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Posted By USFN,
Thursday, January 26, 2023
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Michael
Gonzales, Managing Partner of West Coast
Litigation and Foreclosure, has been named member and owner at McCalla Raymer
Leibert Pierce, LLP (USFN Member – AL, CA, CT,
FL, GA, IL, KY, MS, NV, NJ, NY, OH, OR, TX, WA). Gonzales joined the firm
in 2017 and is based in the firm’s Long Beach, California office. Additionally,
Drew
Powers has been promoted to Managing Partner
of National Evictions team. Powers started at the firm in 2011 as an
associate and has been a partner at the firm since 2015. She will be
overseeing the firm’s 15 state Eviction teams and National Eviction platform. 
@2023 USFN Winter Report
Tags:
#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Thursday, January 26, 2023
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Trott Law,
P.C. welcomed three new attorneys to the firm. Scott Gies joined our Bankruptcy group in Michigan, bringing with
him 23-plus years of experience. He is admitted to both the Eastern and Western
District of Michigan. Aaron
Bayliss joined our Michigan Litigation
group. Bayliss is a University of Detroit Mercy Law School graduate with eight-plus
years of litigation experience. Additionally, Sung Woo Hong joined the Minnesota office. He is a University of
Minnesota Law School graduate and is practicing primarily foreclosure and litigation. 
@2023 USFN Winter Report
Tags:
#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Thursday, January 26, 2023
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Bendett & McHugh, P.C. (USFN Member – CT, ME, MA, NH, RI,
VT) is proud to announce that Jane Torcia received the 2022 Barbara Goodrich Rising Star Award
presented by the Connecticut Mortgage Bankers Association (CMBA). The award is
given to someone who exemplifies the values of a true rising star in the
industry. Torcia is the Managing Attorney of the firm's Real Estate and
Eviction Departments and serves on the CMBA's Closing and Compliance Committee.
Firm principal Randy McHugh thanked the CMBA and accepted the award on Torcia’s
behalf at the CMBA Board Installation Dinner on October 20, 2022. Torcia was also
recently recognized as a "2022 Connecticut Rising Star®" for Real
Estate by Super Lawyers this year. @2023 USFN Winter Report
Tags:
#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Thursday, January 26, 2023
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Scott
& Corley, P.A. (USFN Member – SC) is proud to
announce that Reginald
"Reggie" P. Corley, President
& Managing Attorney, and Ronald
“Ron” C. Scott, Firm Chairman, have been
recognized in the 2023 edition of BEST LAWYERS in AMERICA®
(Woodard-White Inc.) for the State of South Carolina. This is Corley’s sixth
consecutive year for selection for Mortgage Banking Foreclosure Law, and
Scott’s 14th consecutive year, dating back to his inaugural
selection in the category created by BEST LAWYERS in 2010. 
@2023 USFN Winter Report
Tags:
#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Thursday, January 26, 2023
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BWW Law Group, LLC (USFN Member – DC, MD, VA) proudly announces the
addition of two new Members, Andrew
Brenner and Robert
Michael, and the promotion of Sharisse
Del Vecchio to Managing Director. Brenner
has served as Director of Firm Operations since he joined the firm in 2015. Michael
manages the Virginia default and litigation practices and joined the firm in
2009. Del Vecchio has served as the firm’s Director of Compliance since she
joined the firm in 2013. They have excelled in their respective roles;
consistently exceeding expectations and exhibiting the leadership, dedication,
and expertise which are the hallmarks of BWW’s exceptional service to its
clients. @2023 Winter USFN Report
Tags:
#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Monday, January 9, 2023
Updated: Thursday, February 1, 2024
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Foundation Legal Group: Combined Strengths of Wilson & Associates
and Hutchens Law Firm to Deliver Comprehensive Creditors' Rights Legal Services
in Five States LITTLE ROCK, AR (September 1,
2025) – The mortgage servicing industry is gaining a powerful new partner with
the launch of Foundation Legal Group, a mortgage banking law firm specializing
in comprehensive creditors' rights services. This development unites the
extensive experience and trusted reputations of two long-standing and highly
respected entities in the mortgage banking sector: Hutchens Law Firm and Wilson
& Associates. Foundation Legal Group will
leverage the deep industry knowledge and proven track records of both firms to
provide legal support to mortgage servicers across five states: Arkansas,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. Current clients can expect a seamless
transition and a continued commitment to the high-quality legal services they
have come to rely on from Hutchens Law Firm and Wilson & Associates. "This is a significant step
forward in enhancing the services we can offer to our valued clients in the
mortgage servicing industry," said Jillian Wilson, Co-Managing Partner of
Wilson & Associates. "By bringing together the strengths and expertise
of Wilson & Associates and Hutchens Law Firm, Foundation Legal Group is
positioned to provide top quality legal services and efficient solutions to our
clients that will not just meet, but will exceed, industry expectations.” The attorneys that make up
Foundation Legal Group are very experienced in all facets of creditors' rights,
possessing a deep understanding of the complexities and regulatory landscape of
the mortgage servicing industry. The formation of this new company ensures that
clients will continue to receive expert legal counsel and representation,
backed by the collective history and trust built by both Wilson &
Associates and Hutchens Law Firm over several decades of service. "Our clients will benefit from
the combined resources and the number of experienced attorneys at Foundation
Legal Group. We are committed to upholding the legacy of excellence established
by Wilson and Hutchens, and look forward to serving their needs under this new
banner,” said Hilton Hutchens, Managing Partner of Hutchens Law Firm. Foundation Legal Group is
dedicated to providing: ·
Comprehensive creditors' rights services
tailored to each client. ·
Experienced and knowledgeable attorneys with a
proven track record. ·
A continued commitment to the high-quality legal
services clients have come to expect. ·
Services across Arkansas, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. The launch of Foundation Legal
Group marks an exciting new chapter, building upon a strong foundation of trust
to serve the evolving needs of the mortgage servicing industry. “Our focus at Wilson has always been
to provide exceptional service to our clients. Seeing that commitment expanded through
this partnership is exciting, and will undoubtedly benefit our clients,” said
Jennifer Wilson-Harvey, Co-Managing Partner of Wilson & Associates. About Foundation Legal Group Foundation Legal Group is a law firm specializing in creditors' rights
services for the mortgage servicing industry. Formed through the unification of
Wilson & Associates and Hutchens Law Firm, two long-standing and highly-respected
companies in the mortgage banking sector, Foundation Legal Group provides
comprehensive legal solutions across Arkansas, Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Tennessee. Our experienced attorneys are dedicated to
upholding a tradition of high-quality legal services and delivering exceptional
results for our clients. For more information, please visit: www.TheFoundationLegalGroup.com.
About Wilson &
Associates: Wilson & Associates has been a trusted provider of legal services
to the mortgage banking industry for over 45 years. With
offices in Arkansas, Tennessee, and Mississippi, Wilson & Associates
provides legal services in the real estate and financial industries. Founded by
Robert M. Wilson, Jr. in 1978, Wilson & Associates has built a powerful
reputation, primarily through the firm’s expertise in real estate and mortgage
banking law. Today, its attorneys provide expertise in many other practice
areas of the law, and dedicates the same passion and commitment to its clients.
For more information about the firm, please visit www.TheWilsonLawFirm.com. About Hutchens Law Firm: Hutchens Law Firm has a long history of providing high-quality legal
services to the mortgage servicing sector for over 40 years. Opened in 1980 by
H. Terry Hutchens, their main office is located in Fayetteville, NC. Since
opening, they have expanded across the Carolinas with over 35 lawyers in 15
locations. Their lawyers provide legal services in a variety of practice areas.
For more information about the firm, please visit: www.hutchenslawfirm.com. HWM firm merges with Nebraska-based Eric H. Lindquist
- As of Feb. 1, 2024, Halliday, Watkins & Mann, P.C. (HWM), a leading mortgage default law firm, has merged with Eric H. Lindquist, P.C., L.L.O. (Lindquist), a prominent Nebraska-based
law firm specializing in mortgage default cases. The strategic merger brings together two firms with over 70 years of combined experience assisting mortgage default clients across 12 states.
-
- Together, HWM and Lindquist will provide full-service default legal representation and counseling with approvals from government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.
- "We're thrilled to join forces with the talented team at Lindquist,” said Benjamin J. Mann, Partner at Halliday, Watkins & Mann. “This merger combines our firms’ mortgage default expertise and expands our capabilities to better serve clients. Together, we'll continue to deliver top-tier service and counsel to mortgage default clients across our multi-state footprint."
The merger brings Lindquist’s entire staff to HWM, including Founder Eric H. Lindquist, who has over 35 years of mortgage default legal experience.
“Halliday Watkins & Mann has an outstanding reputation, and we’re excited to merge our knowledge and resources to provide enhanced value to clients,” said Eric H. Lindquist, Founder of Eric H. Lindquist, P.C., L.L.O. “This merger allows us to leverage our joint capabilities to continue delivering the highest quality counsel and representation to mortgage default clients."
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Posted By USFN,
Friday, January 6, 2023
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By Joseph R. Dunaj, Esq.
Bendett & McHugh PC *
USFN Member (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI,
VT)
On December 22, 2022, the Connecticut Supreme Court issued
its opinion in the case of Bank of New
York Mellon v. Tope, SC 20592, 2022 WL 17825337 (2022), reversing the 2021
opinion of the Connecticut Appellate Court. In the decision, the Supreme Court
clarifies some of the limitations on a borrower’s ability to challenge subject
matter jurisdiction after a final judgment has been entered in a foreclosure
case.
According to the record, the plaintiff had obtained a
judgment of foreclosure by sale in 2016.
The borrower filed a number of motions to open the judgment, some of which were
predicated on the grounds that the plaintiff lacked standing. In a number of
instances, the trial court opened the judgment to modify it and extend the sale
date. In 2017, more than four months after the initial judgment was entered,
the defendant filed another motion to open and vacate the judgment. The defendant
contended that the plaintiff was not the holder of the note, did not have
standing, and therefore the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Specifically, the note was endorsed to JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, as Trustee, but
the named plaintiff and assignee of the mortgage was the Bank of New York
Mellon, as Successor Trustee to JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA. After argument, the
trial court denied the motion to open, reasoning that the issues had already
been decided in the plaintiff’s favor and was not subject to further argument.
That denial formed the basis of the defendant’s appeal.
On February 9, 2021, the Appellate Court issued its opinion
in Bank of New York Mellon v. Tope,
202 Conn. App. 540, 246 A.3d 4 (2021). In a split decision, the Appellate Court
affirmed the decision of the trial court and held that the defendant failed to
establish the trial court lacked obvious jurisdiction. The court held the motion to open was an
impermissible, collateral attack upon the judgment. The Appellate Court based
its decision on prior Connecticut Supreme Court and Appellate Court case law which
held that final judgments are presumptively valid, and collateral attacks are
disfavored. The lone dissenting judge questioned whether the motion to open was
a direct attack on the judgment rather than a collateral attack, and questioned
whether there was enough evidence to determine whether the plaintiff had
standing.
On October 12, 2021, the Supreme Court granted certification
to answer two questions: 1) Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the
motion to open was a collateral attack or a direct attack on the judgment; and
2) If the motion to open judgment was not a collateral attack, could the
Appellate Court’s decision be affirmed on the alternative ground that the trial
court properly denied the motion to open. As to the first question, the Supreme
Court determined that the motion to open was a direct attack, rather than a
collateral attack. The Supreme Court relied upon Connecticut General Statutes §
52-212a, which governs the opening of judgment in civil cases. The statute
mandates that any motion to open judgment must be filed within four months of
the judgment in order for the motion to be adjudicated. The Supreme Court held
that although the motion to open judgment at issue was filed more than four
months after the initial judgment, the motion was filed within four months
after the trial court had opened and modified the judgment. The most recent
modification of the judgment was the operative judgment, and, because the defendant’s
motion to open was filed within four months thereto, the motion to open was a
direct attack on the judgment rather than a collateral attack.
The Supreme Court then addressed the second question,
whether the trial court properly denied the motion to open. The Court held that although the Plaintiff
established that it had possession of the original note and was the assignee of
the mortgage, it was not a holder of the note because of the specific
endorsement, and there was not enough evidence in the record to establish that
the plaintiff had the right to enforce the note as a transferee in possession of
the instrument under Connecticut General Statute § 42a-3-301 and relevant case
law. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court to conduct an
evidentiary hearing to resolve the standing issue.
The result of the Supreme Court’s opinion is clarification
as to how to address a defendant’s persistent, continual jurisdictional
challenges. Although the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s decision,
it did not expressly overturn the Appellate Court’s holding regarding
post-judgment challenges to jurisdiction. The Appellate Court’s central
holding, and the case law upon which it relies, remains valid. Attacks on
subject matter jurisdiction are still disfavored once a final judgment has
entered. Although a direct attack upon the judgment may be more favorable than
a collateral attack, the Supreme Court did not explicitly hold that a direct
attack upon the judgment is always favored. Therefore, in opposing a defendant’s
post-judgment motion, a plaintiff would do well to argue the validity of the
final judgment as a bulwark against the jurisdictional attack, in addition to
addressing the merits of the jurisdictional attack.
The Supreme Court’s opinion also provides guidance as to
what constitutes a direct attack versus a collateral attack in a foreclosure
context. In addition to its analysis as to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-212a, in dicta,
the Supreme Court mentioned that a trial court loses jurisdiction to adjudicate
a motion to open judgment once the borrower has been divested of title in the
case of a strict foreclosure or upon confirmation of a sale in the case of a
foreclosure by sale. Presumably, any motion challenging jurisdiction after a
transfer of title is a collateral attack rather than a direct attack.
Therefore, the Supreme Court’s opinion provides additional ammunition in
opposing a defendant’s post-vesting motion.
In summary, the decision provides both clarification and
guidance useful to mortgage servicers as they face repeated attacks related to
standing and jurisdiction in the Connecticut foreclosure arena. Copyright @2023 USFN USFNews * Denotes firm is a 2022 Award of Excellence recipient
Tags:
#foreclosures #CT
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Posted By USFN,
Tuesday, December 13, 2022
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By Phyllis A.Ulrich, Esq.
Carlisle Law
USFN Member (OH)
On September 28, 2022, Sen. Elizabeth Warren and Rep.
Jerrold Nadler reintroduced the Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act (the “CBRA” or
“Bill”) seeking to: reduce paperwork; simplify the filing process for debtors; and
decrease the cost of filing. The Bill was previously introduced on December 6,
2020, but never made it to a floor vote during the 116th
Congressional session. Warren and Nadler reintroduced the bill as originally
written.
The Bill would eliminate Chapters 7 and 13, replacing them
with a hybrid under new Chapter 10 (11 U.S.C. §1001, et. seq.). The new Chapter
10 retains the mechanism for a Chapter 7-like discharge and provides various
plans of reorganization for claims, as provided for in the current Chapter 13. The
automatic stay mirrors that provided for in current Chapter 13, including a
separate co-debtor stay upon the filing of a case (11 U.S.C. §1009).
There are three types of plans of reorganization referenced
in 11 U.S.C. §1022, all of which can be filed by debtor(s) in a single case.
One plan type – the Residence
Plan (11 U.S.C. §1022(b)) – addresses
debts secured only by the principal residence of the debtor. The plan can
modify the rights of the holders of these claims (including first mortgage
loans) or provide for sale of the residence in the plan, but it can only deal with
debts secured by the residence.
Another plan type – the
Property Plan (11 U.S.C. §1022(c)) – addresses
all other claims secured by property, not including the debtor’s residence.
Though the third plan type – the Repayment Plan (11 U.S.C. §1022(a)) – does not have the same categorical purpose, it provides
for repayment of the debtor’s unsecured debts.
At first glance, the provisions of the Bill appear to allow
the debtor to pick one of the three plans to file, which would certainly
streamline and simplify the current case flow. However, a closer reading indicates
that the debtor can file all three plans in one case at the same time. For
example, 11 U.S.C. §1021(b)(A) states a debtor may file one or more plans. 11 U.S.C
§1023(c) provides for a single hearing on confirmation if the debtor files more
than one plan under 11 U.S.C. §1021.
The Bill is made more complex by the debtor’s option to elect
a “limited proceeding.” If the debtor elects a limited proceeding under 11
U.S.C. §1051, they could select certain claims secured by specific property to
include for reorganization. Such limited proceedings would only give rise to a
limited automatic stay - only applicable to the creditors whose claims are
secured by the selected property. Once again, the debtor may file one or more
of the plans provided for under §1022. The
debtor may elect to convert the limited proceeding to a general proceeding if the
court fails to confirm a plan under the limited proceeding pursuant to 11
U.S.C. §1053(b). Upon conversion to a general proceeding, the automatic stay
and co-debtor stay applies to all creditors of the debtor.
One plan to address all claims under the current Chapter 13
is more compact and tidier. With a National Form Plan, that is used for the
most part, in many bankruptcy jurisdictions, it is now comfortable for the
creditor to scan the plan under familiar provisions to determine treatment of
its claim. The possibility of three plans being filed in one case, results in a
situation where a creditor must carefully read each plan that a debtor files in
a case to determine which plan applies to its claim. The Chapter 10 Trustee
will be busier than ever attempting to address all the plans to ensure each
complies with the Bankruptcy Code and Rules.
While proposed Chapter 10 may theoretically create a simpler
and less expensive process from a debtor’s perspective, it is likely to create
more questions (and perhaps litigation) for most everyone involved in a case.
The end result may be a drawn-out and litigated bankruptcy case, which equates
to more expenses and complication for the debtor. Ironically, a previous
Chapter 10 Bankruptcy option, available for corporations, was eliminated by the
Bankruptcy Reform Act in 1978 due to its complexity.
The CBRA may or may not get to the floor for a vote in this
117th Congress. However, if enacted, it would radically change the
state of current bankruptcy proceedings and practice of today. Copyright @2022 USFN December 2022 USFN e-Update
Tags:
#bankrutpcy
#CBRA
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Posted By USFN,
Monday, December 12, 2022
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by JamesClarke, Esq.
Orlans PC *
USFN Member (DC,
DE, MD, MA, MI, NH, RI, VA)
D.C. provides additional protections for homeowners impacted
by COVID-19 and the availability of HAF funds.
In June, City Council passed B24-0883 (Act 24-0508) – “Foreclosure Moratorium Extension Revision
and Homeowner Assistance Fund Promotion Emergency Amendment Act of 2022,” which
expired October 23, 2022, and B24-0884
(Act 24-0532/Law 24-0186) “Foreclosure Moratorium Extension Revision and
Homeowner Assistance Fund Promotion Temporary Amendment Act of 2022,” which
will expire May 4, 2023. On November 1, 2022, the D.C. City Council passed
additional legislation both in emergency and temporary form - B24-1080
(Act 24-0674) “Foreclosure
Moratorium and Homeowner Assistance Fund Coordination Emergency Amendment Act
of 2022” and B24-1081 “Foreclosure
Moratorium and Homeowner Assistance Fund Coordination Temporary Amendment Act
of 2022.” Both bills are substantively the same, except that the Emergency Bill
expires 90 days after enactment or February 20, 2023, and the Temporary Bill will
expire 225 days after taking effect.
First – the purpose
of the legislation is to provide homeowners with information regarding the D.C.
HAF (Homeowner Assistance Fund) prior to filing first legal or, if pending,
prior to resuming foreclosure.
Second – Unlike
the previous legislation, which provided a deadline of September 30, 2022 for
homeowners to apply for HAF, the current legislation is silent as to any
deadlines, instead deferring to the HAF program. Also, the HAF program administrators are still
accepting applications from homeowners impacted by COVID-19, and funds
apparently still remain available.
Third – Like the
previous legislation, which required a warning letter be sent prior to
September 30, the current legislation requires a similar 30-day warning notice
be sent after October 1 to proceed to first legal or before continuing a
foreclosure action. Once the letter is sent, the file should remain on hold
until expiration of the warning letter. The current legislation no longer
directs the mayor to publish a form notice. Our recommendation is to utilize
the current form published on the HAF website. An
editable sample foreclosure warning notice to be used for this purpose may be
found here (dc.gov) , but with references to the September 30, 2022 application
deadline deleted.
Fourth – Both
bills have an effective date of November 19, 2022.
To view the status, effective dates, and copies of the
legislation, please see:
B24-1080 View
Signed Act (dccouncil.gov) (Effective
November 19 - Expires February 20, 2023)
B24-1081 DC Legislation
Information Management System (dccouncil.gov) (pending
mayoral approval and Congressional review and will expire 225 days after taking
effect) Copyright @2022 USFN December 2022 USFN e-Update
Tags:
#DC
#foreclosures
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Posted By Kristi Payne,
Monday, December 12, 2022
Updated: Thursday, December 15, 2022
|
By JaniceNakano – Incoming Chair of the DEI Section
Aldridge Pite,LLP *
USFN Member (AK,
CA, FL, GA, HI, ID, NY, OR, UT, WA)
When I was younger, I was a runner and competed in sprints
and relays in school. My favorite races were the relays. The hand off of the
relay bar is the most important part of the race. It involves keeping up with
the speed and pace of the runner before or after you and timing the handoff
just right. What I really love about relay races is that you have to work as a
team and each runner is dependent on the other to succeed.
When I joined USFN’s Diversity & Inclusion group, we
were a smaller group of members with the idea and hope to educate our fellow
members. Each member of our section is as valuable as each member of the relay
race. While we don’t all run at the same speed, the passion and dedication to
our mission is the same: education, enlightenment, and action. Our wee group
grew into a larger group, and we eventually became an official section! We
renamed the section, Diversity, Equity & Inclusion (DEI), and Sally
Garrison has led us since its creation. I took over the role of Vice Chair in
2021 and have been working hard to be worthy of taking over from Sally as she
vacates her seat this year.
I can honestly say that while our mission is to provide
information and to help educate our colleagues, I realized that I personally
had a lot to learn about DEI. I struggled a little with some of the new
terminology and had to restructure my thinking about biases. But this is what our
section is all about, right? We aim to educate, enlighten, and take action.
While our society is being saturated with all things related to DEI, it’s easy
to become overwhelmed by the abundance of information, however it’s more
important now than ever to keep the momentum going.
Over the next few years, I plan to lead our group forward as
we navigate through new and expanding topics which are born from increased
awareness and discussion. I still have a lot to learn, but couldn’t be happier
knowing that the members of this section are passionate and dedicated to our
mission. As Nelson Mandela once said, “Education is the most powerful weapon
which you can use to change the world.” Copyright @2022 December 2022 USFN e-Update
Tags:
#DEI
#Leadership
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Posted By USFN,
Monday, December 12, 2022
|
by
Caroline Mudd, Esq.
ArmstrongTeasdale LLP *
USFN
Member (KS, MO)
Dramatic changes for the CFPB could be
in sight as early as the first half of 2023, if the United States Supreme court
accepts review of a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that vacated the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB) “Payday Lending Rule.” On
November 14, 2022, the CFPB filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court
seeking review of the decision in Community Financial Services Association of America, Ltd. v.
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, in which the Fifth Circuit found
that the Bureau’s self-funding structure violates the Appropriations
Clause of the United States Constitution. CFPB requested the Court set this case for argument in the current
term arguing that the Fifth Circuit’s decision “threatens the ability of the
CFPB to function and risks severe market disruption;” and further arguing, “[d]elaying
review until next Term would likely postpone resolution of the critical issues
at stake until sometime in 2024.”
This matter originated in the
Western District of Texas following a suit brought by Community Financial
Services, et.al., a collective party representing payday lenders and
credit access businesses (“CFSA”), which alleged that the Payday Lending Rule, enacted in January of 2018,
exceeded the CFPB’s authority, violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and was further invalid
as the funding structure of the CFPB was unconstitutional. Summary judgment was
denied to the CFSA and granted to the CFPB. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit sided
with the CFPB with regard to three of its arguments, finding that the Payment
Provisions of the Payday Lending Rule did not violate the APA, that the Supreme
Court’s finding that the CFPB’s director’s insulation from presidential removal
was unconstitutional did not in and of itself
warrant vacating the Rule, and that the Bureau’s rulemaking authority did not
violate the nondelegation doctrine.
However, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary
judgment ruling with regard to the issue of whether the CFPB’s funding
mechanism violates the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution, as well as the separation
of powers doctrine. In making this determination, by way of background, the Fifth
Circuit first noted the extensive power and control of the CFPB as the Bureau
has the power to conduct investigations, initiate administrative adjudication,
prosecute civil actions, and seek remedies, including restitution, injunctions,
and civil penalties. Further, the court stated, these powers are given to an agency
run by a single director rather than a board or agency, like most other
government agencies. In addition, the court further took notice that the
Supreme Court had previously commented on the extensive power of the CFPB in Seila
Law, stating that the Bureau “acts as a mini legislature, prosecutor, and
court, responsible for creating substantive rules for a wide swath of
industries, prosecuting violations, and levying knee-buckling penalties against
private citizens.”
The Fifth Circuit noted that
while most executive agencies are funded by annual appropriations, the CFPB
receives funding directly from the Federal Reserve in an amount requested by
the CFPB director. Unless the requested funding is in excess of 12% of the
Federal Reserve’s operating expenses, the Federal Reserve must grant the CFPB director’s
funding request. The court added that as the Federal Reserve is itself outside
of the appropriations process, the CFPB is “double insulated” from
Congressional control. Further, the court stated that instead of holding its
funds in a Treasury account, the CFPB funds are held at a Federal Bank, the
funds are under the control of the CFPB director, and Congress has legislated
that these funds “ . . . shall not be subject to review by the Committees on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate.” 12 USC §5497(a)(2)(C). The Fifth Circuit
determined that the financial structure of the CFPB rendered it unaccountable
to “Congress, and, ultimately, to the people,” thus rendering it
unconstitutional. The court further reasoned that as the CFPB promulgated the
Payday Lending Rule through the use of unconstitutional funding, that the rule
itself should be vacated.
In
urging the Supreme Court to review this matter in the current term, the CFPB advised
that in the short time since the Fifth Circuit has rendered its decision,
several defendants in CFPB enforcement matters have sought dismissal of actions
taken against them by the CFPB based on the Community Financial Services decision.
The CFPB also predicted that while this matter is pending certiorari, a
multitude of challenges will be brought against the CFPB, not only with regard
to the Payday Lending Rule, but as well as challenges that could potentially
call into question the validity of any and all past actions of the CFPB. Although
the Supreme Court granted CFSA’s motion to extend their time to file their
brief in opposition to certiorari to January 13, 2023,
it is entirely possible that if the Supreme Court grants certiorari, the Court
will render a decision in this matter of potential massive consequence to the
United States’ financial services industry before the end of June 2023.
Tags:
#CFPB
#Supreme Court
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Posted By USFN,
Monday, November 7, 2022
|
by Michael J.
McKeefery, Esq.
Cohn, Goldberg
& Deutsch, LLC *
USFN Member (DC,
MD)
For years now, all mortgage holders
in the District of Columbia (“D.C.”) have had to simply accept that a
Condominium Association (“COA”) could swoop in and sever a mortgage holder’s
interests in a property. Under D.C. law, if a COA forecloses on a “super
priority” lien, then a priority mortgage holder’s interest in the property
would be wiped out in its entirety. Despite this bleak backdrop, a case
has finally emerged from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
that offers some solace to a certain group of mortgage holders.
Before this case, the landscape for
all mortgage holders in D.C. had been a treacherous one. In 2014, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia issued its decision in Chase Plaza
Condominium Ass’n v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 98 A.3d 166 (D.C. 2014),
finding that a COA is permitted to foreclose on a six-month condominium
assessment lien, and that such a foreclosure wipes out any and all other liens
on the property, including any previously recorded first mortgage lien. In Liu v. U.S. Bank, N.A.,
179 A.3d 871 (D.C. 2018), the D.C. Court of Appeals found that a COA
foreclosure sale wiped out all other liens, even when there was explicit notice
to all potential buyers that the sale was to be conducted “subject to the first
mortgage or deed of trust.” In 4700 Conn 305 Trust v. Capital One, N.A.,
193 A.3d 762 (D.C. 2018), the Court found that, even in the context of a COA
lien that amounted to more than just the six-month super-priority lien, all liens
were wiped out including previously recorded first mortgage liens.
However, now,
hope shines brightly for a particular group of first priority mortgage holders,
thanks to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia’s
recent decision in M&T Bank v. Delphina N. Brown, 2022 WL 7003740.
The facts of this case are reasonably straightforward. In 2006, Ms. Brown took
out a loan to finance the purchase of a condominium unit commonly known as 512
Ridge Road, SE, #206, Washington, DC (the “Property”). Freddie Mac purchased
this loan in 2007, and M&T Bank (“M&T”) became the servicing agent for
Freddie Mac. In 2016, the Ridgecrest Condominium Owners Association (“RCOA”)
executed and recorded a lien concerning the Property. Thereafter, RCOA
foreclosed on its lien and sold the Property via public sale to a third-party
purchaser. It is uncontested that, at the time of RCOA’s foreclosure sale,
Freddie Mac was the owner of the 2006 loan, and neither Freddie Mac nor the
Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) consented to the sale. In 2017, M&T
filed a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure regarding the Property and
amended that complaint in 2019 to add Freddie Mac as a plaintiff in the action.
M&T and Freddie Mac then removed their case to the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia and filed a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgement with the Court, requesting that the Court find that
the COA foreclosure did not extinguish Freddie Mac’s interest in the Property.
Primarily, in its analysis, the
Court focused upon the interplay between the Federal Foreclosure Bar and the D.C.
Condominium Act (DC Code § 42-1903.13). The Federal Foreclosure Bar provides
that “[n]o property of [an FHFA conservatorship] shall be subject to levy,
attachment, garnishment, foreclosure, or sale without the consent
of the Agency.” 12 U.S.C. § 4617 (j) (3) (emphasis added). The D.C. Condominium
Act grants eligible COA liens a “super-priority” status, permitting a COA with
such a lien to foreclose on a property and extinguish all other liens. The
Court found that the D.C. Condominium Act is preempted by the Federal
Foreclosure Bar. Essentially, the Court found that it was impossible to
reconcile the Federal Foreclosure Bar’s explicit provision that no property of
an FHFA conservatorship shall be subject to foreclosure without consent of the Agency
with a local law that authorizes the foreclosure of FHFA property without its
consent. Therefore, the Court found that, from the text of the federal
provision alone, it was clear that Congress intended for the Federal
Foreclosure Bar to displace state laws such as the D.C. Condominium Act.
The
Court then considered the purposes and objectives of the Federal Foreclosure
Bar. The Federal Foreclosure Bar was enacted as part of the Housing and
Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA”).
HERA “authorized the Director of FHFA to appoint FHFA as either
conservator or receiver for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac;” and, thus, the Federal
Foreclosure Bar prevents entities from extinguishing Freddie Mac’s property
through foreclosure. Perry Cap. LLC v. Mnuchin, 864 F,3d 591, 599-600
(citing 12 U.S.C. § 4617 (a) (1)).
HERA
was enacted after the 2008 mortgage crisis, and Congress chose to “authorize
extraordinary measures to resuscitate” Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, including
granting the FHFA authority to appoint itself as their conservator. Id.
at 599-600. Congress made it clear that it provided this power to FHFA to
“preserve and conserve the assets and property” of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.”
Id. at 600 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 4617 (b) (2) (B) (iv)). Since the D.C.
Condominium Act works against preserving and conserving such assets and
property, the Court found that the D.C. Condominium Act was preempted by the
Federal Foreclosure Bar and could not extinguish Freddie Mac’s lien in this
case. Thus, Brown
stands for the principle that, in D.C., the foreclosure of a COA lien does not
extinguish a priority lien held by an FHFA conservatorship, such as Fannie Mae
or Freddie Mac. However, it is important to note that this decision does not
alter the fact that a private entity’s priority lien would still be wiped out
by the foreclosure of a COA’s super-priority lien in D.C. Copyright @2022 USFN USFNews - Nov. 16 * Denotes firm is a 2021 Award of Excellence recipient.
Tags:
#Condos
#DC
#foreclosures
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Posted By USFN,
Friday, November 4, 2022
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McCalla Raymer Leibert Pierce, LLP (USFN Member - AL, CA, CT, FL, GA, IL, KY, MS, NV,
NJ, NY, OH, OR, TX, WA) is proud to announce the appointment of Elizabeth DeSilva as Fellow to the American College of Mortgage
Attorneys. ACMA is made up of 500 lawyers in North America who share a
commitment to giving back to their profession, improving and reforming laws and
procedures affecting real estate secured transactions, and raising the level of
professionalism of lawyers practicing in this area. DeSilva joined MRLP in 2020
as deputy general counsel, where she tracks all firm litigation and ensures
compliance with state and federal law, administrative, and client requirements.
She has more than 20 years of experience in residential real estate and
mortgage banking. DeSilva received a Juris Doctor from Texas Tech University
School of Law, and a B.S. in Government & Business from Texas Woman's University.
Copyright @2022 USFN Fall Report
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#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Friday, November 4, 2022
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Jillian Wilson has been named
Co-Managing Partner of Wilson &
Associates, PLLC
(USFN member – AR, MS, TN). Wilson previously served as the supervising
attorney for the firm’s Arkansas and Mississippi foreclosure legal departments.
She received her B.A from George Washington University and her J.D., cum laude,
from the University of Arkansas School of Law and is currently pursuing her
Master of Business Administration from the University of Arkansas Walton
College of Business. She is a member of multiple industry-related organizations
and is a frequent contributor to panel discussions for national mortgage
banking events and conferences.
Copyright 2022 USFN Fall Report
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#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Friday, November 4, 2022
|

Eric (Ric) Lindquist, of Eric H. Lindquist,
P.C., L.L.O.
(USFN
member – NE), was recently inducted into the Nebraska Football Hall of Fame at
a banquet on September 9. Eric was a three-year starter at cornerback and
was an All-Big Eight choice and Academic All-American in 1981. He finished
his career with 9 interceptions, 11 pass breakups and nearly 100 tackles. Copyright @2022 USFN Fall Report
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#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Wednesday, October 26, 2022
|
by Lance Olsen
McCarthy Holthus, LLP *
USFN Member (AZ, AR, CA, CO, ID, NV, NM, OR, TX, WA)
In the summer of 2020, the Oregon legislature passed House
Bill 4204 addressing foreclosure during the time of the Covid-19 emergency. In
addition to prohibiting most foreclosure activity during a defined emergency
period, the bill also restricted a lender’s ability to pass through certain
costs of default. Further, the bill compelled
deferment to maturity any amounts that came due during the emergency period
unless the borrower agreed otherwise.
By its specific language, HB 4204 was automatically repealed
on March 31, 2021, 90 days after the end of the emergency period created by the
bill.
Recently, the United States District Court for the District
of Oregon had the opportunity to rule on the impact of that repeal as well as
the continuing effect of HB 4204.
As described in the facts of Corvallis Hospitality, LLC v. Wilmington Trust, National Association
et. al, 2022 WL 10475079, between
May and October of 2020, Corvallis Hospitality, LLC, the owner and operator of
the Corvallis Hilton Garden Inn, faced pandemic-related hardships and defaulted
on monies owed to their lender. Corvallis at *2. On October 7,
2020, the lender advised the hotel owners that they were in default, imposing
late fees, interest on past due payments, and accelerating the note. Efforts at
a workout followed, but by April of 2021, the lender moved forward with
non-judicial foreclosure. Id.
On December 14, 2021, the hotel owners filed suit against
their lender alleging, among other things, that the lender had violated HB
4204. Id. Specifically, the hotel owners argued that their lender had
improperly assessed charges associated with the default and had not deferred to
maturity all amounts that came due during the emergency period. Id.
Under HB 4204, a borrower who suffers an ascertainable loss
of money or property because a lender took an action prohibited by the Act is
allowed to bring an action to recover actual damages, as well as the borrower’s
court costs and attorney fees.
On June 22, 2022, the defendant lender moved for judgment on
the pleadings arguing that no cause of action remains under HB 4204. The court
agreed. Id.
The court noted that on June 1, 2021, the Oregon legislature
expressly repealed Section 1 of HB 4204 in its entirety without provision of a
savings clause or any preservation of any part of that section. Id. at
*3. This repeal included the remedies section of HB 4204 under which the
hotel’s action had been brought. Because
after June 1, 2021, HB 4204 ceased to exist, no action can be brought alleging
violation of HB 4204 after that date. Whether the alleged misconduct occurred
during a time when the bill was in effect is not relevant when the entirety of
the bill has been repealed.
The District Court noted that if the legislature had
intended for claims arising under HB 4204 to survive, it would have expressly preserved
those claims in HB 2009, a successor bill that specifically repealed HB 4204. Id.
at *4. The legislature having chosen not to do that, the court declined to
read into the law a contradiction to the actual words in the law.
It should be noted that this opinion is subject to appeal,
and thus, it is possible that we have not heard the last word in Oregon.
However, as of today, it would appear any action based on HB 4204 that was not
pending before June 1, 2021 (and possibly as early as March 31, 2021) cannot
survive.
Also of note is HB 2009, enacted by the legislature on June
1, 2021, provides largely identical restrictions and remedies that had been
provided by HB 4204. Although no subsequent bill repealed HB 4204 in the same
way that HB 2009 repealed HB 4204, Section 12 of HB 2009 provides that Section
1 of HB 2009, the section that includes a borrower’s remedy for violation of
the Act, is repealed 90 days after the expiration of the emergency period.
Thus, after March 31, 2022, any action brought under HB 2009 would seem to be
subject to the same arguments that terminated causes of action under HB 4204.
There are other state and federal cases pending that seek to
define the terms and boundaries of both HB 4204 and HB 2009. As case law
develops, further articles and analysis will be offered. Copyright @2022 USFNews - Nov. 2 * Denotes firm is a 2021 USFN Award of Excellence recipient
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Posted By USFN,
Tuesday, October 25, 2022
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By Sally Garrison, Esq. – Outgoing Chair of DEI Section The Mortgage Law Firm* USFN Member (AZ, CA, HI, OK, OR, WA) Hello, my friends and colleagues. It is time for me to hand off the leadership of USFN’s Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) Section. I admit I am sentimental about it. I love this group of people. They have servants’ hearts coupled with a desire to advocate for our community. It is hard not to love them and be inspired by them. I am so honored to have been a facilitator for all the ideas and innovation generated by this group.
In my time as DEI Section Chair, I have learned that this advocacy work can be scary. To be part of this group, you must practice public vulnerability around colleagues and clients you admire. You must entertain, accept, and sometimes, be changed by criticism. You must present new ideas and trends when you are not an expert, but rather an enthusiast, and you must be open to being challenged on those topics. All the while, there are people who have no interest in DEI, and you must realize that they are your target audience and the exact people you want to engage. This work isn’t for the faint of heart – yet USFN has so many people willing to take on this challenge because they care deeply for our community. To quote Audre Lorde, [t]hat visibility that makes us most vulnerable is that which also is the source of our greatest strength. That has certainly been true for this group; they have risen to the challenge. Despite the public vulnerability promoting DEI initiatives requires, this group has done important work and has made a meaningful impact on USFN. It has generated numerous educational programs and provided a variety of articles on many different DEI topics. It found ways to show up in person to make USFN a more inclusive and thoughtful place. It surveyed the membership to find concrete ways to support our firms so that we can build measurable and meaningful success. It has provided significant and timely content to support USFN’s digital footprint. And this section is not done, not by a long shot. I couldn’t be prouder of the members of this section, and I am excited to see where they go from here. To the DEI Section: You will be in the caring, thoughtful, and talented hands of Janice Nakano. I know she will lead you well. Also, I won’t be far away. I will just be serving and supporting the mission when you need me and cheering you on every step of the way. I will leave you with the words of Amy Poehler: It is very hard to have ideas. It’s very hard to put yourself out there, it’s very hard to be vulnerable, but those people who do are the dreamers, the thinkers, and the creators. They are the magic people of the world. Thank you sincerely for your service to USFN and your trust in me. I am forever grateful. -xo, Sally Copyright @2022 USFN October e-Update
Tags:
#Diversity
#Equity
#Inclusion
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Posted By USFN,
Monday, October 24, 2022
|
By Sonia J. Buck,
Esq.
Brock & Scott,PLLC *
USFN Member (AL,
CT, FL, GA, KY, ME, MD, MA, MI, NH, NJ, NC, OH, PA, RI, SC, TN, VA)
The Maine Law Court has requested amici briefs in an
appeal filed by J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp., regarding key issues in
Maine foreclosure law: strict statutory compliance with Maine’s demand letter
statute and the res judicata effect of a judgment for a defendant based on a
finding that a mortgagee’s demand letter failed to strictly comply.
The Oxford County (Maine) Superior Court ruled that
J.P. Morgan failed to comply with 14 M.R.S.A. § 6111 (Maine’s comprehensive and
unforgiving foreclosure demand letter statute), based on a discrepancy with
respect to the total amount due. J.P. Morgan Mortgage Acquisition Corp., v.
Camille J. Moulton, SOPDC-RE-19-02 (November 24, 2021, J. Tammy
Hamm-Thompson, at page 7). Not only did the Superior Court find for the defendant
homeowner, but the Court’s opinion further ruled that res judicata forever precluded
a second foreclosure. Id. at pg. 9.
Going further, the Superior Court specifically ordered that judgment
“shall enter for the Defendant, declaring that she holds title to the real
property at issue, unencumbered by the mortgage and promissory note.” Id.
The Court relied on prior Maine case law that has
resulted in “free homes” to defendants for even technical or minor
noncompliance by the plaintiff with respect to the demand letter. That prior
case law, most notably, FNMA v. Deschaine, 2017 ME 90, and Pushard
v. Bank of America, 2017 ME 230, now has the potential to be overturned.
Although the request for the amici briefs centers
around the preclusive effect of a judgment for the defendant based on the
demand letter statute, it remains to be seen whether the Law Court will also
provide guidance in Moulton as to the level of scrutiny the itemization
and other components of a Maine demand letter will be subject to going forward.
Will minor defects in a demand letter render a note
and a mortgage forever unenforceable? Stay tuned. Copyright @2022 USFN e-Update
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#FreeHouseTrend
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Posted By USFN,
Monday, October 24, 2022
|
By Joseph R.
Dunaj, Esq.
Bendett &McHugh PC *
USFN Member
(CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT)
On August 30, 2022, the Connecticut Appellate Court issued
its opinion in the case of Lending Home
Funding Corporation v. REI Holdings, LLC, 214 Conn. App. 703, 2022 WL
3712640 (2022). In the opinion, the Appellate Court clarifies the rules of
practice that govern the appellate stay and how those rules interact with and
affect the law days set in a judgment of strict foreclosure. The opinion serves
as a reminder to foreclosing plaintiffs to thoroughly review the court file to
ensure that all stays have expired, so that valid title is obtained after a
foreclosure.
In the case, the
plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on property in South Windsor, CT. On
January 28, 2019, the trial court entered a judgment of strict foreclosure in
favor of the plaintiff and set the first law day for May 20, 2019. On May 15,
2019, one of the defendants, REI Holdings, LLC (REI) filed a motion to open
judgment, claiming that the appraised value for the property was too low. On
May 20, 2019, the trial court denied the motion, and sua sponte extended the
first law day until June 24, 2019. On June 10, 2019, REI filed a motion to
reargue the denial of the motion to open. The motion to reargue was timely
filed within the appeal period from the denial of the motion to open. On July
3, 2019, the trial court denied the motion to reargue, sending notice on July
5, 2019. The trial court did not extend the law days sua sponte, nor did any
party file a motion asking to set new law days. The plaintiff subsequently
recorded a certificate of foreclosure, evidencing the transfer of title, and
then conveyed the property via a quitclaim deed to a third party that was not a
part of the foreclosure case.
On December 7, 2020, another defendant in the case,
Traditions Oil Group, LLC (Traditions Oil), filed a motion to open judgment. In
its motion, Traditions Oil claimed that because REI had filed a timely motion
to reargue within the appeal period, that it continued the appellate stay until
the motion to reargue was decided, which rendered the June 24, 2019 law day
ineffective. Therefore, title did not vest in the plaintiff. The trial court
denied the motion to open and a subsequent motion to reargue, concluding that
it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the motion to open because title had
vested in the plaintiff in 2019. Traditions Oil then took an appeal.
The Appellate Court engaged in a discussion of the interplay
between Connecticut Practice Book §§ 63-1 and 61-11, governing appeal periods
and the appellate stay respectively, and how certain motions may extend the stay.
Generally speaking, the rules of practice set a 20-day period from the entry of
a judgment to file an appeal. During that period, there is an automatic stay on
proceedings to enforce or carry out the judgment, and, if an appeal is filed,
the stay remains in existence until the appeal is resolved. However, if during
the appeal period, a party files a motion that would render the judgment
ineffective (including a motion to open or a motion to reargue), then the
appeal period and the appellate stay continue until the motion is decided. These
rules apply to both the entry of a judgment, as well as to a court’s denial of
a motion to open judgment.
The Appellate Court noted that, in the context of strict
foreclosures, if a law day is scheduled while an appellate stay is in effect,
then the law day is ineffective. Continental
Capital Corp. v. Lazarte, 57 Conn. App. 271, 749 A.2d 646 (2000). The Appellate Court also noted that the
Connecticut Supreme Court, in reliance on the precursor to Practice Book § 63-1©,
had previously ruled that a motion to open a judgment, filed within an appeal
period, continues the appellate stay until the motion to open is decided, and
thus the law days will be ineffective. Farmer
& Mechanics Savings Bank v. Sullivan, 216 Conn. 341, 579 A.2d 1054
(1990). The Appellate Court also noted that Practice Book § 63-1© specifically
lists both motions to reargue and motions to open judgment as motions that
would render a judgment ineffective. Given this background, and as applied to
the facts in the case, the Appellate Court held that REI’s timely filing of a
motion to reargue on June 10, 2019, continued the appellate stay from the
denial of REI’s prior motion to open, and, because the motion to reargue was
not decided until July 3, 2019, the June 24, 2019 law day was ineffective.
Therefore, title never vested in the plaintiff. The Appellate Court reversed
the decision of the trial court and remanded the case back to the trial court for
further proceedings.
The Appellate Court’s opinion provides much needed
clarification and guidance in the adjudication of post-judgment matters in
foreclosure cases. A critical factor in determining whether the trial court has
jurisdiction to open a judgment is whether title has vested or not. And, as
noted in the case, the effectiveness of the law days can depend on whether
motions are filed or not, and whether such motions are timely filed. Familiarity
with the interaction between the appellate stay and scheduled law days can
shape how a plaintiff responds to post-judgment motions filed by defendants. For
instance, the Appellate Court noted that Practice Book § 11-11, which governs
motions to reargue, specifically incorporates Practice Book § 63-1. Presumably,
if a defendant files a motion to reargue that does not comply with the
provisions of Practice Book § 11-11, then an otherwise timely motion to reargue
would not extend the appellate stay.
The Appellate Court’s opinion should also serve as a frightening
reminder to all foreclosing plaintiffs and counsel to be diligent to ensure the
validity of the title obtained through the foreclosure. Although the Appellate Court briefly
mentioned that the plaintiff had conveyed its interest to a third party, the
Court does not opine at all as to the validity of that third party’s title.
Foreclosing plaintiffs and counsel should review their case file with a fine-tooth
comb to be absolutely sure that title has properly vested, and thus avoid
potential litigation after the property is sold at REO. Copyright @ 2022 USFN e-Update
Tags:
#CT
#Foreclosures
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Posted By USFN,
Friday, October 21, 2022
|
by Todd
Garan, Esq.
AldridgePite, LLP *
USFN
Member: (AK, CA, FL, GA, HI, ID, NY, OR, UT, WA)
For
the third time this year, on September 21, the Federal Reserve increased the federal
prime rate by three-quarters of a percent to 6.25%. Further, the Federal Reserve signaled additional
increases are likely until inflation subsides. With each rate increase, an
opportunity arises to seek a higher interest rate in Chapter 11 and Chapter 13
Bankruptcy Plans for secured creditors faced with a potential “cramdown.” This article
will focus on the impact of rate increases on the formula prescribed by In re Till,
addressing risk factors posed by the debtor and/or the collateral itself, and
case strategy for obtaining a higher interest rate in bankruptcy cases as the
Federal Reserve continues to raise the prime rate.
I.
The
Till Formula and why Bankruptcy Courts
Rely Upon it?
In the Chapter
11 context, §1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) requires a debtor's plan to provide the
secured creditor with “deferred payments” having a "present value" in
the full amount of the creditor's secured claim.
The same rationale applies to
secured claims in the Chapter 13 context. See,
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
Given the
applicability of the present value analysis to secured claims under both Chapter
11 and Chapter 13 plans of reorganization, most courts’ interest rate
methodology starts with a review of the Supreme Court's plurality decision in Till
v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004). In Till, the Supreme Court adopted a two-part “prime-plus” formula for
determining the proper interest rate a debtor should pay on a creditor’s secured
claim that complies with the “cramdown” provisions of the Bankruptcy Code Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465,
(2004). The Supreme Court in Till
stated that:
“the
approach begins by looking to the national prime rate, reported daily in the
press, which reflects the financial market's estimate of the amount a
commercial bank should charge a creditworthy commercial borrower to compensate
for the opportunity costs of the loan, the risk of inflation, and the
relatively slight risk of default. Because bankrupt debtors typically pose a
greater risk of nonpayment than solvent commercial borrowers, the approach then
requires a bankruptcy court to adjust the
prime rate accordingly. The appropriate size of that risk adjustment depends,
of course, on such factors as the circumstances of the estate, the nature of
the security, and the duration and feasibility of the reorganization plan.”
In
proposing this method, the Court in Till was motivated primarily by what
it viewed as the method’s simplicity and objectivity.
First, the method minimizes the need for costly evidentiary hearings, as the
prime rate is reported daily, and as “many of the factors relevant to the
[risk] adjustment fall squarely within the bankruptcy court’s area of
expertise.”
Second, the approach varies only in “the state of financial markets, the
circumstances of the bankruptcy estate, and the characteristics of the loan”
instead of inquiring into a particular creditor’s cost of funds or prior
contractual relations with the debtor.
Third, while courts often
acknowledge that Till’s infamous Footnote 14 appeared to endorse a
“market rate” approach for Chapter 11s if an “efficient market” for a
loan substantially identical to the cramdown loan exists, courts almost
invariably conclude that such markets are lacking.
Thus,
the prime-plus formula is particularly helpful in Chapter 13 cases, but also in
individual Chapter 11 cases, where the majority of the loans in question are residential,
including 1 to 4 unit properties. A creditor can utilize what evidence is
readily available in the bankruptcy case to help bolster, or further elaborate
on the risk factors to adjust the prime rate upwards to appropriately
compensate a creditor for the risk associated with the debtor’s proposed
Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 Plan of reorganization, serving to minimize costly
experts, or lengthy evidentiary hearings. This is something all parties can
appreciate, given the forum.
II.
Who
Has The Burden of Proof?
In
discussing the “prime-plus” interest rate calculation, the Till Court went on to explain that in starting from a concededly low
estimate and adjusting upward, the evidentiary burden is placed squarely
on the creditors, who are likely to have readier access to any information
absent from the debtor's filing.
Thus, it is up to the creditor to argue how and why the proposed interest rate
should be increased above the prime rate for any additional risks.
III.
Determining
the Federal Prime Rate
Fortunately,
ascertaining the federal prime rate for purposes of a bankruptcy proceeding is straightforward
and cost effective as this information is readily available through well-known
public sources, including the internet. As a result, the federal prime rate may
be subject to judicial notice,and is capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to reliable sources.
As of September 21, 2022, the
Federal Prime rate was 6.25%.
The chart below outlines the federal prime rate adjustments since March 2020:
|
Date of Change
|
Federal Prime
Rate
|
|
3/16/2020
|
3.25%
|
|
3/17/2022
|
3.50%
|
|
5/5/2022
|
4.00%
|
|
6/16/2022
|
4.75%
|
|
7/28/2022
|
5.50%
|
|
9/21/2022
|
?
|
Notably,
because the prime rate is readily available, a creditor can quickly review a debtor’s
Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 Plan of reorganization to determine if the cramdown
rate is below the current federal prime rate. If so, the plan is likely
unconfirmable, and a creditor may proceed with a plan objection without a full
analysis of the debtor’s perceived “risk factors.” However, a creditor seeking an interest rate
above the prime rate will need to proceed with the “plus” portion of the Till formula through an examination of
“risk factors.”
IV.
Evidence Available
in the Bankruptcy Case to Assist the Risk Factor Analysis
As
discussed above, the burden of proof for adjusting the proposed cramdown rate lies
with the creditor. In other words, once the appropriate prime rate is
determined, the burden falls on the creditor to convince the court risk factors
warrant a rate adjustment above the prime rate. The key is to use the most cost
effective means available to help build up the risk factors and achieve a more
fair and appropriate interest rate for the secured claim. Creditors may utilize
what evidence is already available in the bankruptcy case to avoid the need for
additional expert testimony and attendant costs. So, where can a creditor find
this information?
A. Debtors’ Schedules.
First, a creditor may examine any risks outlined in the Debtor’s Schedules and
Statements. This seems obvious, but it is equally important to understand a debtor’s
bankruptcy schedules and statements are executed under oath and can be treated
as admissions of fact of which a court can also take judicial notice.
As such, the schedules provide useful information with an evidentiary basis
about the debtor, debtor’s operating history, and information to test the
veracity of debtor’s good faith intent and financial projections.
B. Monthly Operating Reports.
Second, monthly operating reports are unique to Chapter 11 Cases, including in
the Subchapter V context. The filing of monthly operating reports are mandatory
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, associated with U.S.
Trustee’s guidelines, and are often adopted through local bankruptcy court rules
as well. Operating reports are very helpful in the
risk assessment process because the reports readily allow a creditor and court
to view the actual and historical income and expense information for a
property, including, but not limited to, property taxes, any debt payments,
insurance, homeowners’ association dues, property management fees, and maintenance
and repair costs over the course of the case.
C. Debtor’s Financial Projections.
Third, debtors are often required to provide financial projections in support
of a plan of reorganization, particularly in a Chapter 11, to support how a debtor
will make payments under the plan to prove feasibility, a required element of
plan confirmation.
These projections should, though do not always, provide income and expense information
on a property-by-property basis, in addition to a debtor’s personal income and
expenses, and payments proposed under the plan of reorganization.
The above information is within the “four corners” of the
debtor’s bankruptcy case to provide a creditor with admissible evidence to
support the risk factors below and build on the federal prime rate to appropriately
compensate a creditor for risks under a proposed plan of reorganization.
V.
The
Risk Factors and Putting it Altogether
In
addition to the information gathered from the debtor’s bankruptcy filings,
additional risk factors may be evident based on: (i) the history of the debtor;
(ii) the nature of the debtor’s proposed restructuring; or (iii) the collateral
itself. Generally, the appropriate size of the risk adjustment depends upon
such factors as the circumstances of the debtor’s estate, the nature of the
security (collateral), and the duration and feasibility of the proposed
reorganization plan. These factors may
be further refined and/or expanded on by considering: (a) the quality of debtor's management; (b) the commitment
of the debtor's owners; (c) the health and future prospects of the debtor's
business; (d) the quality of the lender's collateral; and (e) the feasibility
and duration of the plan.
However, in many ways, these are merely factual refinements within the three
factors initially discussed by the Till Court.
A. The Debtor’s Pre-Bankruptcy History. Generally, information about the debtor or debtor’s
history may not factor heavily in terms of an upward risk adjustment since it
assumes the debtor struggled financially to end up in bankruptcy. However,
there are certain instances where evidence should be referenced to make it more
of a factor or less neutral to the court. A debtor is expected to manage and
perform under the proposed plan of reorganization, after all, so what has gone
on before should not be completely ignored and could serve to test the veracity
or even the good faith of debtor’s proposed plan of reorganization.
For
example, is the debtor a repeat filer, or does the debtor have a history of
filing for bankruptcy protection every few years, or defaulting on previously
confirmed plans? In essence, is there a greater likelihood debtor may drag
creditors through a bankruptcy case seeking the benefits of a modification, but
fail to follow through in completing a plan of reorganization to term or
discharge? Accordingly, the debtor’s pre-petition
history could provide grounds for an upward risk adjustment.
Another
red flag involves a newly formed entity with no operating history or
substantive assets beyond the real property in question versus an ongoing
business with a decent operating history, cash reserves, or other substantive assets.
The former is riskier because the debtor is a self-contained unit with very
limited business prospects absent the real property rental income, and thus, warranting
a risk adjustment upwards in the court’s risk analysis.
Thus,
creditors and the court should not ignore the debtor’s pre-petition history and
debtor’s historical management of the assets as the perspective can provide
some argument for an upward risk adjustment.
B. The
Nature of the Debtor’s Proposed Operations.
A creditor should examine the debtor’s plan of reorganization itself, and
how all the assets and income/expense projections will be treated
post-confirmation. In assessing risk, it is important to understand whether the
debtor’s assets have sufficient equity to be liquidated in a time of disruption.
For instance, if the debtor proposes to “cramdown” all loans to the fair market
value of each asset at plan confirmation, thereby creating a portfolio of 100%
loan-to-value debt, how will the debtor handle a downturn post-confirmation? While it is true a debtor may benefit from
cramdowns over time, if there is a disruption shortly after confirmation, a debtor
may find it difficult to refinance or even sell certain real property that is
in default with no equity. An upward market may provide some relief, while a
flat or falling market would obviously pose challenges for the reorganized
debtor. Thus, it is important to examine the risks of the debtor’s proposed
plan of reorganization itself.
Further,
it is crucial to thoroughly review and scrutinize a debtor’s financial projections
and overall substantive cash flow under the plan, including the net cash flow
of each real property asset. Are there substantive cash reserves available after
the payment of administrative claims following confirmation of the plan? Is the
debtor expected to operate at a negative cash flow for any substantive period
post-confirmation, or does it appear any of the real property assets will fail
to generate sufficient net income after expenses? Are there expenses that are
patently missing from the debtor’s projections, or are those expenses overly simplistic? Indeed, while the overall plan may appear
feasible on its face, it may be that certain real property assets are in fact
problematic, requiring debtor to compensate by reallocating funds. In such a
scenario, courts should consider the risks of default as to the subject
property, and other assets as well. This
in turn could lead to a cascading effect in the debtor’s performance under the
plan, particularly where debtor is not able to quickly liquidate or refinance
assets to deal with defaults or disruptions. It is worthwhile to note these
issues for the court based upon evidence already before it, as it serves to
provide a reality check on debtor’s plan projections overall.
C. The Collateral Itself. Arguably, the property itself is one of the
most important factors for the court to consider in assessing risk adjustment
above the federal prime rate. A rental property may be inherently riskier than
a debtor’s residence, which makes sense because in a time of distress or
disruption, a debtor is more likely to use income from other sources, including
the rental property, to pay the mortgage on a home than the rental property obligations.
Similarly, a debtor will be less likely to dip into personal net income to
cover the expenses for that rental property when there is a disruption in the
rental income stream, thereby shifting the expenses and risk to the creditor. Some
of this risk may be mitigated depending upon the type of rental property in
question. For example, a 1 to 4 unit property with multiple tenants may fare
better in terms of handling income disruptions due to a vacancy, unlike a
single-family residence with only one tenant. At the same time, multi-unit
properties can be more costly given common area expenses and maintenance, so
thorough verification of expense information is very important.
In
addition, the occupancy status and vacancy rate of the property should be
examined as risk factors. Will the real property be occupied and generate
rental income by the effective date of the plan? If not, debtor would invariably have to
either forgo meeting such projected expenses post-confirmation for a period,
thereby creating a deficit, or pull funds from elsewhere to cover any
shortfall, which may make debtor’s ability to perform under the plan generally,
or other real property obligations, more precarious.
Similarly,
creditors should scrutinize the specific property projections against
historical income and expense information in the monthly operating reports or
schedules to ensure all regular and ongoing expenses are considered, along with
a sufficient cushion for disruptions, vacancy and/or repairs for the property.
If the debtor’s current projections only consider the mortgage payment, taxes,
and insurance, with little to no net income, this is largely a red flag, and suggests
the debtor’s projections are far too simplistic and will not be able to handle
any disruptions. This is certainly a notable risk adjustment.
A
less common example that would give rise to an upward risk adjustment, but an
important one, is whether the property or collateral requires repairs before it can become habitable and
generate income to meet the debtor’s proposed expenses under a plan. If the debtor’s
financial projections do not allow for, or anticipate how those repairs will be
made, and/or when the repairs would be completed, then any chance of the debtor
being able to meet those projections by the effective date is likely illusory,
at best, given funds from elsewhere under the plan would need to be utilized.
Accordingly,
while the burden of proof to establish cause for a rate adjustment falls on
creditors, many reorganizations present ample evidence and perceived risk
factors to justify a higher interest rate above the federal prime rate.
VI.
Final
Outlook: The Increasing Federal Prime Rate Should Be Utilized To Compensate for
Risk and Provide Creditors with Leverage
As
the Federal Reserve continues to raise the base prime rate, creditors seeking a
higher cramdown interest rate should closely monitor for upcoming rate
increases. It may be wise to postpone any stipulated agreement regarding the
appropriate market rate until closer to the confirmation date if the Federal
Reserve has signaled an intent to raise rates in the near future. Further, each rate increase presents a
creditor with increased leverage in plan negotiations and an opportunity to
negotiate more favorable plan terms.
Further, by utilizing the risk factors
discussed above, and the information readily available to the court in the debtor’s
bankruptcy case, creditors may bring these risks to the court’s attention
easily and thereby present an opportunity to obtain a 1- to 3-point increase
above the federal prime rate to compensate the creditor more appropriately for
the anticipated risks. For example, if
the prime rate is currently at 6.25%, it is possible for a creditor to obtain a
rate of 6.50% to 10.50% by utilizing evidence that is already before the court.
In addition to compensating for risk under a debtor’s
plan, there is a secondary benefit. If
the court agrees with a creditor’s analysis, then a debtor must rework the
proposed financial projections at the adjusted interest rate. If this occurs, a
debtor may conclude retention of the collateral provides more of a burden than a
financial benefit, which may result in the court blocking confirmation, or a stipulated
surrender of the collateral. At the very
least, it makes the debtor more amenable to a creditor’s preferred stipulated claim
treatment terms. Likewise, a debtor may be forced to convert or dismiss a case
if the appropriate interest rate adversely affects the feasibility of the
proposed plan. Again, higher interest rates result in increased creditor
leverage. Something most creditors prefer, particularly in the Chapter 11
context.
Thus, by using trending increases to the federal prime rate
to recalculate the Till formula, and
by utilizing the evidence within the debtor’s bankruptcy case to support upward
rate adjustments due to perceived risk factors, creditors can obtain more
favorable loan terms under the debtor’s proposed plan of reorganization, or
block a cramdown or reorganization altogether. Copyright @2022 Fall 2022 USFN Report
Tags:
#Bankruptcy
Interest Rates
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Posted By USFN,
Friday, October 21, 2022
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by Bret Chaness, Esq.
Rubin Lublin, LLC *
USFN Member (AL, GA, MS, TN)
Almost one and a half years after a panel
of the Eleventh Circuit issued its original opinion in Hunstein v. Preferred
Collection and Management Services, Inc., the en banc court has
concluded that the panel got it wrong. Hunstein involved a debt collector that
“electronically transmitted to Compumail [its mailing vendor] certain
information about [him], including, among other things: (1) his status as a
debtor, (2) the exact balance of his debt, (3) the entity to which he owed the
debt, (4) that his debt concerned his son’s medical treatment, and (5) his
son’s name. Compumail used that information to generate and send a dunning
letter to Hunstein.” Hunstein sued Preferred, alleging that it violated the
FDCPA prohibition on communicating with third parties in connection with the
collection of a debt. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b). The district court
dismissed the case, concluding that Preferred’s communications to Compumail
were not “in connection with the collection of any debt.” Despite Hunstein not
alleging that he had any actual damages because of the alleged violation, the
district court did not address whether he had Article III standing.
The
three-judge panel issued its original opinion in April 2021. In that decision,
the panel raised the question during briefing as to whether Hunstein had
Article III standing because he alleged only a statutory violation without
suffering actual harm. The panel noted that, in such a situation, standing
could only be established if the “statutory violation at issue led to a type of
harm that has historically been recognized as actionable” and “that the fit
between the new statute and a pedigreed common-law cause of action need not be
perfect, but we are called to consider at a minimum whether the harms match up
between the two.” The panel concluded that the statutory prohibition of
communicating with third parties was a close fit with the tort of “public
disclosure of private facts” and thus found Hunstein had Article III standing.
Because
the court found Hunstein had standing, it went on to analyze whether the
district court was correct in its decision that the transmission of data was
not a communication “in connection with the collection of any debt.” The
district court found it was not because for a communication to be “in
connection with the collection of any debt,” the communication must “make[ ] an
express or implied demand for payment.” Since the information Preferred sent to
Compumail did not demand payment of a debt, the district court held that it was
not “in connection with the collection of any debt.” The Court of Appeals
disagreed that such a communication must “make[ ] an express or implied demand
for payment” because the cases that came to such a conclusion were based upon
violations of Section 1692e, not 1692b(c). Section 1692e concerns
communications to consumers, while Section 1692b(c) concerns communications
with third parties. Because communications with third parties would never
demand payment from the debtor, the court concluded that the term “in
connection with the collection of a debt” does not have the same meaning in
both sections.
Instead,
the court held the term should be given its plain meaning, looking at the
meaning of “the phrase ‘in connection with’ and its cognate word,
‘connection.’”
Dictionaries have
adopted broad definitions of both. Webster's Third defines “connection” to mean
“relationship or association.” Connection,
Webster's Third International Dictionary at 481 (1961), and the Oxford
Dictionary of English defines the key phrase “in connection with” to mean “with
reference to [or] concerning,” In
Connection With, Oxford Dictionary of English at 369 (2010). Usage
authorities further explain that the phrase “in connection with” is “invariably
a vague, loose connective.” Bryan A. Garner, Garner's Dictionary of Legal Usage
440 (3d ed. 2011).
Based
on this broad definition, the court stated that “[i]t seems inescapable that
Preferred’s communication to Compumail at least ‘concerned,’ was ‘with
reference to,’ and bore a ‘relationship [or] association to its collection of
Hunstein’s debt” and “[held] that Hunstein has alleged a communication ‘in
connection with the collection of any debt’ as that phrase is commonly
understood.” Thus, the district court’s judgment dismissing the case was
reversed by the panel.
It was the court’s decision
regarding a communication in connection with the collection of a debt, rather
than its standing decision, that immediately alarmed the default services
industry. In fact, the court even recognized the impact of its decision on the
industry, stating that
It's not lost on us that our interpretation of §
1692c(b) runs the risk of upsetting the status quo in the debt-collection
industry. We presume that, in the ordinary course of business, debt collectors
share information about consumers not only with dunning vendors like Compumail,
but also with other third-party entities. Our reading of § 1692c(b) may well
require debt collectors (at least in the short term) to in-source many of the
services that they had previously outsourced, potentially at great cost. We
recognize, as well, that those costs may not purchase much in the way of “real”
consumer privacy, as we doubt that the Compumails of the world routinely read,
care about, or abuse the information that debt collectors transmit to them.
Even so, our obligation is to interpret the law as written, whether or not we
think the resulting consequences are particularly sensible or desirable.
Needless to say, if Congress thinks that we've misread § 1692c(b)—or even that
we've properly read it but that it should be amended—it can say so.
Preferred quickly filed a petition for
rehearing en banc, and amicus briefs poured in giving countless examples
of mundane practices that could be considered prohibited under the panel’s
interpretation of communications in connection with the collection of a debt.
It was suggested that the panel’s interpretation could prohibit simply filing and serving a lawsuit
to collect a debt, since lawyers and their staff – who work at firms that may
qualify as debt collectors – must communicate with court staff, judges, process
servers, and others to effectively prosecute a case.
Under Eleventh Circuit rules, a petition
for rehearing en banc is also treated as a petition for rehearing before
the original panel. In this case, the panel issued a substitute opinion on October
28, 2021, in response to the petition for rehearing en banc. The
substitute opinion was issued to address the impact, if any, of the Supreme
Court’s decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021). TransUnion
was a case that further addressed whether plaintiffs have Article III standing
to assert claims for statutory damages in the absence of actual harm. The
substitute opinion concluded that TransUnion did not change its
conclusion from the original opinion that Hunstein had Article III standing.
However, the panel was not unanimous in this holding. Unlike the original
opinion, the substitute opinion included a vigorous dissent from Judge Gerald
Tjoflat, who argued that the proper application of TransUnion should
mean Hunstein lacks Article III standing.
Before Preferred had an opportunity to
file another petition for rehearing en banc following issuance of the
substitute opinion, the court acted on its own and ordered the case be heard en
banc. Oral arguments were heard in February 2022, and after a seven-month
wait, the en banc opinion was issued on September 8, 2022. The en
banc court disagreed with the standing analysis and held that the plaintiff
did not have Article III standing. Judge Britt Grant, writing for the majority,
concluded that there is not a close fit between the FDCPA provision at issue
and public disclosure of private facts because that tort requires publicity
of highly offensive facts. In this case, there was no publicity, which
requires disclosure to the public at large and not just one private party.
Judge Grant also found the communications were not of highly offensive
information. Because these essential elements of the tort were missing, the
plaintiff lacked standing, and the district court was correct in dismissing the
case.
While this decision is certainly a victory
for Preferred and the industry, because the court held that Hunstein lacked
standing, it did not address the merits question of whether the transmission of
the data was a communication in connection with the collection of a debt. That
question remains open (the original panel decision was vacated), but the Hunstein
decision makes it far more difficult for a plaintiff to establish the threshold
issue of standing when they allege nothing more than a statutory violation.
However, in an unpublished decision
released just one day before Hunstein, a panel that included Judge Grant
vacated a district court’s decision dismissing an FDCPA case for lack of
standing and allowed a case to proceed on very tenuous claims of actual
damages. In Toste v. The Beach Club of Fontainbleau Park Condo. Ass’n, Inc.,
No. 21-14348, 2022 WL 4091738 (11th Cir. Sept. 7, 2022), a plaintiff sued his
homeowner’s association and lawyers representing it under the FDCPA, alleging
that it tried to collect incorrect amounts from him and filed a claim of lien
on those incorrect amounts (for this, Toste alleged an improper communication
with a third party, just like Hunstein). The plaintiff claimed that he suffered
damages in time wasted addressing his concerns and emotional distress resulting
in lost sleep. The district court dismissed the case for lack of standing,
“consider[ing] his emotional damages and the time he spent trying to discover
the true amount of his debt to be too insubstantial.” The Court of Appeals
reversed, finding in part that the plaintiff’s time spent addressing each debt
collection letter amounted to an actual injury. The court noted that “concrete
harm from wasted time requires, at the least, more than a few seconds” but that
Toste had spent “at least several minutes” on each letter (of which there were
two). Although Toste is unpublished, district courts will likely find it
persuasive, and it set a very low bar for pleading actual damages. Plaintiff’s
lawyers who are aware of the decision may very well tailor their pleadings
based on this decision so that they can get past a motion to dismiss for lack
of standing.
Thus,
while Hunstein ruled out many FDCPA claims based solely on a statutory
violation, Toste has provided a roadmap for plaintiff’s lawyers to
attempt to plead actual damages based on nothing more than alleging that their
client made a phone call or spent a few minutes reading a letter they thought
was confusing or incorrect. Copyright @2022 Fall 2022 USFN Report
Tags:
#Hunstein
Eleventh Circuit
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Posted By USFN,
Friday, October 21, 2022
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By Victor Kang,
Esq.
Rubin Lublin,LLC*
USFN Member (AL,
GA, MS, TN)
As we move into
the post-COVID world where companies are battling staffing shortages and remote
workforce demands, a new struggle for employers is how best to meet these
challenges by leveraging technology. By now, everybody in the default services
workforce has most likely used Zoom, Webex, Go-To-Connect, and probably has had
nightmares with that incessant Teams notification rattling in your brain
(bumm-bumm-bloop-bloop-dahbumm-bumm). No matter how the workforce is
structured, there are elements of technology that intrude into all areas of
work.
With that in
mind, what do you do if you have employees who refuse to learn or adapt to this
new era of communication? What are your options if an employee continues to
ignore company policies that attempt to automate or create efficiencies through
use of new advances? As an important, but often ignored, aspect of DEI, ageism
is something that all employers must be careful to not perpetuate in their
human resource decisions. In 2020, more
than 20,000 age discrimination complaints were filed with the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. The AARP says that almost two out of three
workers who are 45-plus years old- have seen or experienced age discrimination
in their workplace. In the same survey, 91% of those respondents said that age
discrimination is common.
Inevitably,
there will be situations where you may have to move forward and separate from
an employee due to their inability to adapt. Here are some pointers on how to
avoid potential discrimination lawsuits or challenges to your company’s
policies.
1.
Document Everything!
Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), workers ages 40 and over are
protected from age discrimination in the workplace. This means that an employee
cannot face harassment, discrimination, termination, or pressure to retire
because of their age. This protection should be factored into all actions taken
to remediate or correct an employee who is protected. Additionally, depending
on your jurisdiction, terminated employees may ask for a reason or
documentation. Even for states that are at-will employment, the terminated
employee can (and often will) file a complaint with state or federal
authorities (State Department of Labor or the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission). It is paramount that your managers document effectively that the
employee was given proper trainings, re-trainings, and other remedial measures
to give them every chance to learn the new skills.
2.
Provide Trainings and Skill Assessments
When you hold
trainings on new technologies, do not exclude older workers. Make sure that
trainings are crafted to all skill levels; do not assume that all staff have
similar backgrounds. Some may require
more personalized trainings, and age should not factor into who gets more
attention. Document each additional training and require acknowledgement from
the staff; require read receipts or written signatures as part of your
training. Prepare knowledge and skill tests that require a passing score. With
more layers of training documentation and skill assessments, you can document
that any potential remedial actions are justified and based solely on skill set
and aptitude.
3.
Review Potential Accommodations Within
Reason
If you come
across situations where staff members cannot or will not learn the new skills,
a potential alternative is to see if there are any other job functions that may
require less technical skills. Perhaps there are roles that require more manual
duties. This form of accommodation, especially for protected classes, can show
that you exhausted all options. Be careful, however, not to allow certain
people to be held to a different standard of duties. Even though staff under 40
may not be protected from age discrimination, you may unintentionally create a
toxic work environment if any staff member is immune from client systems or
online meetings. Ironically enough, the thought of not forcing an older worker
to learn newer technology to prevent ageism claims might backfire and lead to
MORE discrimination because of resentment from co-workers. You might start
hearing derogatory nicknames because other staff members have to create workarounds
for the employee.
4.
Stay Consistent Among ALL Staff
When you are
ready to move forward with a write-up, consult with your HR manager to create a
clearly worded action plan. Make sure to list out all trainings, meetings,
one-on-ones, and other proof that the employee was given the same (or
additional) training. Including additional verbiage to clarify that these new tasks
are a result of client/court requirements (i.e., using BKFS, Serengeti, e-File,
PACER, Tempo, etc.) or essential communication tools for remote work will demonstrate
that you are not arbitrarily creating processes to target the employee’s lack
of skills. For example, if an employee is a fully remote worker, you have justification
to require them to use Zoom, Teams, or other communication tools to facilitate
contact with them. Requiring the use of other technology, like logging billable
hours through web-based applications, using e-faxes, scanners, and webcams can
all be an essential part of the job if the requirements are equally applied.
5.
Spread The Wealth
Termination is
not the only time age discrimination can occur under ADEA. In considering
promotions and compensation, age cannot be a factor in your analysis. One
question all companies and firms may deal with is how to compensate or account
for aging employees who may show decline in efficiency and productivity as they
age. An employment attorney, in conjunction with your HR manager, should be
able to help navigate this conundrum. But, as with all other areas, focus
solely on the skill set and utility of the worker. Use measurable metrics
(files touched, accuracy rates, internal performance scorecards) that cannot be
attributed solely to age to avoid challenges of discriminatory promotions or
raises.
6.
Hire Younger? Not So Fast!
Perhaps by only
hiring younger applicants, you think you can avoid some of the issues touched
on above? That’s definitely not the right way to proceed. Another area under
the ADEA that can be a potential issue is discriminating applicants based on
their age. Searching the internet for an applicant’s age or looking at the year
a candidate received their degree on a resume, are major missteps and something
that ADEA does not allow. The recommendation is to have blind resume reviews
where school graduation dates are obscured. Also, to avoid age discrimination,
create knowledge or skill-based tests that can be used to differentiate
prospective candidates based solely on ability and not age. For example, use a combination
of basic knowledge tests (math/grammar/attention to detail) and computer skills
aptitude tests (create dummy files in your client system and give them simple
instructions to locate a file by loan number, typing speed tests, internet- and
MS Office-skills tests). Most recruiting sites like Indeed, ZipRecruiter,
SimplyHired and Monster will have examples of skill tests.
7.
Don’t Underestimate An Ageism Claim
While ageism
claims are viewed as sometimes harder to successfully prove compared to other
discrimination suits, bear in mind that a plaintiff who successfully sues an
employer for age discrimination under the ADEA can potentially recover back pay,
lost benefits, and equitable relief including front pay, along with attorney’s
fees and damages. Front pay covers the loss of income that may continue to
occur after the trial is over. Some examples of damages paid include $15.4 million
from the LA Times to a sportswriter and $11 million from Google to over 200
plaintiffs. These damages can cripple a company, so the risk is extremely high
and worth avoiding at all costs. The root of most of these cases originated
from mass layoffs. Unfortunately, during the COVID pandemic, almost every firm
and company was affected by the moratoria against foreclosure and eviction
actions. Hopefully, we never experience
that again, but if you find yourself having to undertake layoffs, make
absolutely certain that age is not a factor. You must not consider how soon
they may be near retirement age; while it may seem logical to force someone out
with an early retirement, an involuntary termination can lead to potential
claims.
Companies
ultimately want to avoid all forms of discrimination. In addition to the
federal protections offered under the ADEA, consult with an employment attorney
to make sure any actions you undertake do not run afoul of any state or local
guidelines. Some jurisdictions may have additional constraints on top of state
or Federal guidelines. Ageism and technology, unfortunately, are linked at the
hip, so take the time to foster a collaborative environment for all
backgrounds. Steer clear of stereotypes and have a diverse workforce. Consult
your HR manager and employment attorney when implementing new policies that
could be viewed as targeting those over 40. In the end, just like with any
other protected class, equal treatment of all is the basic tenet to avoid
issues. Copyright @2022 Fall 2022 USFN Report
Tags:
#ageism
#Equity. #Inclusion
age discrimination
Diversity
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Posted By USFN,
Friday, October 21, 2022
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By
Blair Gisi, Esq.
SouthLaw,PC*
USFN
Member (IA, KS, MO, NE)
With
the housing shortage continuing, some companies in Kansas are getting creative
with how they are replenishing their inventory. It is becoming more and more
common for title work ordered in anticipation of a foreclosure to include a
recent conveyance from the borrowers to a business entity. The parties intend to
convey redemption rights to that entity by virtue of a deed, given that K.S.A.
§60-2414(a) provides very clearly that a “defendant owner may redeem real
property” following the Sheriff’s Sale.
K.S.A §60-2414(a) also provides
that:
. . . . Except for mortgages
covering agricultural lands or for mortgages covering single or two-family
dwellings owned by or held in trust for natural persons owning or holding such
dwelling as their residence, the mortgagor may agree in the mortgage instrument
to a shorter period of redemption than 12 months or may wholly waive the period
of redemption.
In other words, where a
single-family residence is no longer owned by a natural person and the subject
mortgage includes a redemption-waiver clause, a lender may be entitled to
wholly waive any redemption period.
Now, if a defendant owner can show
the trial court that the property is being held as their primary residence,
redemption waiver may not be appropriate. However, with a vacant property, or
in a situation where the defendant owners are renting the property or generally
no longer using the property as their primary residence, there should be no
issue with successfully arguing the redemption period was waived; and with the
redemption period waived, the lender is
entitled to a Sheriff’s Deed immediately following the Sheriff’s Sale.
The case law is light on this
pursuit in this context, so best practices likely warrant a discussion between
the law firm and the lender/investor before alleging the redemption is waived.
However, under the right circumstances, this statute could prove useful as a
powerful REO tool.
Copyright @2022 Fall 2022 USFN Report
Tags:
Kansas
REO/Eviction
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Posted By USFN,
Friday, October 21, 2022
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By Brian H.Liebo, Esq.
Liebo,
Weingarden, Dobie & Barbee, PLLP
USFN Member (MN)
The mortgage is in default and in foreclosure.
Coincidentally, the house mysteriously burns down. What appears to be just terribly
bad luck for a borrower may turn out to be far more sinister-- arson. In these
instances, a mortgage servicer needs to quickly focus on hazard insurance claim
issues, in addition to foreclosing the mortgage. A critical issue with fire damage cases, and
other hazard insurance, is whether the foreclosure should be completed without
regard to a pending hazard insurance claim.
When a home in foreclosure burns down, the mortgage servicer
should not automatically rush to complete the foreclosure. Instead, the
mortgage servicer should fully resolve the hazard policy claim and obtain the
claim proceeds before having the sheriff’s sale conducted. Speeding to sale and
improperly handling the hazard claim process can have more than one detrimental
impact, including full loss of coverage. Specifically, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals has held that where a mortgagee forecloses its mortgage after the date
of the hazard loss and bids full debt, the mortgagee may forfeit its separate
rights under the mortgage clause of a fire insurance policy.
In the pivotal case, Margaretten
& Co. v Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 526 N.W.2d 389 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995),
a fire destroyed the mortgaged property. The insurer denied the homeowner’s
claim for insurance proceeds because the owners caused the fire. The mortgagee
filed a claim for its own insurance benefits under the terms of the hazard
insurance policy. However, the insurer also denied the mortgagee’s claim
because the mortgagee refused to give the insurer a partial assignment of the
mortgage equal to the insurance benefits payment. The insurer was trying to
preserve its own right of subrogation for the arson. The mortgagee ultimately
foreclosed on the delinquent mortgage and bid in the full debt amount at the
sheriff’s sale. After the lender sued to recover the insurance proceeds, the
Court held the insurer was right to deny the claim, and it was justified in requiring
the mortgagee to give a partial assignment of the mortgage that would have
balanced the parties’ interests. This result makes clear that a mortgage
servicer with a pending hazard loss should not complete a foreclosure until it
is sure it has satisfied all insurance policy requirements and fully resolved
its claim with the insurer.
It is important to note that Minnesota has a short, two-year
statute of limitations period for insurance loss claims. In fact, it is necessary to not just make a
claim within two (2) years from the date of loss, but also commence a lawsuit
within two years from the date of loss to compel coverage and ensure all policy
rights are preserved by the lender.
While a foreclosure can be a complicated enough process,
throwing in a large hazard loss such as arson can create a process full of
pitfalls and peril. Hence, the safest approach, wherever possible, is for a
servicer to fully resolve hazard-loss claims and funds with both the insurers
and borrowers, respectively, before completing foreclosures. Doing so may help
prevent not only losses of coverage, but also protracted litigation. Copyright @2022 Fall 2022 USFN Report
Tags:
Foreclosures
Minnesota
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Posted By USFN,
Wednesday, October 12, 2022
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By Kayo Manson-Tompkins, Esq.
The Wolf Firm, A Law Corporation *
USFN Member (CA, ID, OR, WA)
For
decades, non-judicial foreclosures have been processed pursuant to California
Civil Code Section 2924, et seq. Basically, the trustee records a substitution
of trustee and notice of default and then waits 90 days, or what is referred to
as the pre-publication period. After the pre-publication period expires, the
trustee schedules a sale date, records a notice of sale, mails out the notice
of sale, publishes the notice of sale, posts the notice of sale, and then
conducts the sale.
Of course, this process, which used
to take approximately 120 days to complete, has already been elongated by the
passage of AB 1837, which created California Civil Code Section 2924m. This
statute allows qualified bidders to submit a notice of intent to bid up to 15
days after the foreclosure sale, and then submit funds that exceed the original
bid up to 45 days after the foreclosure sale.
On February 18, 2022, Senator Bob
Archuleta introduced a bizarre bill, SB 1323, that created a major stir in the
industry and came incredibly close to passage. Under SB 1323, the foreclosure
trustee was required to take steps to market the subject property prior to conducting
a foreclosure sale if there was “equity” in the property.
This approach was subject to a
number of significant problems. First, the standard deed of trust does not
provide the trustee with the power to market property prior to foreclosure
sale. The trustee does not own the property and has no right to sell it except
by foreclosure sale. Nonetheless, the proposed Bill required that the trustee
list the property with a real estate agent and offer the subject property for
sale. Again, the bill was silent as to what role the owner had in this process
(e.g., could the owner refuse to allow the property to be shown), and whether
the trustee and/or real estate agent could be held liable for trespassing on
the owner’s property or for selling the property at a price less than what the
owner claimed the true value to be.
The
determination of equity was also problematic. The only real way to obtain an
accurate appraisal is with an interior inspection. The bill was silent as to
what role the trustor (owner of the property) had in this process, and whether
the trustee had the power to force the homeowner to allow an interior
inspection. Also, there was concern that the trustee might have liability for
an inaccurate appraisal.
The good
news is that the United Trustee’s Association, in association with other
industry trade groups, killed SB 1323 - it is dead!!! Had this bill passed, at
the very least, it would have caused major delays in the foreclosure process, opened
up new litigation challenges to the foreclosure, and in the end, may have even
caused most lenders to seek judicial (which was not subject to the legislation)
as opposed to non-judicial foreclosure.
The bad
news is that the “equity sale” concept may arise from the dead. A new bill is
being written to create a different procedure that would protect homeowners
from losing the equity in their homes due to foreclosure. The industry
organizations are working through their lobbyists to ensure that this Bill is
carefully tracked once introduced and that it is refined so that it falls
within the standard foreclosure process.
We are
ever watchful of what the California legislature is doing that might impact the
foreclosure process and ultimately our clients’ portfolios.
Should
you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact Kayo Manson-Tompkins,
kayo.manson-tompkins@wolffirm.com
or Caren Castle, caren.castle@wolffirm.com. * Denotes Law Firm is a 2021 Award of Excellence Recipient Copyright @2022 USFNews
Tags:
#Foreclosures
California
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