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Posted By USFN,
Monday, July 7, 2025
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USFN is proud to announce its
filing of an amicus brief in the United States Supreme Court supporting the
petition for a writ of certiorari in US Bank v. Fox, a case involving
constitutional questions about the retroactive application of FAPA in NY. As a
supplement to the constitutional arguments raised in the petition, USFN’s
amicus brief examines the wide body of case law that FAPA disrupts, the unusual
way the legislation came about, and its far-reaching harmful effects.
USFN would like to extend a
heartfelt thank you to Rich Haber, Esq, and Brian Scibetta, Esq. of McCalla RaymerLeibert Pierce LLP for their exceptional work drafting on behalf of our organization. Their
insight, precision, and commitment helped ensure our industry’s voice was
clearly and powerfully represented. We’re proud to stand alongside such
outstanding advocates.
Click here for a copy of the brief.
Tags:
#AmicusBriefs
#NY
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Posted By USFN,
Wednesday, May 8, 2024
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By Adam Diaz, Esq. Diaz, Anselmo & Associates, PA * USFN Member (FL, IL, IN, KY, OH, WI) The 4th District Court of Appeals reversed its opinion in Desbrunes v. U.S. Bank, N.A., as
Trustee, which held that a Personal Representative is a necessary party to
a foreclosure on homestead property. The new ruling correctly held that
when a borrower passes away the property transfers to heirs without the need of
a probate proceeding. The Court specifically found that since “[p]ersonal representatives have no
jurisdiction over nor title to homestead . . . .” the property would not be an
asset to the estate and subject to administration. The Court noted in a
footnote that it was unaware of the status of the property when it issued the
initial decision, but after review of the Rehearing, and Amicus Briefing, this
issue can be fully addressed. The Court did not make a distinction
regarding foreclosure proceedings being in rem or how the rules would
apply to non-homestead property which leaves a potential grey area in the
law. However, the briefings do go into depth on how probate law would
address non-homestead property.
The
Court’s shift is significant for the Mortgage Industry, as it no longer
requires a Lender in Florida to initiate a probate proceeding in order to
obtain clear title when foreclosing. The original ruling put an
unnecessary burden on Lenders which would have caused significant delay in
expense to the foreclosure process. USFN participated in an Amicus Brief in March 2024 in the Desbrunes v. U.S. Bank, N.A., as Trustee petition to the 4th DCA. Kudos to Adam Diaz with Diaz and Associations for their outstanding work on this brief. Advocacy Advisory - May 8, 2024 USFNews - May 15, 2024
* Denotes firm as a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient
Tags:
#AmicusBriefs
#Florida
#foreclosures
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Posted By USFN,
Wednesday, March 27, 2024
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Florida
Appellate Court Finds Lenders Must Administer Probate Proceedings in Order to
Obtain a Valid Foreclosure Judgment
By Adam Diaz, Esq.
Diaz
Anselmo & Associates, PA*
USFN Member (FL, IL,
IN, KY, OH, WI)
Florida’s 4th Appellate
District reversed a foreclosure judgment for a lender with a groundbreaking
decision creating new required steps to foreclose the interest of a deceased
party. The Court’s decision in Desbrunes v. US Bank Nat’l Ass’n, as Tr. for
Structured Asset Sec. Corp. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series
2006-AM1, 2024 WL 591432, at *1 (Fla. 4th DCA Feb. 14, 2024) represents a
detrimental break in Florida jurisprudence that has governed foreclosure
proceedings for decades.
The facts of Desbrunes
are like many typical foreclosure proceedings involving a deceased party. US
Bank National Association, as Trustee for Structured Asset Securities Corp.
Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2006-AM1 (“Plaintiff”) filed a one
count action for foreclosure naming Francois Desbrunes as a defendant.
Desbrunes actively litigated the case, but ultimately passed away before the
entry of the judgment, wherein his counsel filed a suggestion of death.
The plaintiff sought to
Amend the Complaint. The purpose of the amendment was to drop Desbrunes as a
party, add known and unknown heirs, as well as appoint a Guardian Ad Litem.
This is the standard process in Florida.
However, Desbrunes’
counsel, who was no longer representing any party, filed a Motion to Abate
pursuant Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.260(a), requesting the Court require the plaintiff
to administer a probate in order to continue the action. The Trial Court denied
the motion because Desbrunes’ counsel was not a party to the case, but did not
rule on whether a probate is a required task to obtain a valid judgment.
The Trial Court granted
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and an heir, Ronald Desbrunes, appealed the
ruling. The heir argued on appeal the denial of the Motion to Abate should have
been granted. The 4th District Court of Appeal only considered the arguments
regarding 1.260. The Court held that the plaintiff improperly substituted
Desbrunes with the heirs pursuant to Rule 1.260(a) despite the fact the plaintiff
never moved for substitution under the Rule. The 4th held that only an estate
can be substituted in for a deceased party citing non-foreclosure cases
involving money judgments.
The 4th went further to
find any judgment where a probate was not opened would be a “nullity.” This
language causes the most concern as it would open completed cases to attack.
Due to the severity of this ruling a rehearing was filed.
The opinion failed to
account for Florida Probate law which governs the transfer of title upon a
title holder’s death. Under Florida Law when a property is homestead, the
property will pass entirely outside of the estate. See Buettner v. Fass,
21 So. 3d 14, (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). This transfer is codified within
Florida Statutes s. 732.401, 731.102, 732.103. Therefore, a deceased borrower’s
estate never holds title and would not be a necessary party to the foreclosure.
See Citibank, N.A. v. Villanueva, 174 So. 3d 612, 613 (Fla. 4th DCA
2015) (“The fee simple title holder is an indispensable party in an action to
foreclose a mortgage on property.”) (citations omitted)
The Firm, on behalf of
USFN, also filed an Amicus Curie brief, along with ALFN and Legal League. The
purpose of the Amici was to bring to the attention of the Court that if the
opinion is not revised, or reversed, it will significantly impact the mortgage
industry, and cause severe consequences this Court may not have anticipated or
intended.
Currently, the
rehearing is under review with the Court. Copyright © 2024 USFN USFNews - April 3 * Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient.
Tags:
#amicusbriefs
#Florida
foreclosures
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Posted By USFN,
Friday, February 2, 2024
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By Robert Wichowski, Esq.
Brock & Scott, PLLC *
USFN Member (CT, NC, RI, AL,
FL, GA, KY, ME, MD, MA, MI, NH, NJ, OH, PA, SC, TN, VT, VA)
The Maine Law Court has issued its long-awaited decision in
the case of JP Morgan Acquisition Corp. v. Camille J. Moulton (2024 ME 13).
This decision comes on the heels of Charles D. Finch v. U.S. Bank (see USFN article here) and it is one in which USFN, among other industry
participants, filed an amicus brief in support of the lender’s position.
This case involves the foreclosure of a residential mortgage
in which the trial court found that the foreclosing plaintiff’s demand letter did
not comply with 14 MRSA §6111 (Maine’s demand letter statute). In Maine, until
the decision of the Finch case, proceeding to foreclosure with a demand
letter that did not strictly comply with each and every requirement of 14 MRSA
§6111 would result in a judgment in favor of the borrower, which was deemed an
adjudication on the merits of the case. Such an adjudication, pursuant to the
prior cases of Pushard v. Bank of America, N.A., 2017 ME 230 and Fed.
Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Deschaine, 2017 ME 190, and on res judicata
principals, resulted in a “free house” for the borrower and an inability of the
mortgagee to collect any sums on the note or enforce the mortgage.
As previously written by USFN, the Finch case
represented a sea change in Maine foreclosure law, holding that res judicata
did not apply where a non-compliant notice was the basis for the adverse result
because, according to the language of the statute, a compliant notice is a
condition precedent to enforcement of the mortgage and acceleration of the
debt. After the decision in Finch, a judgment in favor of a borrower
based upon a defective notice is no longer an adjudication on the merits of the
case. Thus, res judicata does not operate
to preclude future claims.
Although the Finch decision was argued prior to this
case, the Maine Law Court, having both cases pending before it at the same
time, solicited amicus curie briefs on the questions of whether the Court
should reconsider its precedent that a failure to comply with 14 MRSA §6111
renders the note and mortgage unenforceable as well as whether the Deschaine
and Pushard cases should be overruled. In response, several amicus
curiae briefs were submitted, and partially on the basis of those briefs, both
decisions in Finch and Moulton were decided.
In this case, the notice of default was deemed non-compliant
with the statute because there was a sum of money being held in suspense as a
partial payment that was not accounted for on the demand, which resulted in the
amount to cure in the notice being listed as higher than it really was. The
trial court entered judgment in favor of the borrowers and further ordered that
Moulton “holds title to the real property at issue, unencumbered by the
mortgage and the promissory note.” The court also awarded her reasonable attorneys’
fees and costs. Although the Law Court did not take issue with, or disturb the
trial court’s ruling that the notice of default was not compliant with 14 MRSA
§6111 or the award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, the Law Court vacated the
portion of the judgment that declared that Moulton holds title to the real
property at issue free of the note and mortgage. In doing so, the Court held
that such a judgment does not preclude the lender from bringing a future
foreclosure claim based on a future default, nor does it discharge the entire
mortgage or effect a transfer of title.
Although this case, coupled with the Finch opinion,
represents a step away from the severe foreclosure climate in Maine for lenders
as well as the “court as a casino” effect that the Deschaine and Pushard
cases created, it will not end strict scrutiny on notices of default and could
even result in an increase in trial courts finding that notices are
defective.
Failure
to comply with § 6111 still may have drastic consequences. Not only does the lender
need to recommence a foreclosure, starting with a new demand letter and be
subject to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, the second
foreclosure case can only proceed as to future defaults. Unless the first
foreclosure case also contained a separate count for breach of contract (suit
on the note), which is often not an option due to bankruptcies and statutes of
limitation, a lender must waive the prior unaccelerated amounts past due.
The takeaways from Moulton
are that foreclosure complaints should include a separate count for amounts due
under the note, when possible, and that § 6111 remains a strict compliance
statute.
We do recommend consulting with local counsel to confirm the
validity of notices of default. Certain
cases should also be evaluated upon referral for a possible contract claim. Copyright © USFN 2024 USFNews - February 7 * Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient
Tags:
#AmicusBriefs
#FreeHouseTrend
#Maine
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Posted By USFN,
Tuesday, February 21, 2023
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by
Megan McNamara, Esq.
and
Hillary Prada, Esq.
Berkman,
Henoch, Peterson, Peddy & Fenchel, PC
USFN
Member (NY)
On February 14, 2023, the
New York Court of Appeals issued its much-anticipated ruling on Bank of
America v. Kessler (N.Y. Feb. 14, 2023), wherein the Court reversed the
Second Department and held that the inclusion of additional information with
the RPAPL 1304 notice did not invalidate the notice. This ruling constitutes a
significant departure from the prior ruling of the Second Department and will
have a dramatic effect on New York foreclosure matters.
In New York, the 90-day
pre-foreclosure notice is governed by RPAPL 1304 and is a condition precedent
to the commencement of a foreclosure action. Further, the failure to
demonstrate strict compliance with RPAPL 1304 is a basis for dismissal of a
foreclosure action. As you may recall, on December 15, 2021, the Second
Department issued its decision in Bank of America, N.A. v. Kessler, 202
A.D.3d 10, 160 N.Y.S.3d 277 (2d Dept. 2021), holding that at the “inclusion of
any material in the separate envelope sent to the borrower under RPAPL 1304
that is not expressly delineated in these provisions constitutes a violation of
the separate envelope requirement of RPAPL 1304(2).” As such, any additional
materials included in the envelope with the notice as well as any extraneous
information on the notice itself was deemed to not be in compliance with RPAPL
1304.
The Second Department’s holding
in Kessler had an immediate and detrimental impact on lenders as it spurred
a host of additional decisions issued by the Second Department as well as the lower
courts. Specifically, Kessler was responsible for the dismissal of
countless cases, many of which were already stalled for almost two years as a
result of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Court of Appeals
specifically looked to the intent of RPAPL 1304, which was in part to enable
communication between the borrower and lender, prevent unnecessary foreclosures,
and inform borrowers of their rights. The Court of Appeals held that the
“accurate statements that further the underlying statutory purpose of providing
information to borrowers that is or may become relevant to avoiding foreclosure
do not constitute an ‘other notice.’” Additionally, the Court noted that a
bright-line rule could conflict with federal law, such as the FDCPA
mini-Miranda language and bankruptcy protection disclaimer.
Specifically, in
rejecting the Second Department’s “bright-line rule,” the Court of Appeals held
that “to the extent that there is any ambiguity about how to interpret the
statute, application of a bright-line rule would contravene the legislative
purpose. RPAPL 1304 is a remedial statute that should be read broadly to help
borrowers avoid foreclosure.” In evaluating its decision, the Court held that
unlike its ruling in Freedom Mortgage Corp. v. Engel, 37 N.Y.3d 1, 169 N.E.3d
912 (2021), a bright-line rule would not be appropriate as “[d]etermining
whether additional language in a section 1304 notice is permissible requires no
examination of intent or extrinsic evidence, but rather an objective facial
determination of the language’s relevance, truth, falsity, or potential to
mislead or confuse.” The Court rather relied on the “workable rule” standard as
set forth in CIT Bank v. Schiffman, 36 N.Y.3d 550, 168 N.E.3d 1138 (2021).
The Court noted in its decision that a bright-line rule would defeat the intent
of the statute and would punish lenders who are attempting to comply with
federal disclosure requirements or are providing additional information
intended to further assist borrowers to avoid foreclosure.
On December 30, 2022, the
New York Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (“FAPA”) was enacted as a direct
result of the Court of Appeals decision in Engel. The intent of FAPA was
to render the holding with respect to acceleration in Engel ineffective
and ultimately moot. FAPA has the potential to be extremely detrimental to both
pending and future foreclosure actions and is likely to face numerous
challenges to its enforceability from lenders seeking to foreclose. As a result
of the legislature’s immediate response to the Engel decision, it is
possible there will be a similar action taken in response to the Court of
Appeals holding in Kessler. The Court of Appeals even noted in its
opinion in Kessler that “Engel was recently legislatively
overruled.”
It is expected that the
Court of Appeals decision in Kessler will have a dramatic impact on
pending foreclosure actions. Specifically, in cases that have motions and
appeals pending premised on the Second Department’s holding, lenders can
reasonably expect a favorable ruling as long as the additional language or
information included within the notice was not false, misleading, or unrelated.
Additionally, to prevent any potential ramifications of FAPA, lenders are
likely to appeal or move to vacate dismissals that were premised on the Second
Department’s holding. This decision is certainly a welcome relief for many
lenders who were faced with the difficult decision as to whether to recommence
due to issues with the pre-foreclosure notice, or worse, had cases dismissed. USFN is extremely proud to have participated in
the Kessler case as an amicus and is gratified to see arguments it
advanced be accepted by the Court. We look forward to keeping you apprised
with the impact of the Kessler decision in New York.
Read the full Court of Appeals decision in Kessler here. Copyright @2023 USFNews - Feb. 22
Tags:
#AmicusBriefs
#Kessler
#NY
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Posted By USFN,
Wednesday, February 15, 2023
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On February 14, 2023, New York’s
highest court issued its long-awaited decision in Bank of America, N.A. v.
Kessler. (Click here for a copy of the decision.) A lower appellate court
had previously decided that statutorily required pre-foreclosure notices (“90-day
Notices”) were invalid if they included additional information, such as FDCPA
and SCRA warnings, or bankruptcy disclaimers, because 90-day Notices are
required to be sent in a “separate envelope” from all other notices. In this
great win for the industry, the Court held that “accurate statements
that further the underlying statutory purpose of providing information to
borrowers that is or may become relevant to avoiding foreclosure do not
constitute an ‘other notice’ [under RPAPL 1304(2)]” and therefore do not
violate the “separate envelope” rule. The decision saves many pending
foreclosures from dismissal, and potentially allows others that were previously
dismissed to be restored. Stay tuned for a more thorough article to be
published in the USFNews next week that will discuss the import of the Kessler
decision and its intersection with the Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act enacted
December 30, 2022.
USFN is extremely proud to have participated in the Kessler
case as an amicus and is gratified to see arguments it advanced be accepted by
the Court. USFN member McCalla Raymer Leibert Pierce, LLC (Rich Haber and Brian
Scibetta) was counsel of record for USFN in connection with its amicus motion
and brief filings, and the following USFN members also contributed to planning,
drafting and editing: Frenkel Lambert Weiss Weisman & Gordon, LLP (Keith
Abramson); Aldridge Pite, LLP (Susan West and Christopher Medina); Schiller,
Knapp, Lefkowitz & Hertzel, LLP (Gary Lefkowitz); Berkman, Henoch, Peterson
& Peddy, P.C. (Megan McNamara and Hillary Prada); and Bendett & McHugh,
P.C. (Rob Wichowski, former USFN Amicus Brief Task Force Chair). Thank you to
all participating firms for lending your time and expertise to this important
issue!
If there is a matter now or in the future that you think
might benefit from amicus support by USFN, please reach out to Rich Haber,
current USFN Amicus Brief Task Force Chair (rich.haber@mccalla.com).
Tags:
#AmicusBriefs
#Kessler
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Posted By USFN,
Monday, October 24, 2022
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By Sonia J. Buck,
Esq.
Brock & Scott,PLLC *
USFN Member (AL,
CT, FL, GA, KY, ME, MD, MA, MI, NH, NJ, NC, OH, PA, RI, SC, TN, VA)
The Maine Law Court has requested amici briefs in an
appeal filed by J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp., regarding key issues in
Maine foreclosure law: strict statutory compliance with Maine’s demand letter
statute and the res judicata effect of a judgment for a defendant based on a
finding that a mortgagee’s demand letter failed to strictly comply.
The Oxford County (Maine) Superior Court ruled that
J.P. Morgan failed to comply with 14 M.R.S.A. § 6111 (Maine’s comprehensive and
unforgiving foreclosure demand letter statute), based on a discrepancy with
respect to the total amount due. J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp., v.
Camille J. Moulton, SOPDC-RE-19-02 (November 24, 2021, J. Tammy
Hamm-Thompson, at page 7). Not only did the Superior Court find for the defendant
homeowner, but the Court’s opinion further ruled that res judicata forever precluded
a second foreclosure. Id. at pg. 9.
Going further, the Superior Court specifically ordered that judgment
“shall enter for the Defendant, declaring that she holds title to the real
property at issue, unencumbered by the mortgage and promissory note.” Id.
The Court relied on prior Maine case law that has
resulted in “free homes” to defendants for even technical or minor
noncompliance by the plaintiff with respect to the demand letter. That prior
case law, most notably, FNMA v. Deschaine, 2017 ME 90, and Pushard
v. Bank of America, 2017 ME 230, now has the potential to be overturned.
Although the request for the amici briefs centers
around the preclusive effect of a judgment for the defendant based on the
demand letter statute, it remains to be seen whether the Law Court will also
provide guidance in Moulton as to the level of scrutiny the itemization
and other components of a Maine demand letter will be subject to going forward.
Will minor defects in a demand letter render a note
and a mortgage forever unenforceable? Stay tuned. Copyright @2022 USFN e-Update
Tags:
#AmicusBriefs
#FreeHouseTrend
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