By Blair Gisi, Esq.

SouthLaw, PC *

USFN Member (IA, KS, MO, NE)

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, 223 L. Ed. 2d 438, may provide clarity in an area that has long divided federal courts: whether a party seeking relief from a void judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 must file its motion within a “reasonable time.”

The dispute arose from a 2014 Chapter 11 bankruptcy filed by Vista-Pro Automotives and a related adversary proceeding against Coney Island Auto Parts seeking roughly $50,000 in unpaid invoices. A default judgment was ultimately entered against Coney Island, although questions remained about whether service had been properly effected under the governing rules.

In 2016, the Chapter 11 case was converted to Chapter 7, and the trustee demanded payment from Coney Island based on the previously entered default judgment. This demand appears to have been the first confirmed notice Coney Island had of the judgment.

Despite that notice, Coney Island did not seek relief until 2021—five years later—when federal marshals attempted to seize the $50,000 pursuant to the judgment.

In its motion for relief, Coney Island argued the judgment was void because it had never been properly served. According to the company, the court therefore lacked personal jurisdiction, rendering the judgment void. Because a void judgment cannot be validated by the passage of time, Coney Island contended the one-year limitation for certain Rule 60 motions should not apply.

The bankruptcy court rejected that argument, concluding that the delay between Coney Island’s actual notice of the judgment in 2016 and its motion for relief in 2021 was unreasonable. The United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit affirmed, holding that motions under Rule 60(b)(4) must still be brought within a reasonable time. The appellate decision included a dissent arguing that courts lack authority to enforce void judgments.

Writing for the Court, Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. emphasized that Rule 60’s timing requirement applies to all motions brought under Rule 60(b), including those seeking relief from a void judgment:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 permits a court to ‘relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding,’ and subdivision (b)(4) specifically authorizes relief from a ‘void’ judgment. … Rule 60(c)(1) provides that a ‘motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time.’ Because a motion for relief from an allegedly void judgment is a motion under Rule 60(b), the reasonable-time limit applies.

Coney Island, at 442–43.

The Court did not define what constitutes a “reasonable time.” That omission may stem from the posture of the case: Coney Island did not argue that its motion was timely under the circumstances, but rather that no time limitation should apply at all.

Potential Divergence in Kansas

While the decision may clarify federal practice in some jurisdictions, Kansas courts may take a different approach as it relates to its own statute, K.S.A. §60-260. In the recent decision in MidFirst Bank v. Sipple, 2026 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 110, the Kansas Court of Appeals acknowledged Coney Island but began its analysis by stating: “First, our Kansas caselaw establishes that a ‘reasonable time’ for challenging a void judgment is any time.”

Ultimately, however, the court determined that the defendants’ arguments failed on the merits, making further analysis of the timing issue unnecessary. As a result, the broader implications of the Supreme Court’s ruling for Kansas law remain unsettled.

The Sipple case involved pro se litigants who had repeatedly challenged rulings throughout a foreclosure proceeding dating back to 2022. Given the procedural posture and the nature of the appellants’ arguments, the court appeared to have little need to fully address how Coney Island might affect Kansas precedent.

Looking Ahead

Whether Kansas and other jurisdictions ultimately align with the Supreme Court’s interpretation remains to be seen. The Coney Island decision could become a useful tool in cases involving long-delayed challenges to judgments, particularly in litigation involving pro se parties.

At the same time, the ruling may raise practical concerns in contexts such as junior lien disputes, tax foreclosures, and post-sale title issues where challenges to underlying judgments may surface years later.

For now, the decision underscores the importance of identifying potential service or jurisdictional defects early and consulting local counsel to evaluate the evolving impact of the Supreme Court’s ruling as what is “reasonable” will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

Copyright © 2026 USFN

USFNews - April 1, 2026

By Blair Gisi, Esq.
SouthLaw, PC *
USFN Member (IA, KS, MO, NE)

In Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc'y v. Campbell, 2021 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 330, the Kansas Court of Appeals issued a ruling that provides a bright line rule under K.S.A. §60-241. 

60-241. Dismissal of actions. (a) Voluntary dismissal.

(1) By the plaintiff. 

(A) Without a court order. Subject to subsection (e) of K.S.A. §60-223, K.S.A. §60-223a and K.S.A. §60-223b, the plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by filing:

(i) A notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment; or

(ii) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared. When the dismissal is by stipulation, the clerk of the court must enter an order of dismissal as a matter of course.

(B) Effect. Unless the notice or stipulation states otherwise, the dismissal is without prejudice. But if the plaintiff previously dismissed any federal- or state-court action based on or including the same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits.

That bright line or “two-dismissal” rule is: “[I]f a plaintiff has once dismissed an action, a dismissal by notice of a second action based on or including the same claim, amounts to an adjudication on the merits.  As such, the second dismissal effectively creates a res judicata bar to a third action.”  Campbell at 6.

In this case, the Appellate Court stated that the district court relied upon “judicial magic” in concluding the second foreclosure case, which was dismissed by a Court Order, was legally equivalent to a notice of dismissal. Given this false equivalency relied upon by the district court and given the procedural disposition of the case at dismissal which would prevent dismissal by notice, “the dismissal of that [second] action must have been by court order, obviating the application of the two-dismissal rule.”  Campbell at 11.

While it may be arguable that certain circumstances leading to the dismissal of a pending foreclosure action, e.g., reinstatement or a loan modification, may create a new cause of action with new or distinguishable grounds for foreclosure, the mere act of filing a second Notice of Dismissal on the same loan against the same borrowers may create grounds for those borrowers to argue that any subsequent foreclosure is precluded under the statute cited above.

To avoid the risk of protracted litigation associated with this issue, the best practice for dismissing subsequent foreclosure cases against the same loan and borrower(s) is to seek leave to dismiss via a Motion and Order to Dismiss, ultimately reviewed and approved by the presiding judge. Obtaining an Order of Dismissal significantly reduces the risk of a res judicata bar to foreclosing, as the Campbell case makes clear, “. . . the [dismissal by notice] rule comes into play only if the second dismissal is by notice.”  At 8 (emphasis in original). Seeking an Order of Dismissal may include additional filing and attorney fees; however, those fees will be significantly less than litigating this issue and potentially losing the right to foreclose.

Copyright © 2024 USFN
USFNews - May 15, 2024

* Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient