By Melissa RobbinsCoutts, Esq.
McCarthy & Holthus,LLP*
USFN Member (AZ, AR, CA,
CO, ID, NV, NM, OR, TX, WA)
In Rose Court LLC v.
Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., the 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed an issue that is common in the default servicing world – a
defaulted borrower who resorts to filing serial lawsuits aimed at stopping or
delaying foreclosure. For borrowers who know how to play the game well,
foreclosure and eviction proceedings can be delayed for many years while their
lawsuits, bankruptcy filings, and other challenges are knocked down by the
servicer, one-by-one. In Rose Court, the borrower’s loan was in default
for a decade before foreclosure was finally completed, and litigation over the
foreclosure continued for many years thereafter in state, federal, and
bankruptcy courts.
In its published opinion
issued in October 2024, the 9th Circuit affirmed the dismissal of one such
suit, and in doing so, the Court provided valuable clarification on the
applicability of one tool in the servicer’s arsenal for combatting serial
filers: the two-dismissal rule of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(B).
The proceeding at issue
before the 9th Circuit was an adversary proceeding filed by the borrower in
bankruptcy court shortly after the foreclosure sale was finally completed. The
borrower raised wrongful foreclosure claims based on allegations that the
trustee’s sale was not actually held and instead was postponed by the
auctioneer. Ruling on motions to dismiss filed by the defendants, the
bankruptcy court held the plaintiff’s allegations were contradicted by the very
evidence submitted in support of the complaint, and accordingly the borrower’s
claims were all dismissed. The borrower, however, requested leave to amend the
complaint to assert new claims that had not been previously raised in the case
regarding the beneficiary’s standing to foreclose. The bankruptcy court dismissed the adversary
complaint without leave to amend, finding that amendment would be futile
because the borrower had previously asserted and voluntarily dismissed the
“new” claims in prior state court litigation, and accordingly the claims were
barred by the two-dismissal rule.
Generally, a plaintiff is
entitled to voluntarily dismiss its own complaint without prejudice to
re-filing. But Rule 41(a)(1)(B) contains a notable exception: “[I]f the
plaintiff previously dismissed any federal- or state-court action based on or
including the same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on
the merits.” The two-dismissal rule is similar to common law rules of res
judicata and collateral estoppel, except that for res judicata principles to
apply, the plaintiff’s claim must have been decided on its merits in the
prior litigation in order for the claim to be barred in a new suit. The
two-dismissal rule, on the other hand, treats a second dismissal as being
equivalent to an adjudication on the merits, even though the case never
resulted in a decision by the court.
For the two-dismissal
rule to apply, four elements must be present: “(1) the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed an
action in either state or federal court, (2) thereafter the plaintiff
voluntarily dismissed a second action pending in federal court, (3) the two
dismissals concerned the same claim, and (4) the plaintiff seeks to raise the
twice-dismissed claim again in federal court.” In Rose Court, the
Court noted that neither the 9th Circuit nor the U.S. Supreme Court had
previously addressed the meaning of the “same claim” element, although other
courts including the 2nd and 10th Circuits had done so.
In those Circuits that
have considered the question, the courts held that the “same claim” element for
application of the two-dismissal rule should be analyzed under the same
standards as the “same claim” element in a res judicata analysis. Under that
framework, two claims will be deemed to be the “same claim” when “the two suits
arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.” In its published opinion
in Rose Court, the 9th Circuit adopted the same standard for cases
within its jurisdiction. The Court further confirmed that the “same claim”
analysis is based on the federal standard rather than the res judicata
standards of the state law where prior cases had been filed, because the
two-dismissal rule of Rule 41 implicates federal interests in limiting a
plaintiff’s right to repeatedly dismiss the same claims.
Applying these standards
to the claims raised by Rose Court, the 9th Circuit found the borrower’s
“new” claims it sought to raise in an amended adversary complaint were not new
and were instead the same claims previously raised in at least two prior state court
actions the borrower had brought against the same defendants and voluntarily
dismissed. In each prior action, the borrower had challenged the validity of
the deed of trust and claimed the original promissory note was never
transferred to the foreclosing beneficiary. Because the borrower had twice
dismissed claims based on the beneficiary’s alleged lack of standing to
foreclose, the two-dismissal rule precluded the borrower from raising those
claims a third time in the adversary action. As such, the Court affirmed the
lower court’s denial of leave to amend.
Unfortunately for the
parties involved, the saga of Rose Court may not be over. The borrower
attempted to raise a new wrongful foreclosure theory on appeal, based on
allegations that the servicer had interfered with her attempt to reinstate the
loan, and she sought leave to file an amended adversary complaint asserting
that new claim. The 9th Circuit declined
to consider the request because the Court generally will not consider new
arguments on appeal that were not raised in the lower court. Thus, although a
borrower is precluded from re-asserting wrongful foreclosure theories based on
the “same claims” that were previously raised and dismissed, a truly “new”
claim arising out of a different “transactional nucleus of facts” would not
necessarily be barred under either Rule 41’s two-dismissal rule or common law
principles of res judicata.
Copyright © 2024 USFN
USFNews - Dec. 4