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CT Supreme Court Reaffirms Stance on Reformation of Mortgages in JP Morgan Chase v. Virgulak

Posted By USFN, Tuesday, April 12, 2022

by RobertWichowski, Esq.

Bendett &McHugh, PC*

USFN Member (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)

 

The Connecticut Supreme Court in JP Morgan Chase v. Virgulak (341 Conn 750 (2022)) further clarified Connecticut’s stance on the reformation of mortgages when attempting to foreclose.

  

The subject mortgage was given by Theresa Virgulak, securing a note given by Robert Virgulak. The note was not signed by Theresa, and the mortgage was not signed by Robert. Robert obtained a Chapter 7 discharge of the debt through bankruptcy, and therefore, was no longer obligated on the note. Plaintiff brought the action which contained three counts: 1) it sought reformation of the mortgage to order that the mortgage secured Robert’s indebtedness; 2) it sought to have the court order that Theresa was unjustly enriched in that she benefited from the loan, and; 3) it sought foreclosure of the mortgage, as reformed.  After a one-day trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Theresa holding that plaintiff failed to sustain its burden of proof that it was entitled to have the mortgage reformed to include Robert, and that it failed to prove that Theresa was unjustly enriched by the loan, and therefore, the claim of foreclosure necessarily failed.

 

The trial court found that Robert signed the note, but the note was not signed by Theresa. The court also found that Theresa signed the mortgage which recited that it was given to secure the $533,000 note. The court further found that Theresa never signed a guarantee of the debt. Although the court held that many of the documents were signed by Theresa, including the HUD-1 settlement statement, the Truth in Lending Statement, and the Notice of Right to Cancel, the note was not signed by her. The trial court also held that even though Theresa testified that the mortgage was used to pay a prior mortgage, she did not receive any of the funds, a portion of which were also used to pay off Robert’s unsecured debt and a portion of which were used to renovate the subject property in which she lived. The record was silent as to any understanding that plaintiff may have had regarding Theresa’s responsibility under the loan. On that basis, the court found that plaintiff was not entitled to the remedy of reformation of the mortgage. Notably, the plaintiff conceded that there was no evidence that required the trial court to find that Theresa intended that the mortgage secure Robert’s debt.

  

The Supreme Court held there was no sufficient evidence presented and that plaintiff fell short of meeting the very high burden required to prove that there was a mutual mistake of the parties, which would require reformation of the mortgage to conform with the understanding of the parties. In making its holding, the Court reiterated its stance that reforming written instruments is something that should be done cautiously. Because there was a discharge of the debt secured by the mortgage, Theresa did not guarantee the debt, and there was insufficient evidence that she intended to, the court ruled that the documents should not be reformed. Accordingly, given that there was no debt secured by the mortgage due to the bankruptcy discharge, plaintiff could not foreclose on Theresa’s interest in the property.

 

This case reveals the high burden that must be met in Connecticut for those that seek to foreclose on mortgage documents where the foreclosing plaintiff is seeking to “fix” defects in the mortgage documents by adding parties or additional obligations.

 

@Copyright 2022

USFN Report - Spring 2022  

Tags:  #Foreclosures  #USFN  Connecticut Supreme Court 

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Awarding Committee for Sale’s Fees and Costs Does Not Violate Automatic Stay

Posted By USFN, Wednesday, December 18, 2019


by Kevin Galin, Esq.
Bendett & McHugh, P.C.
USFN Member (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)

 

The Connecticut Supreme Court recently visited the question of whether state courts have jurisdiction to extend the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) (1) to motions by those court appointed attorneys that administer foreclosure sales (called “committees for sale” or “committees” in Connecticut foreclosure practice. The committees perform duties similar to auctioneers) to recover fees and expenses from non-debtor foreclosure plaintiffs.  In a decision stemming from a writ of error filed by the committee for sale, the Court held that an award of a committee’s fees and costs during a bankruptcy stay does not violate the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

In U.S. Bank, N.A. as Trustee v. Jacquelyn N. Crawford et.al, 333 Conn. 183 (2019), the trial court entered a judgment of foreclosure by sale, and pursuant to Connecticut practice, appointed a committee to conduct the sale. After the sale had been conducted but prior to the sale approval, the defendant-mortgagor filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection, automatically staying the proceedings. The committee nonetheless filed a motion pursuant to Connecticut General Statute § 49-25,[1] which sought to recover fees and expenses incurred prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition in preparing and conducting the sale.

The trial court considered itself bound by Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, 150 Conn. App. 745 (2014), a prior Connecticut Appellate Court decision which held that such motions for award of committee’s fees were prohibited from being awarded as violative of the automatic bankruptcy stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 .  In doing so, the Appellate Court in Shivers held that even though the committee’s motion did not directly affect the defendant, since these fees and costs would be able to be sought by plaintiff at the conclusion of the case, such a motion was subject to the stay.  Relying upon Shivers, the trial court here denied the committee’s motion. The committee’s writ of error followed.

In Crawford, the Connecticut Supreme Court overrules Shivers to the extent that Shivers held that state courts have jurisdiction to extend the automatic stay provisions to proceedings against non-debtors, in particular, the committee for sale appointed in a foreclosure action. The Court first visits the issue of whether or not the denial of the committee’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees is a reviewable issue, which the Court finds that it is.[2] The Court then acknowledges that while the writ of error was rendered moot during the pendency of the writ of error, in that the automatic stay was terminated by virtue of the defendant-mortgagor’s bankruptcy case being dismissed, the claim is reviewable under the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine. 

In doing so, the Court describes this issue to be one that is “of some public importance” as a committee for sale functions as an arm of the court in a judicial sale and that under the Shivers holding, attorneys may be more reluctant to serve as sale committees if they run the risk of being rendered unable to recover their fees and expenses promptly, and without having to seek a judgment from the bankruptcy court, if the debtor declares bankruptcy.

Crawford reinforces the significance of the public policy served by resolving foreclosures expeditiously and further emphasizes the importance of the sale committee’s role in doing so.   It also highlights the relationship between federal bankruptcy proceedings and state court foreclosure actions, clarifies the responsibility of a mortgage servicer to pay committee of sale fees and expenses, notwithstanding a pending bankruptcy of a defendant, and now puts Connecticut state law with respect to this issue in line with most of the holdings of the Bankruptcy Courts for the District of Connecticut. Although there is a split of authority amongst Connecticut’s Bankruptcy courts on the payment of fees and costs during a bankruptcy, further challenges on this issue in Bankruptcy Courts are expected.



[1] General Statutes § 49-25 provides in relevant part: ‘‘[I]f for any reason the sale does not take place, the expense of the sale and appraisal or appraisals shall be paid by the plaintiff and be taxed with the costs of the case. . . .’’

[2] Justice McDonald’s dissenting opinion, with whom Justices Mullins and Kahn join, while conceding that the Shivers decision is inconsistent with the conclusions reached by several federal bankruptcy courts, disagrees with the majority result insofar as the majority finds that the denial of a motion for an award of committee’s fees is an immediately appealable order and therefore the substantive issue should not be reached.

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December e-Update


Tags:  Connecticut Supreme Court  Foreclosure  U.S. Bank N.A. as Trustee v. Jacquelyn N. Crawford 

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