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Member Moves + News: Schneiderman & Sherman, PC

Posted By USFN, Monday, May 13, 2024

 

Schneiderman & Sherman, PC (USFN Member – MI, MN) announced the opening of their newest office in Minnesota, located at 1602 Selby Ave., # 8, St. Paul, MN 55104. The Minnesota location supports their expanding regional market presence and marks the firm’s first law office outside of the State of Michigan.

 

Spring 2024 USFN Report

Tags:  #USFN #MemberNews 

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Member Moves + News: Halliday, Watkins & Mann, PC

Posted By USFN, Monday, May 13, 2024

 

Halliday, Watkins & Mann, P.C. (USFN Member – UT, AL, AK, CO, ID, MN, MS, MT, NE, ND, SD, WY) recently merged with Eric H. Lindquist, P.C., L.L.O., a prominent Nebraska-based law firm specializing in mortgage default cases. The strategic merger brings together two powerhouse firms with over 70 years of combined experience assisting mortgage default clients across 12 states.

 

Spring 2024 USFN Report

Tags:  #USFN #MemberNews 

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Member Moves + News: Gross Polowy

Posted By USFN, Monday, May 13, 2024

 

Gross Polowy LLC (USFN Member – NJ, NY) is pleased to announce the promotions of two of its Senior and Supervising Attorneys.

 

Douglas Weinert was promoted to Managing Attorney of Risk Management. Weinert began his tenure with Gross Polowy from the beginning in January 2012 and most recently served as a Senior Attorney. Within his scope as Managing Attorney, he will continue to oversee firm and client Risk Management, as well as the Attorneys in the First Legal, Motions and Title Curative departments.

 

Brian Goldberg was promoted to Managing Attorney of Trials & Loss Mitigation. Goldberg also joined Gross Polowy in January 2012 and most recently served as a Supervising Attorney. As Managing Attorney, he will continue to oversee Trials, Court Appearances, Settlement Conferences and Home Retention while also managing the attorneys in those departments.

 

  

 

Spring 2024 USFN Report

Tags:  #USFN #MemberNews 

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Member Moves + News: Wilson & Associates

Posted By USFN, Monday, May 13, 2024

 

Wilson & Associates, PLLC (USFN Member – AR, MS, TN) is excited to announce attorneys Courtney McGahhey and Nicole Murray were sworn into the Mississippi Bar recently.

 

McGahhey is a partner in the Foreclosure Department focusing on non-judicial foreclosures. She received her education from the University of Arkansas (B.A. 2005) and the University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law (J.D. 2008, High Honors). She was admitted to the Arkansas Bar in 2008, the Texas Bar in 2009, the Tennessee Bar in 2016, and the Mississippi Bar in 2024.

 

Murray is an associate partner in the Foreclosure Department. She earned her B.A. in Educational Studies at Warner University (2010, Magna Cum Laude), and earned her J.D. from the University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law (2017, Suma Cum Laude). She was admitted to the Arkansas Bar in 2017, the Mississippi Bar in 2024, and is a member of the American Bar Association and the Arkansas Bar Association.

 

   

 

 

Spring 2024 USFN Report

Tags:  #USFN #MemberNews 

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Best Practices for Notices of Dismissal Amid the “Two-Dismissal Rule” in Kansas

Posted By USFN, Wednesday, May 8, 2024


By Blair Gisi, Esq.
SouthLaw, PC *
USFN Member (IA, KS, MO, NE)

 

In Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc'y v. Campbell, 2021 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 330, the Kansas Court of Appeals issued a ruling that provides a bright line rule under K.S.A. §60-241. 

60-241. Dismissal of actions. (a) Voluntary dismissal.

(1) By the plaintiff. 

(A) Without a court order. Subject to subsection (e) of K.S.A. §60-223, K.S.A. §60-223a and K.S.A. §60-223b, the plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by filing:

(i) A notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment; or

(ii) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared. When the dismissal is by stipulation, the clerk of the court must enter an order of dismissal as a matter of course.

(B) Effect. Unless the notice or stipulation states otherwise, the dismissal is without prejudice. But if the plaintiff previously dismissed any federal- or state-court action based on or including the same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits.

That bright line or “two-dismissal” rule is: “[I]f a plaintiff has once dismissed an action, a dismissal by notice of a second action based on or including the same claim, amounts to an adjudication on the merits.  As such, the second dismissal effectively creates a res judicata bar to a third action.”  Campbell at 6.

In this case, the Appellate Court stated that the district court relied upon “judicial magic” in concluding the second foreclosure case, which was dismissed by a Court Order, was legally equivalent to a notice of dismissal. Given this false equivalency relied upon by the district court and given the procedural disposition of the case at dismissal which would prevent dismissal by notice, “the dismissal of that [second] action must have been by court order, obviating the application of the two-dismissal rule.”  Campbell at 11.

While it may be arguable that certain circumstances leading to the dismissal of a pending foreclosure action, e.g., reinstatement or a loan modification, may create a new cause of action with new or distinguishable grounds for foreclosure, the mere act of filing a second Notice of Dismissal on the same loan against the same borrowers may create grounds for those borrowers to argue that any subsequent foreclosure is precluded under the statute cited above.

To avoid the risk of protracted litigation associated with this issue, the best practice for dismissing subsequent foreclosure cases against the same loan and borrower(s) is to seek leave to dismiss via a Motion and Order to Dismiss, ultimately reviewed and approved by the presiding judge. Obtaining an Order of Dismissal significantly reduces the risk of a res judicata bar to foreclosing, as the Campbell case makes clear, “. . . the [dismissal by notice] rule comes into play only if the second dismissal is by notice.”  At 8 (emphasis in original). Seeking an Order of Dismissal may include additional filing and attorney fees; however, those fees will be significantly less than litigating this issue and potentially losing the right to foreclose.


Copyright © 2024 USFN
USFNews - May 15, 2024


* Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient

Tags:  #Foreclosures  #Kansas 

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4th DCA Reverses Prior Decision in Desbrunes

Posted By USFN, Wednesday, May 8, 2024

 

By Adam Diaz, Esq.

Diaz, Anselmo & Associates, PA *

USFN Member (FL, IL, IN, KY, OH, WI)

 

The 4th District Court of Appeals reversed its opinion in Desbrunes v. U.S. Bank, N.A., as Trustee, which held that a Personal Representative is a necessary party to a foreclosure on homestead property.  The new ruling correctly held that when a borrower passes away the property transfers to heirs without the need of a probate proceeding. 

The Court specifically found that since “[p]ersonal representatives have no jurisdiction over nor title to homestead . . . .” the property would not be an asset to the estate and subject to administration.  The Court noted in a footnote that it was unaware of the status of the property when it issued the initial decision, but after review of the Rehearing, and Amicus Briefing, this issue can be fully addressed.  The Court did not make a distinction regarding foreclosure proceedings being in rem or how the rules would apply to non-homestead property which leaves a potential grey area in the law.  However, the briefings do go into depth on how probate law would address non-homestead property.

The Court’s shift is significant for the Mortgage Industry, as it no longer requires a Lender in Florida to initiate a probate proceeding in order to obtain clear title when foreclosing.  The original ruling put an unnecessary burden on Lenders which would have caused significant delay in expense to the foreclosure process.

USFN participated in an Amicus Brief in March 2024 in the Desbrunes v. U.S. Bank, N.A., as Trustee petition to the 4th DCA. Kudos to Adam Diaz with Diaz and Associations for their outstanding work on this brief.  


Advocacy Advisory - May 8, 2024
USFNews - May 15, 2024

* Denotes firm as a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient

 

 

 

Tags:  #AmicusBriefs  #Florida  #foreclosures 

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FDCPA Violation Claim Survives Obduskey Argument

Posted By USFN, Wednesday, April 10, 2024

By Courtney McGahhey, Esq.

Wilson & Associates, PLLC *

USFN Member (AR, MS, TN)

 

Most attorneys practicing in non-judicial foreclosure states are well aware of the United States Supreme Court decision in Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus, LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029 (2019). In Obduskey¸ the Court held that a law firm that only sends communications to debtors to enforce a security instrument in non-judicial foreclosure proceedings is not a “debt collector” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), provided that the notices sent are antecedent steps required under state law to enforce a security instrument.  Id. at 1039.

 

Recently, the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas weighed in on the topic in Reppy v. Cenlar FSB, Inc., No. 5:23-cv-05227, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40574 (W.D. Ark. 2024). In this case, the court allowed the plaintiff’s FDCPA claims to survive a motion to dismiss filed by the foreclosing law firm, despite the foreclosing law firm’s arguments in reliance on Obduskey.

 

Plaintiffs John and Karen Reppy filed suit in November 2023 in state circuit court in Benton County, Arkansas, against Cenlar FSB Inc., Citimortgage, Inc. and Mickel Law Firm, P.A.  The claims against Mickel Law Firm (“Mickel”) were for alleged violations of the Arkansas Statutory Foreclosure Act, the Arkansas Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, and the FDCPA.  With regard to the FDCPA, plaintiffs alleged that the FDCPA notice mailed by Mickel violated the FDCPA. Plaintiffs argued that the mailed notice falsely identified the owner of the debt, falsely identified the successor creditor, falsely identified the deadline for plaintiffs to dispute the debt, and overshadowed the plaintiff’s right to dispute the debt. Plaintiffs also argued the FDCPA notice failed to provide an itemization date; amount of the debt on the itemization date; an itemization of the current amount of the debt reflecting interest, fees, payments, and credits since itemization; and the current amount of the debt.  Reppy v. Cenlar FSB, Inc., No. 04CV-2023-3100 (2023 Ark. Cir.).

 

The case was subsequently removed to federal court, and in December 2023, Mickel filed a motion to dismiss all claims against it.  Among the arguments made by Mickel included an argument that it was not a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA and therefore not liable to the plaintiffs. Mickel relied upon the ruling in Obduskey, arguing to the court that that it was engaged in no more than non-judicial foreclosure proceedings, and thus not a debt collector under the FDCPA.  However, Mickel also stated in its brief that it sends FDCPA notices “out of an abundance of caution, and because its clients request Mickel to do so, but it is not required to do so…”.

   

A couple of points are worth noting here. One is that the mailing of a FDCPA notice is not required by the Arkansas Statutory Foreclosure Act. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 18-30-101 to 117. Second, is that Mickel’s brief in support of its motion to dismiss did not include an argument that it should be afforded the safe harbor protections provided by 12 CFR Section 1006.34(d)(2). Collectors can receive a safe harbor for compliance with the validation information content and format requirements contained within the CFPB’s model validation notice found at 12 CFR § 1006 Appendix B.  No argument was made by Mickel that its FDCPA notice was substantially similar to the CFPB’s model notice.

 

The court in its Memorandum Opinion and Order made note that the ruling in Obduskey does not extend to a law firm who sends communications not required by the Arkansas non-judicial foreclosure law required to be sent to debtors.  The court pointed to Mickel’s own statement that it mailed the FDCPA letter “out of an abundance of caution.”  The court further found that several aspects of Mickel’s FDCPA letter demonstrated an “animating purpose” of inducing payment by the plaintiffs.  Under the animating purpose test, for a communication to be in connection with the collection of a debt, an animating purpose of the communication must be to induce payment by the debtor. Heinz v.  Carrington Mortgage Servs., LLC, 3 F 4th 1107, 1112 (2021).  The court referenced the fact that the letter explicitly stated “THIS IS A COMMUNICATION FROM A DEBT COLLECTOR. THIS IS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT AND ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED MAY BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE.”  The court went on to point out that the letter described ways the plaintiffs could make payments to Mickel in satisfaction of the debt, and that the letter offered the debtor certain check-the-box options, including one stating, “I enclosed this amount: $__________.”

 

Ultimately, the court found the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the animating purpose of the FDCPA letter was to induce payment of a debt.  Thus, the plaintiff’s FDCPA claim survived Mickel’s motion to dismiss.  This case is still pending before the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, and we recommend closely monitoring the case.

 

Copyright © 2024 USFN

USFNews - April 17, 2024

 

* Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient

 

Tags:  #FDCPA  #Obduskey 

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Appellate Court's Reversal Opinion has Significant Impact on Florida Foreclosure Process

Posted By USFN, Wednesday, March 27, 2024

Florida Appellate Court Finds Lenders Must Administer Probate Proceedings in Order to Obtain a Valid Foreclosure Judgment

 

By Adam Diaz, Esq.

Diaz Anselmo & Associates, PA*

USFN Member (FL, IL, IN, KY, OH, WI)

 

Florida’s 4th Appellate District reversed a foreclosure judgment for a lender with a groundbreaking decision creating new required steps to foreclose the interest of a deceased party. The Court’s decision in Desbrunes v. US Bank Nat’l Ass’n, as Tr. for Structured Asset Sec. Corp. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-AM1, 2024 WL 591432, at *1 (Fla. 4th DCA Feb. 14, 2024) represents a detrimental break in Florida jurisprudence that has governed foreclosure proceedings for decades.

 

The facts of Desbrunes are like many typical foreclosure proceedings involving a deceased party. US Bank National Association, as Trustee for Structured Asset Securities Corp. Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2006-AM1 (“Plaintiff”) filed a one count action for foreclosure naming Francois Desbrunes as a defendant. Desbrunes actively litigated the case, but ultimately passed away before the entry of the judgment, wherein his counsel filed a suggestion of death.

 

The plaintiff sought to Amend the Complaint. The purpose of the amendment was to drop Desbrunes as a party, add known and unknown heirs, as well as appoint a Guardian Ad Litem. This is the standard process in Florida.

 

However, Desbrunes’ counsel, who was no longer representing any party, filed a Motion to Abate pursuant Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.260(a), requesting the Court require the plaintiff to administer a probate in order to continue the action. The Trial Court denied the motion because Desbrunes’ counsel was not a party to the case, but did not rule on whether a probate is a required task to obtain a valid judgment.

 

The Trial Court granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and an heir, Ronald Desbrunes, appealed the ruling. The heir argued on appeal the denial of the Motion to Abate should have been granted. The 4th District Court of Appeal only considered the arguments regarding 1.260. The Court held that the plaintiff improperly substituted Desbrunes with the heirs pursuant to Rule 1.260(a) despite the fact the plaintiff never moved for substitution under the Rule. The 4th held that only an estate can be substituted in for a deceased party citing non-foreclosure cases involving money judgments.

 

The 4th went further to find any judgment where a probate was not opened would be a “nullity.” This language causes the most concern as it would open completed cases to attack. Due to the severity of this ruling a rehearing was filed.

 

The opinion failed to account for Florida Probate law which governs the transfer of title upon a title holder’s death. Under Florida Law when a property is homestead, the property will pass entirely outside of the estate. See Buettner v. Fass, 21 So. 3d 14, (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). This transfer is codified within Florida Statutes s. 732.401, 731.102, 732.103. Therefore, a deceased borrower’s estate never holds title and would not be a necessary party to the foreclosure. See Citibank, N.A. v. Villanueva, 174 So. 3d 612, 613 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (“The fee simple title holder is an indispensable party in an action to foreclose a mortgage on property.”) (citations omitted)

 

The Firm, on behalf of USFN, also filed an Amicus Curie brief, along with ALFN and Legal League. The purpose of the Amici was to bring to the attention of the Court that if the opinion is not revised, or reversed, it will significantly impact the mortgage industry, and cause severe consequences this Court may not have anticipated or intended.

 

Currently, the rehearing is under review with the Court.

 

Copyright © 2024 USFN

USFNews - April 3

 

* Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient.

 

 

 

Tags:  #amicusbriefs  #Florida  foreclosures 

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New Jersey Law Revamps Sheriff’s Sale Process

Posted By Kristi Payne, Friday, March 8, 2024
Updated: Tuesday, March 19, 2024

By Timothy Ziegler, Esq.

Frenkel Lambert Weiss Weisman & Gordon, LLP*

USFN Member (NY, FL, NJ)

 

Governor Phil Murphy signed into law New Jersey Assembly Bill 5664, the “Community Wealth Preservation Program,” on January 12, 2024. The bill, which became effective immediately, amends and supplements N.J.S.A. 2A:50-64 and N.J.S.A. 22A:4-8 and affects most aspects of sheriff’s sales. The main gist of the statute is that it provides specific parties with certain advantages over other potential bidders. Foreclosed upon defendants, next of kin of the foreclosed upon defendants, tenants, or nonprofit community development corporations (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Preferred Purchasers”) are given a first and second right of refusal to purchase the property for an “upset price.” Preferred Purchasers, plus any individuals who intend to occupy the property, are also given advantages, including reduced deposit requirements and extended time to complete the sale.      

Foreclosing plaintiffs are now required to provide an upset price, which is defined as “the minimum amount that a foreclosed upon property shall be sold for in a sheriff’s sale as determined by the foreclosing plaintiff.” The upset price must first be provided at least four weeks prior to the scheduled sale date and then again on the day of the sale. The upset price may change between the initial notice and the day of sale, but it shall not increase by more than three percent absent certain defined circumstances. 

             The upset price is now a key component of the sheriff’s sale process, as the Preferred Purchasers, if certain requirements are met, have the opportunity to purchase the subject property at the upset price prior to the sheriff opening the bidding. If that right is exercised, the Preferred Purchaser is only required to provide a 3.5 percent deposit and will be given 90 business days to pay the balance of the upset price to the sheriff. 

            If a Preferred Purchaser does not exercise their right to purchase, the sheriff will conduct an auction for the property. If the successful bidder at the auction is an individual who intends to occupy the property for 84 months, they will also enjoy the benefit of only having to pay a 3.5 percent deposit and will likewise have 90 business days to pay the balance of their bid to the sheriff. If the property is purchased in this matter, the bidder will be required to occupy the property for at least 84 months. 

For any bidder who is not a Preferred Purchaser or does not intend to occupy the property for 84 months, they will be required to pay a 20 percent deposit with the balance due pursuant to the sheriff’s conditions of sale, which is generally 30 calendar days.

            The upset price and revised bidding rules are not the only changes to the sale process. The law also adds new requirements and responsibilities for foreclosing plaintiffs and their counsel. Foreclosing plaintiffs are now required to send the notice of sale to the defendant as well as to the subject property, and the notice must be mailed in an envelope which “plainly states on its exterior that the envelope is a notice for the sale of the foreclosed upon residential property.” The plaintiff is also required to disclose the occupancy of the property, and if vacant, provide access to the property to the successful bidder.

            These sweeping changes leave many questions unanswered.   

Who is responsible for the property during the 90 business days that a purchaser has to complete the sale? Not only will this extended timeframe increase foreclosure timelines, but tax, utility, and insurance bills will continue to come due, and the property will continue to need maintenance. If the foreclosing plaintiff continues to pay these amounts, there is no mechanism in the statute for recoupment if the purchase is completed. On the other hand, if the purchase is not completed, an election to not pay the reoccurring costs would leave the plaintiff open to potential tax sales, maintenance violations. and possible damage to a now uninsured property.  These potential costs and risks are new factors that must be considered by lenders.      

Is the requirement to add additional language to the outside of the envelope compatible with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”)? The FDCPA not only prohibits communication with unauthorized third parties, 15 U.S.C.§ 1692(c)(b), but also prohibits using language on the outside of the envelope when communicating with the consumer, 15 U.S.C.§ 1692f (8). If the laws do conflict, federal preemption will require compliance with the FDCPA over that of the state law.

What happens to junior mortgages if a Preferred Purchaser exercises their right to purchase at the upset price? The law is silent as to junior liens and how they may be affected. If no sale was held, it would follow that the junior mortgages would remain as valid liens on the property. Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2140, the United States requires a judicial sale in actions where it is named as a defendant. Therefore, liens held by the United States, which include mortgages held by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, would remain attached to the property. Thus, junior mortgage holders will need to be vigilant in monitoring how senior foreclosure matters are resolved as their liens may survive the action.

Inquiries have been made to members of the New Jersey legislature and there has been indication that further amendments may be forthcoming to address some of the aforementioned concerns. However, no new legislation has been introduced as of the date of this article and any clarification may first come through the courtroom. 

 

Copyright © USFN 2024

USFNews - March 20

* Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient.

Tags:  #Foreclosures  #NJ  #Sheriffsales 

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After prolific litigation, Utah Court of Appeals affirms summary judgment in favor of beneficiary in Lewis

Posted By USFN, Wednesday, February 28, 2024

Court holds foreclosure statute of limitations had not expired and other claims were barred by res judicata


by HillaryR. McCormack, Esq.

Halliday,Watkins & Mann, P.C.*

USFN Member (UT, AK, AL, CO, ID, MN, MS, MT, ND, NE, SD, WY)

 

Utah Code § 57-1-34 requires anyone seeking to foreclose an obligation secured by a deed of trust by either commencing a judicial foreclosure action or initiating a nonjudicial foreclosure by recording a notice of default, within the “period prescribed by law.” The “period prescribed by law” is found in Utah Code § 70A-3-118(1), which prescribes a six-year statute of limitations running from the due date or dates stated in the note, or if a due date is accelerated, within six years after an accelerated due date. However, in Lewis v. U.S. Bank Trust, N.A., as Trustee for LSF9 Master Participation Trust, --- P.3d ---, 2024 WL 57521, 2024 UT App 3, the Utah Court of Appeals clarified that when notices of default are canceled, the statute of limitations is effectively paused, thus preserving a beneficiary’s right to foreclose at a later date. Prolific litigants should also be wary of claim preclusion barring future suits when they could have and should have brought those claims in a prior suit.

 

Brian Lewis (“Lewis”) purchased property in Mona, Utah in August 2014. However, when Lewis bought the property, it was already encumbered by a 2008 deed of trust in favor of U.S. Bank Trust, N.A., as Trustee for LSF9 Master Participation Trust (the “Trust”), which was in default. A notice of default had been recorded in April 2010, but then canceled on May 1, 2014. That same day, a new notice of default was recorded before eventually being canceled on April 30, 2020.

 

When Lewis learned of a pending foreclosure sale to be held in September 2016, he filed suit in state court against the foreclosing parties seeking to quiet title and prevent any future foreclosure, arguing the statute of limitations to foreclose had expired. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Utah. See Lewis v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-01252, 2018 WL 485967 (D. Utah Jan. 18, 2018). The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of the foreclosing parties, holding that the statute of limitations began when the newest notice of default recorded on May 1, 2014, and had not expired when a foreclosure sale was scheduled in September 2016. Lewis appealed to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, but his appeal was dismissed for lack of prosecution. See Lewis v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., No. 18-4020, 2018 WL 3996494, at *1 (10th Cir. May 3, 2018).

 

Continuing a tortured litigation history, days after his appeal’s dismissal, Lewis filed a new complaint in state court against the Trust, again seeking to quiet title in his favor and enjoin the Trust from claiming any interest in the property. The Trust removed the case to federal court, to which Lewis objected and amended his complaint in state court. The state court determined it did not have jurisdiction due to removal, but the federal court eventually remanded the case to state court based on lack of diversity jurisdiction.

 

After further maneuvering, including motions to dismiss, another amendment to the complaint to include claims for quiet title based on laches and unjust enrichment, an interlocutory appeal, and the Trust electing to pursue a judicial rather than nonjudicial foreclosure which was then consolidated into the already pending case, the Trust filed two separate motions for summary judgment and a Notice of Errata to address a watermark inadvertently filed with one of the motions. The Trust’s first motion argued that Lewis’ quiet title and unjust enrichment claims were barred by res judicata. The second motion argued the Trust was entitled to a foreclosure judgment and order of sale, and the statute of limitations had not expired. Lewis, through counsel, only responded to the quiet title motion, leaving the judicial foreclosure motion unopposed. Lewis’ counsel argued she had not realized there were two separate motions, but the court rejected the contention and granted both the Trust’s motions. The court entered judgment, and later declined to set it aside after Lewis filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(1) of Utah’s Rules of Civil Procedure. Lewis appealed.

 

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held the claim preclusion branch of res judicata barred Lewis from recovery on his quiet title and unjust enrichment claims. Lewis’ quiet title claim involved the same property and was a continuation of his yearslong efforts to avoid foreclosure. Although the legal theory behind his quiet title claim in the most recent suit was new (laches), the underlying claim and those in previous litigation arose from the same transaction. Similarly, his unjust enrichment claim, premised on the idea that his maintenance and improvement of the property benefited the Trust since he began improving the property in 2015, could have been raised in his prior 2016 suit. So, because the quiet title and unjust enrichment claims could have been raised in previous litigation, res judicata barred them in the current suit.

 

Lewis also argued on appeal that the district court incorrectly concluded the statute of limitations to foreclose had not run. Lewis contended that the default occurred when payments were missed in 2009, but foreclosure was not initiated until 2016, when he learned of a scheduled trustee’s sale. However, the Court of Appeals relied on its precedent in Deleeuw v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, 2018 UT App 59, 424 P.3d 1075 holding that the “period prescribed by law” for commencing a foreclosure as required by Utah Code section 57-1-34 was the six-year statute of limitations found in Utah Code section 70A-3-118(1). This six-year statute of limitations runs from the due date or dates stated in the note, or if a due date is accelerated, from the accelerated due date. The Court of Appeals also cited its precedent in Daniels v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust, 2021 UT App 105, ¶ 3, 500 P.3d 891 and Johnson v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, 2020 UT App 127, ¶ 21, 475 P.3d 946 (Utah 2021) in holding that recording a notice of default is an act of acceleration, causing the statute of limitations to begin running. However, the Court of Appeals clarified that canceling a notice of default halts the statute of limitations, whereas recording a new notice re-accelerates the due date and thus restarts the limitations period. The 2010 notice of default recorded against the property was canceled on May 1, 2014, and a new notice recorded that same day before that new notice was itself canceled on April 30, 2020. Each cancellation halted the limitations period, whereas each notice recording started the period anew. Therefore, the limitations period had not run when the Trust filed its judicial foreclosure. Lewis also argued on appeal that the Trust’s judicial foreclosure claim was a compulsory counterclaim in his 2016 suit, which has yet to be addressed in Utah. However, the Court of Appeals declined to consider the argument because it was unpreserved, leaving the issue unsettled.

 

The Court of Appeals also rejected Lewis’ contention that it was an abuse of discretion for the lower court to have denied his Rule 60(b) motion because his counsel failed to understand there were two pending summary judgment motions requiring response. The Court of Appeals held that Lewis failed to establish the requisite due diligence necessary for relief from the judgment due to mistake or inadvertence under 60(b), because failing to read documents in full was unreasonable and made him ineligible for relief. Therefore, the lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 60(b) motion when there was no proper basis for relief from the judgment.

 

Going forward, mortgagees may feel more confident in foreclosures where there has been no acceleration, and that they may effectively pause the statute of limitations by canceling a notice of default. However, because the Court of Appeals declined to address whether judicial foreclosure was a compulsory counterclaim to earlier, borrower-initiated litigation, mortgagees and their counsel will want to keep a close eye on whether a Utah appellate court revisits and weighs in on this issue in a future case.

 

Copyright © USFN 2024

USFNews - March 6

* Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient

Tags:  #statuteofLimitations  #UT #foreclosure 

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Member Moves + News: McCalla Raymer Leibert Pierce, LLC

Posted By USFN, Friday, February 16, 2024

 

McCalla Raymer Leibert Pierce, LLC (USFN Member – CT, FL, GA, IL, AL, CA, KY, MS, NV, NJ, NY, OH, OR, PA, TX, WA) announced that it has expanded into Pennsylvania. The firm is now offering residential and commercial foreclosure, litigation, bankruptcy, eviction and REO services across the state. Additionally, Lisa Lee and Judi Romano have joined the firm. Lee will serve as the Chief Marketing Officer for the firm and will continue her term as USFN President. Romano has joined as a partner in the Pennsylvania foreclosure group. Both industry veterans will be based in the firm’s new Philadelphia office and will be integral in the oversight of the Pennsylvania practice.

 

  

 

 

2024 USFN Winter Report

Tags:  #USFN #MemberNews 

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Member Moves + News: Carlisle Law

Posted By USFN, Friday, February 16, 2024

 

 

Carlisle Law (USFN Member – OH, IN, KY) has opened offices in Indiana and Kentucky. Carlisle Law Principal Jerry Higgins is in the Indiana office, and practices in both Indiana and Kentucky. The Firm is also proud to announce it has added the following attorneys who work in the Indiana and Kentucky offices: Marsha Dailey (IN and KY); Derek Harvey (IN and KY); Terra Meek (KY and the United States Bankruptcy Courts for ED and WD of KY and ND and SD of IN) and Samantha Nix (KY).   

 

 

2024 USFN Winter Report

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Member Moves + News: Rosenberg & Associates

Posted By USFN, Friday, February 16, 2024

 

Rosenberg & Associates, LLC (USFN Member – DC, MD, VA) welcomed Bernice Saka as a new associate attorney. Saka holds a Bachelor of Arts in English Literature and a Bachelor of Arts in Art History from Roanoke College (2019, cum laude) and received her Juris Doctor from Mississippi College School of Law (2023). She is a member of the Academic Honor Society, Phi Beta Kappa, and the English Honor Society, Sigma Tau Delta. Saka is licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia and works out of the firm’s Bethesda, Maryland office, practicing real estate law with a focus on foreclosure.

 

 

2024 USFN Winter Report

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Mitigating Risk by Segmenting and Separating Data – Network Security Architecture Explained

Posted By USFN, Thursday, February 15, 2024

By Alexander Craddock and NateBraun

NetDirector

USFN Associate Member

 

With the latest generation of phishing and social engineering assisted by the newest AI technologies, information security is more important than ever for small businesses. According to the Acronis Cyberthreats Report, H2 2023, AI-enhanced phishing attacks affected over 90% of organizations surveyed and resulted in a 222% increase in email attacks in 2023 when compared to the same time period in 2022.

 

This risk is especially great for any business dealing in PII (Personally Identifiable Information), financial data, or legal – for the default servicing industry, this is the triple threat that makes security a high priority across the organization. One of the best strategies to ensure data security is data segregation.

 

The goal is to ensure that only the individuals who are authorized to view certain data sets have access to them – and that while that access is secure, it remains easy and convenient for the team members who need the data to do their job.

 

It’s easiest to envision a complete data segregation strategy by visualizing the way a layered, segmented security protocol works on physical documents. The familiar layers of security are present for most hard copies of documents in the physical world. An example:

 

·         a property gateway (potentially with a security guard) exists, verifying access to the property.

·         the building entrance uses a badge reader or biometric scan, and a secondary badge entrance would provide further segregated access to a particular wing.

·         within the wing, even fewer key cards would grant access to certain hallways or individual rooms.

·         a certain key is required to unlock a particular cabinet full of sensitive files.

 

In this example, there are up to six layers of security present between the “outside world” and the sensitive information, each of which limits access in steps. Could an outside unknown malicious actor get access to a document in the file cabinet (without the use of “Hollywood writers”)? The short answer is no. In this scenario, the only people who could do harm are a very limited number of internal employees, restricted by the many layers of access and significantly narrowing down potential threats.

 

What if one of those layers is compromised, like the lock on the cabinet? Even with one or two less layers of security, the documents themselves are still secure from outside access. Risk probability decreases exponentially after each layer of security in place.

 

An equivalent layered segregation process is the best approach to ensure a secure environment for digital data. For example:

 

·         A VPN gateway functions as the property access, with as many as eight factors of verification in this “frontline” defense: a username and password, with multifactor authentication (MFA) tokens matching the PC/Device, IP Address/location, a one-time PIN from Authenticator, mobile device registration for authenticating devices, and FaceID on the authenticated device.

·         Firewall/security rules work as the building key card: after VPN connection is established, the VPN client with an Endpoint Security Profile can determine what access is allowed based on the user’s account and group membership; denying or granting specific IP/port access.

·         Application authentication represents key card access to specific rooms and hallways, and is separately managed in a similar way to the VPN (factors include Internal WebUIs, File Shares, RDP, SSH, and a different username/password requiring a new MFA)

·         Finally, the file cabinet lock is represented by specific application access. After authentication in the previous steps, what data is available to that authenticated user in the specific application? This is the final step to ensuring the right data is readily available to users who need it, and can also determine read/write permissions, modification availability, etc.

 

Final questions to consider around data segregation include:

Q: How many layers does our company need?

A: One layer, even with MFA, is no longer enough. Companies should have at minimum two layers each with their own multifactor authentication before classified/protected information can be reached.

Q: Which technologies are most important to secure?

A: Endpoint security for physical devices (laptops, phones, etc.) through which employees can access classified information is most important. Authentication and file transfers for Unified Messaging technologies (email, IM, phone, online conference, voicemail) is second most important. Web based interfaces, applications, and connections would be third on the list. These are the big three that absolutely need their own layers of security, including MFA.

 

Copyright © 2024 USFN

USFNews - Feb. 21

Tags:  #Briefing  #Cybersecurity 

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Key Takeaways and Practical Tips from USFN’s Recent Briefing: Cyberattacks & How to Respond

Posted By USFN, Thursday, February 15, 2024

by Tina Crivello

Brock & Scott, PLLC *

USFN Member (CT, NC, RI, AL, FL, GA, KY, MA, MD, ME, MI, NH, NJ, OH, PA, SC, TN, VA, VT)

 

USFN kicked off the new year with a Briefing on one of the industry’s most timely and critical topics for today and the foreseeable future – Cyberattacks & How to Respond. On January 23, a panel of industry leaders, including attorneys, fintech leaders, and insurance experts, provided attendees key insight into the state of cyberattacks and what we can do now to prevent and prepare.

 

Cyberattack prevention as the first line of defense should be at the forefront of everyone’s efforts. Ronny Loew, ProCirrus Technologies, Inc., and Jan Duke, a360inc, shared the top elements of a prevention plan which includes a three-prong approach of user education, using application controls, and increasing awareness throughout an organization. Loew reminded attendees, “Eighty-two percent of the issues that are occurring are due to the human element.” Security training and simple, yet effective, controls such as multifactor authentication can help prevent many attacks. Just as important is email security, patching and updating of anything connected to the network or internet, and cybersecurity services such as endpoint monitoring. Duke suggested to ensure that phishing training campaigns in organizations are relevant to users, “so it’s something that really will try to appeal” to employees. She encourages organizations to have town hall meetings to discuss the dangers and “make it real” to employees, so they hear it from the top of how important this is.

 

Wendy Lee, of Sagent, covered highlights of communication plans once an incident has unfortunately occurred. She stressed the importance of pre-planning a crisis communication plan and how the onslaught of communication will be handled. Most critical is understanding federal law, state breach notification laws, contractual obligations, as well as executive buy-in and control. Lee shared a story about a recent settlement related to failure to disclose timely to victims of a cyberattack and stressed how critical it is to meet the notification requirements. Federal requirements, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) four-day time limit, may not directly impact your business, but it could impact a company you do business with if they are a publicly traded company. Customers may require reporting in one day due to the SEC’s requirement for reporting events “that could have a material impact.” Evaluating materiality in a 24-hour window may be almost impossible, which means potentially reporting an incident whether it’s known yet if there is a material impact. Big companies today are making the required filing regardless of potential material impact to ensure adherence to the law.

 

Key points to include in a crisis communication plan include:

·         Understanding who to notify – victims, state Attorneys General, or other government entities

·         Knowing when to notify the above

·         Adhering to specific requirements about the notice contents

·         Following any state specific form of requirement – in writing, electronic, or by phone

 

Perhaps even before, or at minimum at the same time, as sending any other notices, Harrison Tropp of SGP Advisors, recommended immediately notifying your cyber insurance carrier or broker. Carriers have designated claims hotlines through which you are assigned an adjuster who will begin assembling the claim team. This may include the insurance adjuster and broker, a legal expert, a data security firm, and law enforcement. They will help a company figure out next steps. In cases of ransomware, this will almost always include immediately paying the ransom so companies can regain access to systems as expeditiously as possible. Tropp notes it’s critical to have draft communication ready to go should an event happen. It is also important to have an action plan in place and test it regularly. He also highlighted how the underwriting process, “especially in the default space has gotten increasingly more difficult.” During the underwriting process, insurance companies may run certain tests on a company’s systems and if they don’t meet the requirements they will refuse to underwrite.

 

Brian Nicholas, Esq., McCalla Raymer Leibert, Pierce, LLC, stressed the importance of running a test of a company’s action plan and key questions to ask. First response type questions may include, “How do you know if the attack is real?” and “Who should you contact first?,” among others. Second to answering those questions is knowing what your cyber insurance policy covers, how it helps, and how to activate coverage. In today’s online world, Nicholas recommends having a hard copy of your policy and response plan available to key members of your organization. Finally, Nicholas posed the question of how we reduce the risk of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) exposure. “The biggest risk is loss of that confidential information.” Understanding how companies keep or expunge that data, especially when considering, for many, adhering to state bar guidelines.

 

Nate Braun, of NetDirector, provided pointers on risk reduction with data segregation and segmentation. Network segmentation, which is the grouping and isolation of information systems by function and classification through use of controls, virtual environments, and disk encryption, are just a few steps an organization can take to protect data. Braun cleverly compared network security to being akin to physical security and showed how the multiple check points needed to access a physical file in a cabinet are analogous to the multifactor authentication steps needed when accessing data on a network.

 

The briefing was concluded by moderator Elizabeth DeSilva, Esq., and Brian Nicholas discussing what it really means to run a “table-top” drill. Nicholas explained it is just like your disaster recovery drills, where you run through the steps as if it had been a real event. It’s important to throw a few “curveballs” into the drill as well. What happens if your CIO is on vacation? If your email is down, do you have a secondary system or plan in place to communicate with employees and clients?

 

USFN is committed to helping the industry combat cybersecurity issues and will continue to bring members together to learn and share experiences and expertise surrounding this critical topic.

 

In the meantime, bookmark USFNevents.org and plan to join us for these upcoming virtual programs: 

  • March 12: USFN Briefing: Show Me the Judicial Foreclosure
  • May 7: USFNgage: Artificial Intelligence

 

Copyright © 2024 USFN

USFNews - Feb. 21

 

* Denotes Member is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence Recipient

Tags:  #Briefing  #Cybersecurity 

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Following Finch Decision, Maine Law Court Follows Suit and Vacates "Free House" Precedent in Moulton

Posted By USFN, Friday, February 2, 2024

By Robert Wichowski, Esq.

Brock & Scott, PLLC *

USFN Member (CT, NC, RI, AL, FL, GA, KY, ME, MD, MA, MI, NH, NJ, OH, PA, SC, TN, VT, VA)

 

The Maine Law Court has issued its long-awaited decision in the case of JP Morgan Acquisition Corp. v. Camille J. Moulton (2024 ME 13). This decision comes on the heels of Charles D. Finch v. U.S. Bank (see USFN article here) and it is one in which USFN, among other industry participants, filed an amicus brief in support of the lender’s position.

 

This case involves the foreclosure of a residential mortgage in which the trial court found that the foreclosing plaintiff’s demand letter did not comply with 14 MRSA §6111 (Maine’s demand letter statute). In Maine, until the decision of the Finch case, proceeding to foreclosure with a demand letter that did not strictly comply with each and every requirement of 14 MRSA §6111 would result in a judgment in favor of the borrower, which was deemed an adjudication on the merits of the case. Such an adjudication, pursuant to the prior cases of Pushard v. Bank of America, N.A., 2017 ME 230 and Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Deschaine, 2017 ME 190, and on res judicata principals, resulted in a “free house” for the borrower and an inability of the mortgagee to collect any sums on the note or enforce the mortgage.

 

As previously written by USFN, the Finch case represented a sea change in Maine foreclosure law, holding that res judicata did not apply where a non-compliant notice was the basis for the adverse result because, according to the language of the statute, a compliant notice is a condition precedent to enforcement of the mortgage and acceleration of the debt. After the decision in Finch, a judgment in favor of a borrower based upon a defective notice is no longer an adjudication on the merits of the case.  Thus, res judicata does not operate to preclude future claims.

 

Although the Finch decision was argued prior to this case, the Maine Law Court, having both cases pending before it at the same time, solicited amicus curie briefs on the questions of whether the Court should reconsider its precedent that a failure to comply with 14 MRSA §6111 renders the note and mortgage unenforceable as well as whether the Deschaine and Pushard cases should be overruled. In response, several amicus curiae briefs were submitted, and partially on the basis of those briefs, both decisions in Finch and Moulton were decided.

 

In this case, the notice of default was deemed non-compliant with the statute because there was a sum of money being held in suspense as a partial payment that was not accounted for on the demand, which resulted in the amount to cure in the notice being listed as higher than it really was. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the borrowers and further ordered that Moulton “holds title to the real property at issue, unencumbered by the mortgage and the promissory note.” The court also awarded her reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Although the Law Court did not take issue with, or disturb the trial court’s ruling that the notice of default was not compliant with 14 MRSA §6111 or the award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, the Law Court vacated the portion of the judgment that declared that Moulton holds title to the real property at issue free of the note and mortgage. In doing so, the Court held that such a judgment does not preclude the lender from bringing a future foreclosure claim based on a future default, nor does it discharge the entire mortgage or effect a transfer of title.

 

Although this case, coupled with the Finch opinion, represents a step away from the severe foreclosure climate in Maine for lenders as well as the “court as a casino” effect that the Deschaine and Pushard cases created, it will not end strict scrutiny on notices of default and could even result in an increase in trial courts finding that notices are defective.

 

Failure to comply with § 6111 still may have drastic consequences. Not only does the lender need to recommence a foreclosure, starting with a new demand letter and be subject to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, the second foreclosure case can only proceed as to future defaults. Unless the first foreclosure case also contained a separate count for breach of contract (suit on the note), which is often not an option due to bankruptcies and statutes of limitation, a lender must waive the prior unaccelerated amounts past due.

 

The takeaways from Moulton are that foreclosure complaints should include a separate count for amounts due under the note, when possible, and that § 6111 remains a strict compliance statute.

 

We do recommend consulting with local counsel to confirm the validity of notices of default.  Certain cases should also be evaluated upon referral for a possible contract claim.

 

Copyright © USFN 2024

USFNews - February 7

 

* Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient

Tags:  #AmicusBriefs  #FreeHouseTrend  #Maine 

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Maine Law Court Reverses Course Regarding Res Judicata Effect of Prior Foreclosure Judgments in Favor of Defendant Mortgagors

Posted By Kristi Payne, Tuesday, January 16, 2024
Updated: Monday, January 22, 2024

By Sonia J. Buck, Esq.

Brock &Scott, PLLC *

USFN Member (CT, NC, RI, AL, FL, GA, KY, MA, MD, ME, MI, NH, NJ, OH, PA, SC, TN, VA, VT)

 

In Finch v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 2024 ME 2; ____ A.3d ____, the Maine Law Court issued a 4-3 decision on January 11, 2024, overruling its prior “draconian” holding in Pushard v. Bank of Am., N.A. (2017 ME 230, 175 A.3d 103), which required a lender to discharge its mortgage following a foreclosure judgment in favor of the defendant mortgagor predicated on a faulty 14 M.R.S. § 6111 notice of default. Id. at ¶6. Under Pushard, if a judgment was entered in favor of the mortgagor because the lender made an error in its notice of default, the mortgagor would be entitled to a “free house” under res judicata principles. The mortgagee would thereafter be precluded from any subsequent foreclosure action and the mortgage would be unenforceable. The Law Court in Finch concluded, however, that a mortgagor is not automatically entitled to a discharge of the mortgage when a lender fails to comply with a necessary element to the foreclosure, namely, a demand letter that strictly complies with 14 M.R.S. § 6111.

The Law Court now properly recognizes the issuance of a conforming demand letter to be a condition precedent to the foreclosure action. If the notice was non-confirming, acceleration of the debt is a legal impossibility. In a well-written and well-reasoned majority opinion, the Law Court now acknowledges it was incorrect in Pushard insofar as it held that the mortgagee had accelerated the note, “despite the plain statutory prohibition on acceleration without compliance.” Finch at ¶2. Finch now makes it clear that “a failure to meet a precondition to the commencement of a suit does not have claim-preclusive effect.” Finch at ¶49.

As background, in Pushard, the plaintiff initiated a foreclosure action against the borrowers and lost. Pushard at 107; ¶4. As was the case in Finch, the trial court in Pushard concluded that the bank failed to meet its burden on critical elements of foreclosure. Id. The Court therefore entered a foreclosure judgment in favor of the defendants. Id. One of the elements the Bank failed to satisfy was the requirement of a notice of default that strictly complies with statutory requirements under 14 M.R.S. § 6111. Id. Citing the borrower-friendly line of foreclosure precedent since § 6111 was revamped in 2009, the Law Court in Pushard ruled that strict compliance with § 6111 is required and that failing to comply results in a judgment for the defendant. Such a judgment invokes res judicata principles and precludes the mortgagee from later enforcing the note and the mortgage in a subsequent foreclosure action. The Pushard Court further held that a discharge of the mortgage is required, because the “note and mortgage are unenforceable and [the borrowers] hold title to their property free and clear of the Bank’s mortgage encumbrance.” Id. at 115–16; ¶36 (citing Federal National Mortgage Association v. Deschaine, 170 A.3d 230, 236 (Me. 2017)). The result was extremely harsh, in that even a small typographical error or other de minimis mistake in the demand letter resulted in a free home for borrowers, notwithstanding the borrowers’ (often long-standing) default on the loan and an otherwise informative notice of default and right to cure.

After winning in the foreclosure action, the Pushards, like Finch, subsequently initiated an action against the bank seeking (among other things): “(1) a discharge of the mortgage and (2) an order enjoining the Bank from enforcing the note and mortgage and compelling the Bank to record a release of the mortgage.” Pushard at 108; ¶5. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court found for Bank of America, correctly holding that the foreclosure judgment does not preclude a subsequent foreclosure claim because the bank did not accelerate the payments on the note. Pushard at 106; ¶1. The Law Court, however, in what now is being declared an error, reversed the trial court’s decision in Pushard and required that Bank of America discharge the Pushards’ mortgage. Id.

For over seven years, the Pushard rule has been the law in Maine, putting lenders, servicers, and law firms in a position of extreme risk in the event of any errors, even minor or inconsequential ones, in the demand letter, despite substantial compliance and providing the borrowers with the necessary information (in other words, complying with the spirit and intent of § 6111, as amended in 2009). At long last, the Finch decision strikes a balance of equities between the parties with respect to the effects of a prior judgment against the mortgagee, while still requiring strict compliance with § 6111.

The procedural posture in Finch was much like that of Pushard. In 2015, U.S. Bank’s foreclosure action against Chares D. Finch resulted in a judgment in Finch’s favor, on the grounds that the bank’s demand letter failed to strictly comply with § 6111. Finch at ¶3. Relying on res judicata and “free and clear title” principles outlined in Pushard, Finch then filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment in Superior Court in an attempt to force U.S. Bank to discharge its mortgage, given the judgment in Finch’s favor. Id. The Superior Court entered judgment in Finch’s favor, and U.S. Bank appealed. Id.

The Law Court vacated the Superior Court’s declaratory judgment in favor of Finch and remanded the case for an entry in favor of U.S. Bank. U.S. Bank’s mortgage remains enforceable. Finch at ¶52. In overruling aspects of Pushard through Finch, the Law Court relied on the clear language of § 6111: “the mortgagee may not accelerate maturity of the unpaid balance of the obligation or otherwise enforce the mortgage because of a default consisting of the mortgagor's failure to make any required payment … until at least 35 days after the date that written notice … is given by the mortgagee.” Finch at ¶2; 6 (citing 14 M.R.S. § 6111). Based on the precondition to acceleration set forth in § 6111, for “claim preclusion purposes, the fact that the Bank could not accelerate the note balance or enforce the mortgage means that the Bank’s claim for the full amount due on the note and for foreclosure of the mortgage was not and could not have been litigated.” Finch at ¶7. If no justiciable litigation on the note or the mortgage is allowed due to failure of a condition precedent set forth in § 6111, no claim preclusion can occur.

The Finch Court noted that it erred with its premise in Pushard that acceleration can be “triggered” by a foreclosure action being filed without the lender having any right to do so under the statute: “Our premise that a lender’s filing of a foreclosure action automatically accelerates the note cannot be squared with the plain language of § 6111.” Finch at ¶25-27. The Finch Court also noted that it erred in not distinguishing Pushard from Johnson v. Samson Constr. Corp.,1997 ME 220, 704 A.2d 866, which is distinguishable in at least two material ways. Finch at ¶26. In Johnson, the foreclosure was dismissed with prejudice as a sanction. Whether or not the lender ever had the right to accelerate the note was not an issue in Johnson. Id. Further, Johnson involved a business loan on a non-residence such that the non-acceleration language and condition precedent set forth in § 6111 did not apply. Id. Therefore, the lender in Johnson was not prohibited from acceleration, such that the amount due was not only accelerated but the note and mortgage were also litigated. Id.

Despite the heavy-handed dissenting opinion, lamenting that principles of stare decisis are being eviscerated and that the Finch decision is a “retreat from the principles of judicial restraint,” (Finch at ¶90), the majority thoroughly reconciled its Finch decision with stare decisis principles, including consistency, anomaly, workability, reliance, and policy. It noted for example, that Johnson is still good law in its holding that a dismissal with prejudice in one foreclosure action, as a sanction for misconduct, barred a second foreclosure. Finch at ¶26. The Law Court further held that this decision was not a departure from current Maine jurisprudence, but a re-alignment to return Maine law back to consistency with prior rulings and with every other jurisdiction in the country.

            In addition, strict compliance with § 6111 is only one element required to be proven for a foreclosure judgment to be issued to a mortgagee. There remain eight essential elements:

1.     The existence of the mortgage, including the book and page number of the mortgage, and an adequate description of the mortgaged premises, including the street address, if any;

2.     Properly presented proof of ownership of the mortgage note and the mortgage, including all assignments and endorsements of the note and the mortgage;

3.     A breach of condition in the mortgage;

4.     The amount due on the mortgage note, including any reasonable attorney fees and court costs;

5.     The order of priority and any amounts that may be due to other parties in interest, including any public utility easements;

6.     Evidence of properly served notice of default and mortgagor's right to cure in compliance with statutory requirements;

7.     Proof of default of or completion of mediation; and

8.     If the homeowner has not appeared in the proceeding, a statement, with a supporting affidavit, of whether or not the defendant is in military service in accordance with the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.

Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Higgins, 2009 ME 136, ¶11, 985 A.2d 508, 510-511. If a mortgagee fails to prove the foreclosure case due to failure of any of the other elements, where the note was accelerated, there might still be a res judicata impact on any subsequent foreclosure.  

            Much remains to be seen in this line of jurisprudence. Foremost, J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp. v. Moulton , Law Court Dkt. No. Oxf-21-412 (argued Nov. 1, 2022) remains pending before the Law Court. Like Finch, the Moulton case also involves a demand letter that failed to comply with the strict requirements of § 6111 and resulted in judgment for the defendant, again holding that the note and mortgage were unenforceable. The Finch case will undoubtedly be further discussed and analyzed in the highly anticipated Moulton decision. Even if Moulton retains the strict compliance component in interpreting § 6111, the Law Court should provide guidance on what constitutes strict compliance. For example, what level of itemization of the amounts due will be required? Might § 6111 interpretation provide room for de minimis errors, where the notice of default substantially complies and addresses the spirit of the statute? It also remains to be seen what impact Finch (and soon-to-be Moulton) will have on the body of foreclosure case law in Maine going forward. What is certain is that Finch represents a long overdue shift in Maine foreclosure law and a course-correction by our Law Court and marks a victory for lenders in what has historically been a borrower-friendly foreclosure environment in Maine courts.

 

Copyright © USFN 2024

USFNews - January 24

 

* Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient

Tags:  #foreclosure  #freehouse  #Maine 

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A Summary of USFN Briefing on Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion: DEI Is Still Good For Business

Posted By USFN, Wednesday, January 3, 2024

By Kim Pogue Jenkins, Esq.

Baer & Timberlake,P.C.*

USFN Member (OK)

 

USFN’s most recent Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Briefing Series on December 12, 2023, focused on The DEI Outlook for 2024 and Forward: How to Navigate the Changing Climates. The three panelists presenting were Greg Campbell, a partner at Aldridge Pite, LLP, who spoke about the current state of DEI; Emily Bartekoske, a Senior Partner at SouthLaw, P.C., who addressed lesser-known DEI categories; and Marisa Myers Cohen, shareholder at McCabe, Weisberg & Conway, LLC, who presented DEI recruiting tips and tricks. All in all, while there have been some recent setbacks to corporate DEI initiatives, it is still a priority for employees and employers. Here’s a brief recap of what our panelists shared during the Briefing.

 

Current State of DEI

 

Greg Campbell began by acknowledging slowing DEI momentum over the past year, in contrast to the 2020 surge of companies implementing DEI policies and departments. One reason for the 2020 wave was the death of George Floyd and the attention it brought to DEI. Another reason was pandemic legislation, like the CARES Act, which made money available to fund DEI programs. From July 2020 to July 2021, job postings with DEI in the title jumped 92%.

 

However, since last July, DEI job postings dropped by 38%. What could account for the shift? Financial factors, such as the end of the CARES Act, recession, slower growth, and higher interest rates. The bottom line remains a major consideration for businesses, along with attracting the best talent, fostering innovation, and employee retention. Legal pressure is another factor. The Supreme Court ruling in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard held that the policies at Harvard and the University of North Carolina violated the Equal Protection Clause by considering race in admissions. While this ruling only affected universities, many businesses and law firms believed that they might be targeted next, and they were correct. American Alliance of Equal Rights sent threatening letters to seven top law firms demanding that they halt their diversity fellowship programs, saying they exclude qualified white and Asian students. Additionally, at least five state Attorneys General have sent letters to the top 100 law firms in the country demanding a reevaluation of DEI policies. Many companies have started ditching their DEI programs to avoid potential legal trouble or are laying off their DEI-focused positions in these challenging economic times.

 

Companies who rescind their DEI programs may lose talent, as employees question if the company ever really intended to be inclusive or if they just wanted to appear that way when it was socially beneficial.

 

Campbell then switched gears to address why some are hesitant to speak out about DEI issues. Reasons include a fear of doing or saying the wrong thing or a fear of negative repercussions from co-workers. He also addressed “reverse belonging,” when a person does not feel like they can join a group or event if they are not in an underrepresented category. He stressed that anyone who is an ally is welcome in USFN DEI events and programs, and he urged those interested in DEI to continue to engage and learn, read articles in USFN publications, and attend webinars like this one.

 

Lesser-known DEI Categories

 

Emily Bartekoske began this presentation by acknowledging the widespread action on categories like sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, race, ethnicity, or religion before noting that DEI is also applicable to lesser-known categories. These can include cognitive diversity, age, education, language, physical ability, class diversity, invisible disabilities, geographical location, socioeconomic status, and family status.

 

The first focus was on age. We typically think about discrimination against older workers but we also need to avoid making hurtful generalizations about younger generations. We often look at this issue through a defensive lens, to avoid a lawsuit, but this presentation encouraged us to instead use a lens of inclusion. We can and should actively celebrate and encourage the unique skill sets that differing age groups bring.

 

How can firms and servicers implement this suggestion and create a welcoming and inclusive environment for all employees? First, by updating company policies and by providing anti-bias training that doesn’t promote stereotypes. They can also encourage multigenerational collaboration on projects, and mentoring programs which go in both directions: older workers mentoring younger workers, and vice versa.

 

Physical ability was also addressed. Again, firms should look through the lens of inclusivity. Ask employees if they are facing any challenges in this area at work. Consider that many physical challenges are not visible. A person may have trouble lifting or standing. They may suffer from chronic pain or an autoimmune disorder. Think about these challenges when planning events. A golf outing as a reward is fun for some, but it can also exclude some members from participating. Businesses can also offer nontraditional accommodation, like extended breaks or flexible schedules.

 

Cognitive Diversity is defined as the variety of ways in which people think, process information, problem-solve, and make decisions. Neurodiversity includes ADHD, autism spectrum disorder, or dyslexia. Fifteen to twenty percent of people are neurodivergent. Businesses want to make employees feel welcome and included, and to maximize their learning and productivity. To accomplish this, they must identify the learning styles of employees and accommodate them in training and communication. They should also review their hiring process to remove unnecessary steps that can cause stress for many. Consider providing interview questions ahead of time to reduce anxiety and allow for better preparation. Providing nontraditional accommodations like quiet workspaces, headphones, or low-sensory areas where an overwhelmed person can go to self-regulate, can greatly benefit neurodivergent employees. Finally, check in regularly to make sure employees are not headed toward burnout. Acceptance of diversity should be promoted from the top down to eliminate stigma.

 

 

DEI Recruiting Tips and Tricks

 

Companies that maintain a sustained commitment to DEI will reap the rewards and intangible benefits by attracting high-quality job seekers. Businesses should collect employee data and then compare the statistics to those demographics in your state or county to know how they are doing on DEI.

 

Companies should make sure that they are looking both at the current employees and those who will be hired. Job descriptions should be free from targeting certain ages and free from exclusionary language. Recognize bias in the hiring process and advertising of jobs.

Ask yourself and your team questions such as does this position really need a college degree or a lot of work experience?

 

Make sure interviewers are not asking improper questions about age, national origin, sexual orientation, or family status. If possible, have a diverse team of interviewers, ideally including other employees and not just management or top-level executives. Using an interview script can help to eliminate both implicit and affinity bias. Implicit bias is a negative attitude, of which one is not consciously aware, against a specific social group. Affinity bias is the tendency to act favorably toward people who have grown up in a similar manner as the interviewer. Avoid questions like “Do you golf?” While this question might create a connection between the interviewer and interviewee, it may also have the reverse effect due to affinity bias.

 

In summary, businesses should capture the appropriate data, look at it through the various lenses, and remember that a commitment to DEI will help them both hire and retain talent, and provide an inclusive and welcoming workspace.

 

Save the Date: NEW USFNgage Series

The Four Pillars of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion

Tuesday, Feb. 13, 1-2:30 pm CT

In these brand-new virtual webinar programs, USFNgage sessions will be set up as a Zoom meeting format where speakers will engage directly with participants face-to-face. Participants should come prepared to enable their video, unmute themselves, and to engage with our speakers and fellow participants through group conversations and smaller breakout discussions. Registration for this event will open soon.

 

 

Copyright © USFN 2024

USFNews - January, 10, 2024

* Denotes firm is a 2023 Award of Excellence recipient

Tags:  #diversityandinclusion 

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Member Moves + News: CaseMax & Provana

Posted By USFN, Friday, December 1, 2023

 

CaseMax (USFN Associate Member) and Provana (USFN Associate Member) announce a new partnership to provide an automated solution for bankruptcy e-filing, designed to minimize errors and accelerate submission times. This collaboration has yielded a powerful workflow, reducing document errors typically associated with the routine task of e-filing for bankruptcy proceedings.

Tags:  #USFN #MemberNews 

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Member Moves + News: Scott & Corley, PA

Posted By USFN, Friday, December 1, 2023

 

Scott & Corley, PA (USFN Member – SC) is proud to announce that Reginald "Reggie" P. Corley, and Ronald “Ron” C. Scott, have been recognized in the 2024 edition of BEST LAWYERS in AMERICA® (Woodard-White Inc.) for the State of South Carolina. This year marks Reggie Corley's seventh consecutive year as a selection for Mortgage Banking Foreclosure Law, and for Ron Scott, it marks his 15th consecutive year from his inaugural selection in the category which was initially created by BEST LAWYERS in 2010.  

 

  

Tags:  #USFN #MemberNews 

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Member Moves + News: Wilson & Associates, PLLC

Posted By USFN, Friday, December 1, 2023

 

Wilson & Associates, PLLC (USFN Member – AR, MS, TN) is proud of the recognition and accomplishments received by several of its attorneys. Nakisha Miller was recently promoted to Associate Partner. Aaron Squyres received the Arkansas Bar Association’s Presidential Award of Excellence in June. Jennifer Wilson-Harvey was named one of Arkansas’ Best Lawyers in AY Magazine in the category of real estate law and was also recognized in the 2024 edition of Best Lawyers © for Mortgage Banking Foreclosure Law.

 

    


Additionally, Wilson & Associates held its fourth annual CLE Program in September with almost 50 attorneys in attendance. This is an innovative program designed to provide firm attorneys as well as any other attorneys with their CLE hours, while also benefiting the local legal community. Proceeds from registration fees are donated to the Arkansas Bar Association.

Tags:  #USFN #MemberNews 

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Michigan Court of Appeals Addresses Claiming Surplus Funds from Properties Lost to Tax Sale

Posted By USFN, Thursday, November 30, 2023

By William D. Meagher, Esq.
Trott Law, P.C.*
USFN Member (MI, MN)

 

The Michigan Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion offering some finality to the evolving process for claiming surplus proceeds from a tax sale. In its “for publication” opinion In re Petition of Muskegon County Treasurer for Foreclosure, the Court upheld the statutory framework that was enacted to effectuate constitutional compliance under the Michigan General Property Tax Act (“GPTA”). This does not directly impact servicers in the typical sense. However, it is significant in that it clearly sets a firm timeline should it be necessary to try to recover losses from a property inadvertently lost to tax sale.

 

It is important to understand what brought about the current process. Prior to 2020, the GPTA did not provide a mechanism by which former property owners could recover surplus proceeds after a property was foreclosed for delinquent taxes and subsequently sold at auction to a third party, for an amount exceeding the tax delinquency. Instead, the surplus, if any, was retained by the Foreclosing Governmental Unit (“FGU”).

 

There were numerous challenges to the pre-2020 practice under the GPTA provisions, largely focusing on it consisting of an unconstitutional taking, among other things. The Michigan Supreme Court issued its opinion in one such case, Rafaeli, LLC v. Oakland County on July 17, 2020. The Rafaeli case confirmed the ability of the FGU to foreclose for delinquent taxes and take title to the property. However, the opinion further held that there was no right to retain surplus proceeds after selling the property to satisfy the outstanding taxes, interest, penalties, and fees. The surplus proceeds were required to go to the prior owner since to do otherwise constitutes a government taking under the Michigan Constitution entitling plaintiffs to just compensation.

 

After the decision in Rafaeli, the Michigan Legislature amended the GPTA to include section 78t, codifying certain rights as recognized by the Michigan Supreme Court in Rafaeli. In its most simplistic terms, this amendment created a statutory process for former holders of a legal interest in a property at the time of tax foreclosure to seek any remaining proceeds from the sale of the property at auction after having satisfied the delinquent property taxes. The statutory process imposes many deadlines for certain filings, one of which is a bit odd in its timing.

 

Foreclosure for delinquent taxes occurs in March, with the redemption on the tax foreclosure judgment generally expiring on March 31, vesting title into the name of the FGU. The property is then auctioned for sale in July, September, and November. It is this post-foreclosure auction sale that may generate recoverable surplus proceeds. One unique and somewhat troubling issue in the statutory scheme is the requirement for an interested owner to submit a claim via Form 5743 by July 1 immediately following the effective date of the tax foreclosure of the property. The process therefore requires an interested party to file a claim before it is even known whether there will be surplus proceeds from the property auction.

 

In re Petition of Muskegon County Treasurer, the interested property owners owned properties that were foreclosed for taxes on March 31, 2021. All properties subsequently sold at auction for significantly more than the tax amounts owed. None of the owners filed claim forms by July 1, 2021. The FGU opposed the various motions due to the late claim filings. The trial court ruled that the statutory timeline was clear and unambiguous and had to be enforced as written.

 

On appeal, the interested prior owners made many, largely constitutionally based arguments. The most significant of which, as it pertains to the mortgage servicing industry from a practical perspective, was that the statutory scheme was not the sole remedy and that the annual July 1 deadline for filing a notice of intent was unenforceable.

 

The Court ruled that the language of Section 78t is unambiguous and that it “is the exclusive mechanism for a claimant to claim and receive any applicable remaining proceeds.” Further, the Court noted that, “although the Takings Clause is self-executing, it must be read within the context of statutory protections available to a property owner.” The Court determined that the GPTA imposes a reasonable, minimal burden on former owners to advise the FGU of their intent to exercise their right to claim any remaining proceeds. So long as the statutory scheme adopted by the legislature comports with due process, which it does, whether such a scheme makes sense or not, or whether a “better” scheme could be devised, are policy questions for the Legislature, not legal ones for the Judiciary.

 

While there may still be challenges on different aspects of the statutory scheme in the future, one thing is now certain:  If an interested party intends to pursue possible surplus proceeds from a tax sale auction, it must file a claim Form 5743 prior to the July 1 deadline. Given this, it is recommended that clients carefully review all tax notices. Portfolios should also be reviewed annually to determine whether any properties were lost to tax sale. If any properties are identified, it may be worthwhile to file the claim by the July 1 deadline to preserve any interest in possible surplus proceeds from the future sale.

 

Copyright © USFN 2023

USFNews - December 6, 2023

 

*Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient.

 

Tags:  #MI  #sale  #surplus  #tax 

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Citizenship Affidavit Now Required on Every Deed Recorded in Oklahoma

Posted By USFN, Thursday, November 30, 2023

By Kim Pogue Jenkins, Esq.

Baer & Timberlake, P.C.*

USFN Member (OK)

 

The Oklahoma Legislature has amended its statute regarding alien ownership of land. Effective November 1, 2023, no deed may be recorded in Oklahoma unless it is accompanied by an affidavit from the grantee attesting that the grantee is taking title in compliance with the state laws on foreign ownership of land.

 

The Oklahoma Constitution and 60 Okla. Stat. §§121-123 have historically provided that a person who is not a citizen of the United States or a bona fide resident of Oklahoma may not hold title to real property in the state, and they must dispose of the property within five years of acquiring title or the property will be forfeited to the State. Title 60 Okla.Stat. §121 was recently amended to add the requirement that any deed recorded with the county clerk must be accompanied by an affidavit that the grantee “is obtaining the land in compliance with the requirements of this section and that no funding source is being used in the sale or transfer in violation of this section or any other state or federal law. A county clerk shall not accept and record any deed without an affidavit as required by this section. The Attorney General shall promulgate a separate affidavit form for individuals and for business entities or trusts to comply with the requirements of this section, with the exception of those deeds which the Attorney General deems necessary when promulgating the affidavit form.” (Emphasis added.)

 

The Oklahoma Attorney General has provided the forms, which may not be altered in any way. Those forms may be located at the attorney general’s website at https://www.oag.ok.gob/public-forms.

 

Foreclosure attorneys will immediately be faced with a dilemma when recording a deed to a government agency. The forms are for individuals and business entities only, and cannot be revised to accommodate HUD, VA, FNMA, FHLMC, or any other government or tribal entity.

 

Upon inquiry, the Attorney General’s office indicated that they would be issuing an opinion exempting governmental and tribal entities from the affidavit requirement. However, as of the date of this article, the office has not yet published that opinion. Until they do so, no deed may be recorded to these entities.

 

Copyright © USFN 2023

USFNews - December 6, 2023

 

* Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient.

Tags:  #Foreclosures  #OK  #Title 

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USFN Letter to HUD re: Show Me State Premium Homes

Posted By USFN, Friday, November 10, 2023

Earlier this Fall, USFN sent a letter to HUD regarding the Show Me State Premium Homes case.

We have since shared with VA and ALTA

 


 

 

We greatly appreciated the opportunity to discuss USFN’s concerns related to the Show Me State Premium Homes case. As promised, this letter will serve to provide a brief description of the issue, and some proposed resolutions that we ask HUD to consider.

Issue:   

In July 2023, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit issued an order affirming a Missouri federal court decision in Show Me State Premium Homes v. McDonnell, 2022 WL 970890 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2022) affirmed 74 F.4th 911 (8th Cir. 2023). Many in our industry have taken that order to hold that a subordinate lien (other than a federal tax lien) held by the United States must be foreclosed by judicial action. Prior to Show Me, servicers, insurers, and foreclosure counsel had relied on the holding in U.S. v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237 (1960), a U.S. Supreme Court decision that explained that nonjudicial foreclosures eliminate junior federal liens using whatever state process is available. The Show Me court did not discuss Brosnan, which seems to leave room to argue that Brosnan is still the operative authority in the nonjudicial foreclosure context. In the interest of brevity, we have not included a full legal analysis of the opinion here but are happy to do so upon request.

 

While we believe there are legal arguments that can be made to counter the effects of this decision (and maybe to overturn it altogether), the decision has begun to have practical, negative consequences that lead us to ask that HUD take immediate action to provide stability and clarity to all stakeholders.


Effects and Potential Effects of the Decision:

  • In some cases and jurisdictions (even beyond Missouri and the 8th Circuit), title insurers and U.S. Attorneys are calling prior practices involving the foreclosure and removal of government liens in nonjudicial states into question, and are taking the position that if the United States has a junior lien (e.g., HUD/USDA/VA second mortgage, HUD HECM second mortgages, etc.), that 28 U.S.C. 2410(c) requires the senior lienholder to name the United States as a defendant, foreclose by judicial action, and seek a judicial foreclosure sale to eliminate the junior federal lien.
  • Because of the above interpretation and its fallout, some servicers and their counsel are making the decision to foreclose properties with junior federal liens by judicial process. In some instances, pending REO and sheriff’s sales have been canceled in favor of the decision to restart using a judicial process.
  • The switch from a non-judicial to a judicial process will inevitably result in higher fees and costs, longer timelines (in some cases as much as a year longer), potential curtailment losses, and higher HUD claim amounts in states where the non-judicial process had been the norm. In at least one affected state (Tennessee), a judicial foreclosure process does not even exist, causing even greater uncertainty. The resultant higher costs and longer timelines associated with the  judicial process and redemption periods will necessarily have negative effects on borrowers (in particular those seeking to cure or payoff and facing higher fees and costs in the process), servicers, and HUD, with little to no corresponding benefit to HUD.
  • There is the possibility that the effects of the decision could expand to include already completed and insured foreclosures. It remains to be seen how title insurers will deal with any potential insurability issues, and who will bear the cost of corrective action, if needed.

Proposed Resolutions:

  1. The most practical solution would be for HUD to consider this ruling an opportunity to confirm and clarify by Mortgagee Letter that it is and has been HUD’s policy to consider junior liens in their favor to have been divested if the mortgaged property was properly foreclosed in accordance with state and local law in the jurisdiction where the property is located, whether by judicial or non-judicial process. This solution would be the most cost effective for all involved and would provide certainty for all stakeholders, including borrowers, servicers and their counsel, title insurers, and past and future third-party buyers of foreclosed properties.

 

  1. In the alternative, HUD should develop a streamlined waiver process to reduce the cost and risks of foreclosure-related losses. This approach is supported by law, specifically 28 U.S.C. § 2410(e), which contemplates a method by which a release of a government lien may be requested. Clear, consistent, and centralized procedures for either requesting a release of lien or granting permission to proceed nonjudicially where a junior lien in favor HUD exists would resolve many of the issues and would provide a relatively cost-effective solution for all interested parties.

As a corollary to the above, USFN also proposes that HUD confirm to servicers that it will waive curtailments related to restarts or protracted timelines that were caused by the uncertainty and effect of this decision. 

 

We greatly appreciate HUD’s willingness to discuss this matter with USFN, and stand ready to provide any additional information that you may need to fully consider the proposed resolutions.

 

Sincerely,

 

 

Jeffrey Weisserman                                                                 Pamela  Donahoo

Chair, USFN Advocacy Committee                                          CEO, USFN

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Tennessee Appeals Opinion Affirms No Privity of Contract Between Borrower and Servicer

Posted By USFN, Wednesday, November 8, 2023

By Aaron Squyres, Esq,

Wilson & Associates, PLLC*

USFN Member (AR, MS, TN)

 

               On August 28, 2023, the Tennessee Court of Appeals issued an opinion of first impression in Clarence Mitchell, et al. vs. Rushmore Loan Management Services, et al W2022-00621-COA-R3-CV, which significantly impacts borrower litigation against mortgage servicers in Tennessee.  In summary, the court found that a borrower cannot prevail on a breach of contract claim against a mortgage servicer if there is no privity of contract between a borrower and a mortgage servicer.

               The facts surrounding the Mitchell foreclosure are commonplace. They fell behind on their mortgage indebtedness, received a Notice of Default and Right to Cure from their servicer, and were offered a series of loss mitigation requests, all of which were denied.  When the servicer initiated foreclosure proceedings, the Mitchells filed suit against Select Portfolio Services (the prior servicer), Rushmore (the current servicer), U.S. Bank as the Trustee of the securitized trust that owned the Mitchell loan, and the law firm conducting the foreclosure. The law firm was subsequently dismissed as a party.

               Motions for Summary Judgment were filed by Select Portfolio Services (SPS), Rushmore, and U.S. Bank. The trial court granted summary judgment to U.S. Bank and initially denied summary judgment to SPS and Rushmore. SPS and Rushmore then renewed their Motions for Summary Judgment. The Mitchells did not contest the Rushmore Motion, and it was granted, leaving SPS as the remaining party.

               The trial court ultimately granted the SPS Motion for Summary Judgment. It declined to grant summary judgment on the first argument, i.e. SPS cannot be liable for breach of contract as SPS was not a party or a signatory to the Deed of Trust, and therefore was never in privity of contract with the Mitchells. The trial court did grant summary judgment on the second claim, i.e., the plaintiffs failed to produce evidence that SPS had breached any term of the contract. The Mitchells appealed.

               The Tennessee Court of Appeals acknowledged the Mitchells’ argument that no Tennessee state appellate court had addressed the question of whether a mortgage servicer can be held liable for breach of contract in the absence of privity, but it correctly noted that multiple courts in various jurisdictions had considered that precise question. It found that courts have consistently found that there is no contractual privity between a borrower and loan servicer, and therefore it ruled that the Mitchells cannot prevail against SPS on a breach of contract claim and affirmed the trial court.

 

Copyright ©2023 USFN

USFNews - Nov. 15, 2023

 

* Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient

              

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