by RobertWichowski, Esq.
Bendett &McHugh, PC*
USFN Member (CT,
MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)
The Connecticut Supreme Court in JP Morgan Chase v.
Virgulak (341 Conn 750 (2022)) further clarified Connecticut’s stance on
the reformation of mortgages when attempting to foreclose.
The subject mortgage was given by Theresa Virgulak, securing
a note given by Robert Virgulak. The
note was not signed by Theresa, and the mortgage was not signed by Robert. Robert obtained a Chapter 7 discharge of the
debt through bankruptcy, and therefore, was no longer obligated on the
note. Plaintiff brought the action
which contained three counts: 1) it sought reformation of the mortgage to order
that the mortgage secured Robert’s indebtedness; 2) it sought to have the court
order that Theresa was unjustly enriched in that she benefited from the loan,
and; 3) it sought foreclosure of the mortgage, as reformed. After a one-day trial, the trial court
entered judgment in favor of Theresa holding that plaintiff failed to sustain
its burden of proof that it was entitled to have the mortgage reformed to
include Robert, and that it failed to prove that Theresa was unjustly enriched
by the loan, and therefore, the claim of foreclosure necessarily failed.
The trial court found that Robert signed the note, but the
note was not signed by Theresa. The
court also found that Theresa signed the mortgage which recited that it was
given to secure the $533,000 note. The
court further found that Theresa never signed a guarantee of the debt. Although the court held that many of the
documents were signed by Theresa, including the HUD-1 settlement statement, the
Truth in Lending Statement, and the Notice of Right to Cancel, the note was not
signed by her. The trial court also held
that even though Theresa testified that the mortgage was used to pay a prior
mortgage, she did not receive any of the funds, a portion of which were also used
to pay off Robert’s unsecured debt and a portion of which were used to renovate
the subject property in which she lived. The record was silent as to any understanding that plaintiff may have
had regarding Theresa’s responsibility under the loan. On that basis, the court
found that plaintiff was not entitled to the remedy of reformation of the
mortgage. Notably, the plaintiff
conceded that there was no evidence that required the trial court to find that Theresa
intended that the mortgage secure Robert’s debt.
The Supreme Court held there was no sufficient evidence
presented and that plaintiff fell short of meeting the very high burden required
to prove that there was a mutual mistake of the parties, which would require
reformation of the mortgage to conform with the understanding of the parties.
In making its holding, the Court reiterated its stance that reforming written
instruments is something that should be done cautiously. Because there was a
discharge of the debt secured by the mortgage, Theresa did not guarantee the
debt, and there was insufficient evidence that she intended to, the court ruled
that the documents should not be reformed. Accordingly, given that there was no debt secured by the mortgage due to
the bankruptcy discharge, plaintiff could not foreclose on Theresa’s interest
in the property.
This case reveals the high burden that must be met in Connecticut
for those that seek to foreclose on mortgage documents where the foreclosing
plaintiff is seeking to “fix” defects in the mortgage documents by adding
parties or additional obligations.
@Copyright 2022
USFN Report - Spring 2022