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Kansas: Creatively Using Redemption Waivers in REO

Posted By USFN, Friday, October 21, 2022

By Blair Gisi, Esq.

SouthLaw,PC*

USFN Member (IA, KS, MO, NE)

 

With the housing shortage continuing, some companies in Kansas are getting creative with how they are replenishing their inventory. It is becoming more and more common for title work ordered in anticipation of a foreclosure to include a recent conveyance from the borrowers to a business entity. The parties intend to convey redemption rights to that entity by virtue of a deed, given that K.S.A. §60-2414(a) provides very clearly that a “defendant owner may redeem real property” following the Sheriff’s Sale. 

            K.S.A §60-2414(a) also provides that:

            . . . . Except for mortgages covering agricultural lands or for mortgages covering single or two-family dwellings owned by or held in trust for natural persons owning or holding such dwelling as their residence, the mortgagor may agree in the mortgage instrument to a shorter period of redemption than 12 months or may wholly waive the period of redemption.

            In other words, where a single-family residence is no longer owned by a natural person and the subject mortgage includes a redemption-waiver clause, a lender may be entitled to wholly waive any redemption period.

            Now, if a defendant owner can show the trial court that the property is being held as their primary residence, redemption waiver may not be appropriate. However, with a vacant property, or in a situation where the defendant owners are renting the property or generally no longer using the property as their primary residence, there should be no issue with successfully arguing the redemption period was waived; and with the redemption period waived, the lender [KSJ1]is entitled to a Sheriff’s Deed immediately following the Sheriff’s Sale.

            The case law is light on this pursuit in this context, so best practices likely warrant a discussion between the law firm and the lender/investor before alleging the redemption is waived. However, under the right circumstances, this statute could prove useful as a powerful REO tool.

           


 [KSJ1]I don’t know Kansas law, but should this be “purchaser” to cover cases where a third party buys at Sheriff’s Sale?

 

 

Copyright @2022

Fall 2022 USFN Report

Tags:  Kansas  REO/Eviction 

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Clarifying 'Usual Place of Abode' in SCRA Collection Cases

Posted By USFN, Tuesday, February 4, 2020
Updated: Monday, February 3, 2020


by Blair Gisi, ESQ. 
SouthLaw, P.C. 
USFN Member (IA, KS, MO, NE)

In overturning the default judgment granted against the debtor in Coastal Credit, LLC v. McNair, 446 P.3d 495 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019), the Kansas Court of Appeals has recently made an important ruling regarding service of process on active military debtors.

The debtor in McNair was in active status in the Army and stationed in Africa when the financing contract he had entered into to purchase a car went into default.  After the default, the creditor repossessed the car, sold it, and then filed a limited action against the debtor to pursue the remaining deficiency.

While the debtor was stationed in Africa, his family was living in Manhattan, KS and in February 2014, the process server executed service upon the debtor’s family at the “usual place of abode” per the process server’s field notes.  It was also noted that that the debtor was in the military and stationed in Africa until June 2014.

The debtor failed to respond or appear to any of the subsequent pleadings and hearings and after complying with the relevant Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) requirements, default judgment was granted against the debtor in August 2015.  When the debtor noticed his wages being garnished in October 2017, he sought to set aside the judgment and disgorge the garnished funds.

To support his motion, the debtor argued that the service was ineffective since the debtor was not served at his “usual place of abode” as defined by Coleman v. Wilson, 1995 Kan. App. Unpub. LEXIS 932 (Ct. App. Dec. 1, 1995).  In that case, this court held that a military service person's usual place of abode is where the person lives, eats, sleeps, and works at the time of the attempted service.  However, the district court denied debtor’s motion on the grounds that service on the debtor’s wife at their Manhattan, Kansas residence as the usual place of abode and that the service was valid.  Debtor timely appealed that ruling.

Focusing on the “usual place of abode” argument, which comes from Kan. Stat. Ann. § 61-3003, the Court of Appeals overturned the district court. 

The Court of Appeals began its analysis with the legislative intent of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 77-201 which provides:

Usual place of residence' and 'usual place of abode,' when applied to the service of any process or notice, means the place usually occupied by a person. If a person has no family, or does not have family with the person, the person's office or place of business or, if the person has no place of business, the room or place where the person usually sleeps shall be construed to be the person's place of residence or abode.

Finding that the legislative intent of the statute was clear and unambiguous, the Court of Appeals applied the statute to mean that the debtor’s usual place of abode in this situation was “the room or place where he usually slept,” which at the time, was in Africa.  The Court of Appeals went on to further state that a person’s usual place of abode may be determined on a case-by-case basis and had the debtor been on vacation or brief business trip to Africa, for instance, then the Manhattan would have constituted his usual place of abode.  Here, the active military deployment to Africa for six months was enough to shift his usual place of abode from his family’s residence to Africa.

The Court of Appeals also made an interesting distinction between a family’s usual place of abode the debtor’s usual place of abode in finding that that there was ineffective service on the debtor, stating that they are not necessarily the same and that the family’s usual place of abode does not control the debtor’s usual place of abode.

When attempting service on an active military debtor, the McNair case serves as an outline for both the scrutiny the debt collector may face in obtaining a default judgment as well as the additional steps that may be necessary in ensuring the judgment can withstand that scrutiny.

Copyright © 2020 USFN. All rights reserved.

Winter USFN Report

 

Tags:  Bankruptcy  Kansas  Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) 

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