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After prolific litigation, Utah Court of Appeals affirms summary judgment in favor of beneficiary in Lewis

Posted By USFN, Wednesday, February 28, 2024

Court holds foreclosure statute of limitations had not expired and other claims were barred by res judicata


by HillaryR. McCormack, Esq.

Halliday,Watkins & Mann, P.C.*

USFN Member (UT, AK, AL, CO, ID, MN, MS, MT, ND, NE, SD, WY)

 

Utah Code § 57-1-34 requires anyone seeking to foreclose an obligation secured by a deed of trust by either commencing a judicial foreclosure action or initiating a nonjudicial foreclosure by recording a notice of default, within the “period prescribed by law.” The “period prescribed by law” is found in Utah Code § 70A-3-118(1), which prescribes a six-year statute of limitations running from the due date or dates stated in the note, or if a due date is accelerated, within six years after an accelerated due date. However, in Lewis v. U.S. Bank Trust, N.A., as Trustee for LSF9 Master Participation Trust, --- P.3d ---, 2024 WL 57521, 2024 UT App 3, the Utah Court of Appeals clarified that when notices of default are canceled, the statute of limitations is effectively paused, thus preserving a beneficiary’s right to foreclose at a later date. Prolific litigants should also be wary of claim preclusion barring future suits when they could have and should have brought those claims in a prior suit.

 

Brian Lewis (“Lewis”) purchased property in Mona, Utah in August 2014. However, when Lewis bought the property, it was already encumbered by a 2008 deed of trust in favor of U.S. Bank Trust, N.A., as Trustee for LSF9 Master Participation Trust (the “Trust”), which was in default. A notice of default had been recorded in April 2010, but then canceled on May 1, 2014. That same day, a new notice of default was recorded before eventually being canceled on April 30, 2020.

 

When Lewis learned of a pending foreclosure sale to be held in September 2016, he filed suit in state court against the foreclosing parties seeking to quiet title and prevent any future foreclosure, arguing the statute of limitations to foreclose had expired. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Utah. See Lewis v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-01252, 2018 WL 485967 (D. Utah Jan. 18, 2018). The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of the foreclosing parties, holding that the statute of limitations began when the newest notice of default recorded on May 1, 2014, and had not expired when a foreclosure sale was scheduled in September 2016. Lewis appealed to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, but his appeal was dismissed for lack of prosecution. See Lewis v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., No. 18-4020, 2018 WL 3996494, at *1 (10th Cir. May 3, 2018).

 

Continuing a tortured litigation history, days after his appeal’s dismissal, Lewis filed a new complaint in state court against the Trust, again seeking to quiet title in his favor and enjoin the Trust from claiming any interest in the property. The Trust removed the case to federal court, to which Lewis objected and amended his complaint in state court. The state court determined it did not have jurisdiction due to removal, but the federal court eventually remanded the case to state court based on lack of diversity jurisdiction.

 

After further maneuvering, including motions to dismiss, another amendment to the complaint to include claims for quiet title based on laches and unjust enrichment, an interlocutory appeal, and the Trust electing to pursue a judicial rather than nonjudicial foreclosure which was then consolidated into the already pending case, the Trust filed two separate motions for summary judgment and a Notice of Errata to address a watermark inadvertently filed with one of the motions. The Trust’s first motion argued that Lewis’ quiet title and unjust enrichment claims were barred by res judicata. The second motion argued the Trust was entitled to a foreclosure judgment and order of sale, and the statute of limitations had not expired. Lewis, through counsel, only responded to the quiet title motion, leaving the judicial foreclosure motion unopposed. Lewis’ counsel argued she had not realized there were two separate motions, but the court rejected the contention and granted both the Trust’s motions. The court entered judgment, and later declined to set it aside after Lewis filed a motion under Rule 60(b)(1) of Utah’s Rules of Civil Procedure. Lewis appealed.

 

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held the claim preclusion branch of res judicata barred Lewis from recovery on his quiet title and unjust enrichment claims. Lewis’ quiet title claim involved the same property and was a continuation of his yearslong efforts to avoid foreclosure. Although the legal theory behind his quiet title claim in the most recent suit was new (laches), the underlying claim and those in previous litigation arose from the same transaction. Similarly, his unjust enrichment claim, premised on the idea that his maintenance and improvement of the property benefited the Trust since he began improving the property in 2015, could have been raised in his prior 2016 suit. So, because the quiet title and unjust enrichment claims could have been raised in previous litigation, res judicata barred them in the current suit.

 

Lewis also argued on appeal that the district court incorrectly concluded the statute of limitations to foreclose had not run. Lewis contended that the default occurred when payments were missed in 2009, but foreclosure was not initiated until 2016, when he learned of a scheduled trustee’s sale. However, the Court of Appeals relied on its precedent in Deleeuw v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, 2018 UT App 59, 424 P.3d 1075 holding that the “period prescribed by law” for commencing a foreclosure as required by Utah Code section 57-1-34 was the six-year statute of limitations found in Utah Code section 70A-3-118(1). This six-year statute of limitations runs from the due date or dates stated in the note, or if a due date is accelerated, from the accelerated due date. The Court of Appeals also cited its precedent in Daniels v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust, 2021 UT App 105, ¶ 3, 500 P.3d 891 and Johnson v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, 2020 UT App 127, ¶ 21, 475 P.3d 946 (Utah 2021) in holding that recording a notice of default is an act of acceleration, causing the statute of limitations to begin running. However, the Court of Appeals clarified that canceling a notice of default halts the statute of limitations, whereas recording a new notice re-accelerates the due date and thus restarts the limitations period. The 2010 notice of default recorded against the property was canceled on May 1, 2014, and a new notice recorded that same day before that new notice was itself canceled on April 30, 2020. Each cancellation halted the limitations period, whereas each notice recording started the period anew. Therefore, the limitations period had not run when the Trust filed its judicial foreclosure. Lewis also argued on appeal that the Trust’s judicial foreclosure claim was a compulsory counterclaim in his 2016 suit, which has yet to be addressed in Utah. However, the Court of Appeals declined to consider the argument because it was unpreserved, leaving the issue unsettled.

 

The Court of Appeals also rejected Lewis’ contention that it was an abuse of discretion for the lower court to have denied his Rule 60(b) motion because his counsel failed to understand there were two pending summary judgment motions requiring response. The Court of Appeals held that Lewis failed to establish the requisite due diligence necessary for relief from the judgment due to mistake or inadvertence under 60(b), because failing to read documents in full was unreasonable and made him ineligible for relief. Therefore, the lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 60(b) motion when there was no proper basis for relief from the judgment.

 

Going forward, mortgagees may feel more confident in foreclosures where there has been no acceleration, and that they may effectively pause the statute of limitations by canceling a notice of default. However, because the Court of Appeals declined to address whether judicial foreclosure was a compulsory counterclaim to earlier, borrower-initiated litigation, mortgagees and their counsel will want to keep a close eye on whether a Utah appellate court revisits and weighs in on this issue in a future case.

 

Copyright © USFN 2024

USFNews - March 6

* Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient

Tags:  #statuteofLimitations  #UT #foreclosure 

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Arkansas Court of Appeals Holds Filing a Notice of Cancellation Deaccelerates a Note Tolling the Foreclosure Statute of Limitations

Posted By USFN, Monday, August 14, 2023

By Nicole Murray, Esq.

Wilson & Associates, PLLC*

USFN Member (AR, MS, TN)

 

               In May of this year, the Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed a decision from the Pulaski County Circuit Court, Third Division, holding that the appellant’s foreclosure complaint was not barred by the statute of limitations because its prior maturities of the debt that occurred when it exercised the option to accelerate were later extinguished by filing notices of cancellation (Wilmington Savings Fund Soc’y v. Smith, 2023 Ark. App. 326 (2023)). 

               Milton Smith purchased the subject property and executed a promissory note and mortgage in favor of Bank of America on October 16, 2007. The mortgage provided that, in the event of a default, the lender had the option to declare the entire unpaid balance of the debt, including interest, immediately due and payable, and both the note and mortgage were payable in monthly installments. 

               Smith defaulted on payments on the note in December of 2009, and Bank of America filed a Notice of Default and Intention to Sell which stated that a default had occurred in the payment of the indebtedness and that the unpaid balance of the debt was now wholly due. It also set a foreclosure sale date of July 8, 2010. The sale was later canceled, and a notice of cancellation was recorded in the county records on July 8, 2010. On December 16, 2010, Bank of America recorded another Notice of Default and Intention to Sell with a foreclosure sale scheduled for February 17, 2011, which was later canceled by a recorded notice of cancellation on February 14, 2011.

               The note and mortgage were later assigned to Wilmington Savings Fund Society (“Wilmington”), and Wilmington filed a third Notice of Default and Intention to Sell on February 4, 2016, with a foreclosure sale scheduled for April 5, 2016. In response, Smith filed a complaint to quiet title alleging that the promissory note could not be enforced because no payment had been made since 2009, and thus the statute of limitations for enforcing it had expired. Meanwhile, the hazard insurance on the subject property had expired, and Wilmington sent Smith a letter notifying him that it had obtained the required hazard insurance, as permitted under the terms of the mortgage, and that the premium had been billed to an escrow account created for the loan. Wilmington also later counterclaimed alleging that it was entitled to foreclose because it was still owed the remaining principal sum, plus accrued interest and costs, and the indebtedness under the note had never been accelerated, but even if it had been, the statute of limitations had been tolled by Wilmington’s and/or its predecessors’ abandonment of acceleration as shown by the filing of the notices of cancellation.

               Smith responded with a motion for summary judgment and dismissal arguing that Wilmington’s foreclosure cause of action was barred by the five-year statute of limitation because the limitation period had run many years ago in May 2015 due to Bank of America’s original acceleration of the indebtedness on the note in May of 2010. Wilmington responded by citing Mitchell v. Federal Land Bank, 206 Ark. 253, 174 S.W.2d 671 (1943), arguing the acceleration had been waived through the unilateral actions of the mortgagee when Bank of America waived the May 2010 and December 2010 accelerations by filing notices canceling the foreclosure sales. Wilmington also cited Dunnington v. Taylor, 198 Ark. 770, 131 S.W.2d 62 (1939), arguing that even if the statute of limitation has begun to run when the debt was first accelerated in May 2010, the insurance payments made by Wilmington either tolled the statute of limitation or created a new date from which the limitations would run as each payment was made.

Smith responded by arguing that Mitchell and Dunnington were no longer binding legal precedents because Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-111 had been amended in 1989, and prior to that date, all exceptions to the five-year limitation period had been judicially created. Smith alleged the statute of limitations had undergone a major change after the amendment because the General Assembly had only codified a part of the judicially created exceptions to the statute, but not all of them, and thus the exceptions not expressly included in the statute, such as those from Dunnington and Mitchell, were no longer binding precedent. Wilmington responded by arguing that Dunnington and Mitchell were still binding because the amendment did not include unmistakable language displaying a legislative intent to overrule them.

The circuit court ruled on the motions and entered an order on February 21, 2020, finding that the five-year statute of limitations had run, barring Wilmington from foreclosing on the subject property. In another order on April 6, 2020, the circuit court denied Wilmington’s motion for a new trial, stating that the limitation period had run and the 1989 amendment controlled. Wilmington appealed.

On appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals ruled that Mitchell and Dunnington remained good law and that the legislature had not intended to overrule the prior cases when it amended the statute of limitations in 1989 as shown by the lack of unmistakable language showing such intent. Applying Mitchell to the facts of the present case, the court of appeals found that Wilmington’s foreclosure action was not barred by the statute of limitations because the accelerations of the debt that occurred in May and December 2010 were later extinguished and waived as shown by the filing of the notices of cancellation in July 2010 and February 2011. The note did not mature again until Wilmington later chose to accelerate in 2016, and thus Wilmington’s foreclosure complaint filed in June of 2019 was within the five-year period and not barred by the statute of limitations.

This holding comes as good news to lenders and investors who have chosen to previously accelerate their notes and filed Notices of Default and Intention to Sell, only to later cancel the scheduled foreclosure date. The holding is good news for borrowers too because the parties can now afford to be more generous in canceling prior foreclosures to work with the borrower while no longer battling a looming statute of limitations deadline. While deceleration has long been an option to toll the statute of limitations, this holding provides a clear, concrete example of what deceleration looks like. Lenders and investors can rest assured that their interests are protected by canceling a foreclosure sale after acceleration has occurred as long as a notice of cancellation is filed to toll the statute of limitations.


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USFN e-Update - August

 

 

Tags:  #Arkansas  #Foreclosures  #StatuteOfLimitations 

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