopted by the legislature comports with due
process, which it does, whether such a scheme makes sense or not, or whether a
“better” scheme could be devised, are policy questions for the Legislature, not
legal ones for the Judiciary.
While there may still be challenges on different aspects of
the statutory scheme in the future, one thing is now certain: If an interested party intends to pursue
possible surplus proceeds from a tax sale auction, it must file a claim Form
5743 prior to the July 1 deadline. Given this, it is recommended that clients
carefully review all tax notices. Portfolios should also be reviewed annually
to determine whether any properties were lost to tax sale. If any properties
are identified, it may be worthwhile to file the claim by the July 1 deadline
to preserve any interest in possible surplus proceeds from the future sale. Copyright © USFN 2023 USFNews - December 6, 2023 *Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient.
Tags:
#MI
#sale
#surplus
#tax
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Posted By USFN,
Thursday, November 30, 2023
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By Kim Pogue Jenkins, Esq.
Baer & Timberlake, P.C.*
USFN Member (OK)
The Oklahoma Legislature has amended its statute
regarding alien ownership of land. Effective November 1, 2023, no deed may be
recorded in Oklahoma unless it is accompanied by an affidavit from the grantee
attesting that the grantee is taking title in compliance with the state laws on
foreign ownership of land.
The Oklahoma Constitution and 60 Okla. Stat. §§121-123
have historically provided that a person who is not a citizen of the United
States or a bona fide resident of Oklahoma may not hold title to real property
in the state, and they must dispose of the property within five years of
acquiring title or the property will be forfeited to the State. Title 60 Okla.Stat.
§121 was recently amended to add the requirement that any deed recorded with
the county clerk must be accompanied by an affidavit that the grantee “is
obtaining the land in compliance with the requirements of this section and that
no funding source is being used in the sale or transfer in violation of this
section or any other state or federal law. A county clerk shall not accept and
record any deed without an affidavit as required by this section. The Attorney
General shall promulgate a separate affidavit form for individuals and for
business entities or trusts to comply with the requirements of this section, with
the exception of those deeds which the Attorney General deems necessary when
promulgating the affidavit form.” (Emphasis added.)
The Oklahoma Attorney General has provided the forms,
which may not be altered in any way. Those forms may be located at the attorney
general’s website at https://www.oag.ok.gob/public-forms.
Foreclosure attorneys will immediately be faced with a
dilemma when recording a deed to a government agency. The forms are for
individuals and business entities only, and cannot be revised to accommodate
HUD, VA, FNMA, FHLMC, or any other government or tribal entity.
Upon inquiry, the Attorney General’s office indicated
that they would be issuing an opinion exempting governmental and tribal
entities from the affidavit requirement. However, as of the date of this
article, the office has not yet published that opinion. Until they do so, no
deed may be recorded to these entities. Copyright © USFN 2023 USFNews - December 6, 2023 * Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient.
Tags:
#Foreclosures
#OK
#Title
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Posted By USFN,
Friday, November 10, 2023
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Earlier this Fall, USFN sent a letter to HUD regarding the Show
Me State Premium Homes case. We have since shared with VA and ALTA
We greatly
appreciated the opportunity to discuss USFN’s concerns related to the Show Me State Premium
Homes case. As
promised, this letter will serve to provide a brief description of the issue,
and some proposed resolutions that we ask HUD to consider.
Issue:
In July 2023, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 8th Circuit issued an order affirming a Missouri
federal court decision in Show Me State Premium Homes v. McDonnell, 2022
WL 970890 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2022) affirmed 74 F.4th 911 (8th Cir. 2023). Many
in our industry have taken that order to hold that a subordinate lien (other
than a federal tax lien) held by the United States must be foreclosed by
judicial action. Prior to Show Me, servicers, insurers, and foreclosure
counsel had relied on the holding in U.S. v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237
(1960), a U.S. Supreme Court decision that explained that nonjudicial
foreclosures eliminate junior federal liens using whatever state process is
available. The Show Me court did not discuss Brosnan, which seems
to leave room to argue that Brosnan is still the operative authority in
the nonjudicial foreclosure context. In the interest of brevity, we have not
included a full legal analysis of the opinion here but are happy to do so upon
request.
While we believe there are legal
arguments that can be made to counter the effects of this decision (and maybe
to overturn it altogether), the decision has begun to have practical, negative
consequences that lead us to ask that HUD take immediate action to provide
stability and clarity to all stakeholders.
Effects and Potential Effects of the Decision:
- In
some cases and jurisdictions (even beyond Missouri and the 8th Circuit),
title insurers and U.S. Attorneys are calling prior practices involving
the foreclosure and removal of government liens in nonjudicial states into
question, and are taking the position that if the United States has a
junior lien (e.g., HUD/USDA/VA second mortgage, HUD HECM second mortgages,
etc.), that 28 U.S.C. 2410(c) requires the senior lienholder to name the
United States as a defendant, foreclose by judicial action, and seek a
judicial foreclosure sale to eliminate the junior federal lien.
- Because
of the above interpretation and its fallout, some servicers and their
counsel are making the decision to foreclose properties with junior
federal liens by judicial process. In some instances, pending REO and
sheriff’s sales have been canceled in favor of the decision to restart
using a judicial process.
- The
switch from a non-judicial to a judicial process will inevitably result in
higher fees and costs, longer timelines (in some cases as much as a year
longer), potential curtailment losses, and higher HUD claim amounts in
states where the non-judicial process had been the norm. In at least one
affected state (Tennessee), a judicial foreclosure process does not even
exist, causing even greater uncertainty. The resultant higher costs and
longer timelines associated with the judicial process and redemption
periods will necessarily have negative effects on borrowers (in particular
those seeking to cure or payoff and facing higher fees and costs in the
process), servicers, and HUD, with little to no corresponding benefit to
HUD.
- There
is the possibility that the effects of the decision could expand to
include already completed and insured foreclosures. It remains to be seen
how title insurers will deal with any potential insurability issues, and
who will bear the cost of corrective action, if needed.
Proposed
Resolutions:
- The
most practical solution would be for HUD to consider this ruling an
opportunity to confirm and clarify by Mortgagee Letter that it is and has
been HUD’s policy to consider junior liens in their favor to have been
divested if the mortgaged property was properly foreclosed in accordance
with state and local law in the jurisdiction where the property is
located, whether by judicial or non-judicial process. This solution would
be the most cost effective for all involved and would provide certainty
for all stakeholders, including borrowers, servicers and their counsel,
title insurers, and past and future third-party buyers of foreclosed
properties.
- In
the alternative, HUD should develop a streamlined waiver process to reduce
the cost and risks of foreclosure-related losses. This approach is
supported by law, specifically 28 U.S.C. § 2410(e), which contemplates a
method by which a release of a government lien may be requested. Clear,
consistent, and centralized procedures for either requesting a release of
lien or granting permission to proceed nonjudicially where a junior lien
in favor HUD exists would resolve many of the issues and would provide a
relatively cost-effective solution for all interested parties.
As a corollary to the above, USFN
also proposes that HUD confirm to servicers that it will waive curtailments
related to restarts or protracted timelines that were caused by the uncertainty
and effect of this decision.
We greatly appreciate HUD’s
willingness to discuss this matter with USFN, and stand ready to provide any
additional information that you may need to fully consider the proposed
resolutions.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey
Weisserman
Pamela Donahoo
Chair, USFN Advocacy
Committee CEO, USFN
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Posted By USFN,
Wednesday, November 8, 2023
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By Aaron Squyres, Esq, Wilson & Associates, PLLC* USFN Member (AR, MS, TN) On August 28, 2023, the Tennessee Court of Appeals issued an opinion of first impression in Clarence Mitchell, et al. vs. Rushmore Loan Management Services, et al W2022-00621-COA-R3-CV, which significantly impacts borrower litigation against mortgage servicers in Tennessee. In summary, the court found that a borrower cannot prevail on a breach of contract claim against a mortgage servicer if there is no privity of contract between a borrower and a mortgage servicer. The facts surrounding the Mitchell foreclosure are commonplace. They fell behind on their mortgage indebtedness, received a Notice of Default and Right to Cure from their servicer, and were offered a series of loss mitigation requests, all of which were denied. When the servicer initiated foreclosure proceedings, the Mitchells filed suit against Select Portfolio Services (the prior servicer), Rushmore (the current servicer), U.S. Bank as the Trustee of the securitized trust that owned the Mitchell loan, and the law firm conducting the foreclosure. The law firm was subsequently dismissed as a party. Motions for Summary Judgment were filed by Select Portfolio Services (SPS), Rushmore, and U.S. Bank. The trial court granted summary judgment to U.S. Bank and initially denied summary judgment to SPS and Rushmore. SPS and Rushmore then renewed their Motions for Summary Judgment. The Mitchells did not contest the Rushmore Motion, and it was granted, leaving SPS as the remaining party. The trial court ultimately granted the SPS Motion for Summary Judgment. It declined to grant summary judgment on the first argument, i.e. SPS cannot be liable for breach of contract as SPS was not a party or a signatory to the Deed of Trust, and therefore was never in privity of contract with the Mitchells. The trial court did grant summary judgment on the second claim, i.e., the plaintiffs failed to produce evidence that SPS had breached any term of the contract. The Mitchells appealed. The Tennessee Court of Appeals acknowledged the Mitchells’ argument that no Tennessee state appellate court had addressed the question of whether a mortgage servicer can be held liable for breach of contract in the absence of privity, but it correctly noted that multiple courts in various jurisdictions had considered that precise question. It found that courts have consistently found that there is no contractual privity between a borrower and loan servicer, and therefore it ruled that the Mitchells cannot prevail against SPS on a breach of contract claim and affirmed the trial court. Copyright ©2023 USFN USFNews - Nov. 15, 2023 * Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient
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