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Posted By USFN,
Thursday, January 23, 2025
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Cynthia Kern Woolverton, a member with Millsap & Singer, LLC (USFN Member KS, KY, MO) will be inducted into the American College of Bankruptcy as a Fellow in its 36th Class of the College during its annual meeting in March 2025. The American College of Bankruptcy is an honorary public service association of insolvency professionals invited to join based on a proven record of the highest standards of expertise, leadership, integrity, professionalism, scholarship, and service to the insolvency practice and to their communities. Kern Woolverton joined the firm in 1998 and manages the firm’s practice. She frequently speaks on topics relating to foreclosure and bankruptcy practices and procedures for mortgage servicing and attorney organizations.
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#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Thursday, January 23, 2025
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Gross Polowy LLC (USFN Member NJ, NY) expands it services into the state of Pennsylvania, offering the same suite of services that it currently provides in New York and New Jersey: handling residential foreclosures, contested actions, bankruptcy, evictions, title curative, REO closings, and related litigation for its clients. Jonathan M. Etkowicz will serve as the Supervising Attorney of the Pennsylvania practice. He has 14-plus years of default experience with specialties in the areas of foreclosure, litigation, eviction, legal research and writing, and real estate.
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#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Thursday, January 23, 2025
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BDF Law Group (USFN Member AZ, CA, CO, GA, NV, TX) has announced its expansion into four new states: Alabama, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Wyoming. The firm is now offering foreclosure, litigation, bankruptcy, evictions, and collections services across these states, along with Texas, Colorado, Georgia, California, Arizona, and Nevada. BDF has been a leading provider of legal services to the financial services industry for 35 years.
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#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Wednesday, December 18, 2024
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Fannie Mae released
its Servicing Announcement SVC-2024-07, announcing new allowable
foreclosure and bankruptcy fees. These fees are available for matters
which are active as of January 1, 2025; immediate implementation by servicers
is encouraged and is required by 4/1/2025.
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Posted By USFN,
Thursday, December 12, 2024
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By PatrickHruby, Esq.
Brock& Scott, PLLC *
USFN Member (AL, CT, FL, GA, KY, ME, MD, MA, MI, NH, NJ, NC, OH,
PA, RI, SC, TN, VT, VA)
After this article was submitted for publication, the servicer
appealed the bankruptcy court’s decision. Stay tuned for the outcome of the
appeal and further developments in this case.
A recent
decision from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland sheds
light on a significant issue for mortgage servicers and bankruptcy
practitioners: whether denying a debtor access to an online payment portal
after a bankruptcy filing violates the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362.
The ruling emphasizes the potential legal risks for servicers when discontinuing
certain payment methods for borrowers who file bankruptcy cases.
In re
Klemkowski, Bankr. D. Md. Case No. 22-10257-MMH (October 30, 2024), 2024 WL
4625644, a Chapter 13 debtor sought to compel her mortgage servicer, CitiMortgage,
Inc., and its agent, Cenlar FSB, to restore her access to an online portal used
to make mortgage payments. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, the debtor had
relied on the portal to make her payments. However, once she filed her
petition, the servicer blocked her access, citing its policy of restricting
portal use for borrowers in bankruptcy. The debtor argued that this change
created unnecessary barriers, increasing the likelihood of payment delays and
defaults. The debtor argued that this caused her to miss payments and required
her to defend a motion for relief from stay after falling behind. Meanwhile, the
servicer claimed the restriction was necessary for compliance with bankruptcy
protocols.
The
bankruptcy court ruled that the servicer’s action violated the automatic stay.
The court reasoned that access to the online portal was part of the debtor’s
contractual relationship with the servicer before bankruptcy, based on the
debtor’s right to use the online portal under the servicer’s Online Access
Agreement. This right, as a prepetition contractual interest, became part of
the bankruptcy estate under § 541(a). By unilaterally restricting access to the
portal, the servicer effectively altered the debtor’s rights, thereby
exercising control over estate property in violation of § 362(a)(3).
The
servicer defended its policy by asserting that its systems were unable to
differentiate between borrowers in bankruptcy and those who were not, making it
“impossible” to allow portal access without risking errors or violations of the
automatic stay. However, the court found this explanation insufficient,
describing it as a business decision rather than a legitimate technical
limitation. The court noted that the servicer’s witness, while professional and
knowledgeable about internal procedures, was not a technical expert and did not
provide evidence that these claimed limitations could not be fixed within the
servicer’s system.
The court
also highlighted the practical impact of the restriction on the debtor. Without
portal access, the debtor faced considerable challenges in making timely
payments. She testified about difficulties with alternative methods, including
long delays when making phone payments, issues with mail reliability, the fact
that she had no car, and limited access to branch offices. These barriers, the
court noted, increased the risk of default under her Chapter 13 plan,
potentially undermining her ability to complete the bankruptcy process
successfully.
Judge
Harner emphasized that bankruptcy is designed to give debtors a fair chance to
rehabilitate their finances, not to create new hurdles that could jeopardize
their repayment plans. The court noted that the servicer’s actions were
contrary to the broader goals of bankruptcy law, which aim to make it
easier—not harder—for debtors to comply with their obligations.
Although
the court determined that the servicer’s actions violated the automatic stay,
it did not award monetary damages. The debtor had not provided sufficient
evidence to support a claim for damages under § 362(k). Notably, the debtor did
not present the issue to the court as a stay violation, but under a motion to
compel access to the online portal. The court noted that a case with different
facts may warrant an award of damages under § 362(k).
The court
explained that even though monetary damages were not warranted, the automatic
stay issue remained. Namely, the servicer’s actions to effectively terminate
the Online Access Agreement violated the automatic stay and were void ab
initio. The court explained that “the primary way to abate this violation
is for the Servicer to restore the status quo and the Debtor’s rights under the
Online Access Agreement[,]” but could not determine whether that remedy was
proper or available. Accordingly, the court is allowing the parties to offer
further briefing on those issues.
While this
decision may not gain traction outside of the District of Maryland, it highlights
the need for mortgage servicers to carefully evaluate how their policies align
with bankruptcy law. Many servicers restrict online payment access for
borrowers in bankruptcy, which could result in those servicers inadvertently violating
the automatic stay. The author intends to write on the outcome of the
additional briefing and the court’s final ruling. In the meantime, servicers
may want to consider reviewing their procedures to ensure that borrowers’
rights under prepetition contracts are protected during bankruptcy and reach
out to their bankruptcy counsel to discuss. Copyright © 2024 USFN USFNews - Dec. 18 * Denotes firm is a 2023 Award of Excellence recipient
Tags:
#AutomaticStay
#Bankruptcy
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Posted By USFN,
Monday, December 2, 2024
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By Melissa RobbinsCoutts, Esq.
McCarthy & Holthus,LLP*
USFN Member (AZ, AR, CA,
CO, ID, NV, NM, OR, TX, WA)
In Rose Court LLC v.
Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., the 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed an issue that is common in the default servicing world – a
defaulted borrower who resorts to filing serial lawsuits aimed at stopping or
delaying foreclosure. For borrowers who know how to play the game well,
foreclosure and eviction proceedings can be delayed for many years while their
lawsuits, bankruptcy filings, and other challenges are knocked down by the
servicer, one-by-one. In Rose Court, the borrower’s loan was in default
for a decade before foreclosure was finally completed, and litigation over the
foreclosure continued for many years thereafter in state, federal, and
bankruptcy courts.
In its published opinion
issued in October 2024, the 9th Circuit affirmed the dismissal of one such
suit, and in doing so, the Court provided valuable clarification on the
applicability of one tool in the servicer’s arsenal for combatting serial
filers: the two-dismissal rule of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(B).
The proceeding at issue
before the 9th Circuit was an adversary proceeding filed by the borrower in
bankruptcy court shortly after the foreclosure sale was finally completed. The
borrower raised wrongful foreclosure claims based on allegations that the
trustee’s sale was not actually held and instead was postponed by the
auctioneer. Ruling on motions to dismiss filed by the defendants, the
bankruptcy court held the plaintiff’s allegations were contradicted by the very
evidence submitted in support of the complaint, and accordingly the borrower’s
claims were all dismissed. The borrower, however, requested leave to amend the
complaint to assert new claims that had not been previously raised in the case
regarding the beneficiary’s standing to foreclose. The bankruptcy court dismissed the adversary
complaint without leave to amend, finding that amendment would be futile
because the borrower had previously asserted and voluntarily dismissed the
“new” claims in prior state court litigation, and accordingly the claims were
barred by the two-dismissal rule.
Generally, a plaintiff is
entitled to voluntarily dismiss its own complaint without prejudice to
re-filing. But Rule 41(a)(1)(B) contains a notable exception: “[I]f the
plaintiff previously dismissed any federal- or state-court action based on or
including the same claim, a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication on
the merits.” The two-dismissal rule is similar to common law rules of res
judicata and collateral estoppel, except that for res judicata principles to
apply, the plaintiff’s claim must have been decided on its merits in the
prior litigation in order for the claim to be barred in a new suit. The
two-dismissal rule, on the other hand, treats a second dismissal as being
equivalent to an adjudication on the merits, even though the case never
resulted in a decision by the court.
For the two-dismissal
rule to apply, four elements must be present: “(1) the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed an
action in either state or federal court, (2) thereafter the plaintiff
voluntarily dismissed a second action pending in federal court, (3) the two
dismissals concerned the same claim, and (4) the plaintiff seeks to raise the
twice-dismissed claim again in federal court.” In Rose Court, the
Court noted that neither the 9th Circuit nor the U.S. Supreme Court had
previously addressed the meaning of the “same claim” element, although other
courts including the 2nd and 10th Circuits had done so.
In those Circuits that
have considered the question, the courts held that the “same claim” element for
application of the two-dismissal rule should be analyzed under the same
standards as the “same claim” element in a res judicata analysis. Under that
framework, two claims will be deemed to be the “same claim” when “the two suits
arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.” In its published opinion
in Rose Court, the 9th Circuit adopted the same standard for cases
within its jurisdiction. The Court further confirmed that the “same claim”
analysis is based on the federal standard rather than the res judicata
standards of the state law where prior cases had been filed, because the
two-dismissal rule of Rule 41 implicates federal interests in limiting a
plaintiff’s right to repeatedly dismiss the same claims.
Applying these standards
to the claims raised by Rose Court, the 9th Circuit found the borrower’s
“new” claims it sought to raise in an amended adversary complaint were not new
and were instead the same claims previously raised in at least two prior state court
actions the borrower had brought against the same defendants and voluntarily
dismissed. In each prior action, the borrower had challenged the validity of
the deed of trust and claimed the original promissory note was never
transferred to the foreclosing beneficiary. Because the borrower had twice
dismissed claims based on the beneficiary’s alleged lack of standing to
foreclose, the two-dismissal rule precluded the borrower from raising those
claims a third time in the adversary action. As such, the Court affirmed the
lower court’s denial of leave to amend.
Unfortunately for the
parties involved, the saga of Rose Court may not be over. The borrower
attempted to raise a new wrongful foreclosure theory on appeal, based on
allegations that the servicer had interfered with her attempt to reinstate the
loan, and she sought leave to file an amended adversary complaint asserting
that new claim. The 9th Circuit declined
to consider the request because the Court generally will not consider new
arguments on appeal that were not raised in the lower court. Thus, although a
borrower is precluded from re-asserting wrongful foreclosure theories based on
the “same claims” that were previously raised and dismissed, a truly “new”
claim arising out of a different “transactional nucleus of facts” would not
necessarily be barred under either Rule 41’s two-dismissal rule or common law
principles of res judicata. Copyright © 2024 USFN USFNews - Dec. 4
Tags:
#9thCircuit
#Foreclosures
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Posted By USFN,
Friday, October 25, 2024
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Wilson & Associates, PLLC (USFN Member – AR, MS, TN) is pleased to announce that Shannon Dilday has been promoted to assistant manager of the foreclosure department. Dilday previously served as supervisor of the firm’s Tennessee non-judicial foreclosure team, and has been with the firm since 2015. In addition, the firm also promoted Matt Robins to senior judicial legal assistant.
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#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Friday, October 25, 2024
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Associate Member a360inc, a leading technology solutions provider to law firms, title agencies, mortgage lenders and investors, announced the acquisition of Associate Member ProVest, a market-leading service of process and litigation information services provider to the creditors’ rights legal industry. As part of the transaction, investment funds managed by Morgan Stanley Investment Management (MSIM), Knox Capital, and Nonantum Capital Partners made a strategic investment in a360inc. The combination is a milestone for both a360inc and ProVest and represents innovation for the creditors’ rights industry, setting new standards for productivity through the proper implementation and utilization of technology-driven solutions for creditors’ rights law firms, mortgage lenders and servicers, and the business partner community that supports them.
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#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Thursday, October 24, 2024
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FHA Proposes Updated Policy for Foreclosure Sales Where Secretary-held Liens are Present FHA has posted a
draft Mortgagee Letter in response to the Show
Me decision. The members of the USFN Advocacy Committee are, like most of
you, digesting all the implications. The committee will be meeting in the
coming weeks and preparing comments. If you have any comments you would like
considered for our response, please email Advocacy Committee chair, Katie
Jo Keeling.
The full FHA advisory can be found here. Comments will be accepted
through Nov. 25, 2024.
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Posted By USFN,
Wednesday, September 25, 2024
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By Travis Menk, Esq.
Brock & Scott, PLLC *
USFN Member (CT, NC, RI, AL,
FL, GA, KY, ME, MD, MA, MI, NH, NJ, OH, PA, SC, TN, VT,
VA)
During USFN’s Sept. 10 Briefing, New
Loss Mitigation Options and Bankruptcy Impacts, a discussion featuring four
Creditors’ attorneys and a servicer internal legal counsel highlighted the new
last chance waterfall options recently implemented by the VA, FHA, and the USDA,
and each program’s respective impacts on debtors and creditors in bankruptcy. Each
of these programs, while created with the intent to assist borrowers with new
options in light of the high-interest rate environment, opens the door to a
host of potential issues in the realm of bankruptcy. This Briefing gave a basic
educational overview of each of the three programs and detailed the
considerations and impacts on current bankruptcy processes and forms that will
need concentrated attention by debtors, creditors, and trustees alike to
eliminate potential challenges throughout the bankruptcy process.
The Veteran’s Affairs Servicing
Purchase Program – U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
Marcy J. Ford, Partner at Trott
Law, began the presentation with an overview of the VA’s last chance waterfall
option known as VASP. This program provides for a loan modification
significantly below market interest rate with a 30-to-40-year term option and
may require a three-month trial period. Ford noted that if the debtor is
involved in an active Chapter 13 case, VASP will not be considered while the
case is pending unless the Chapter 13 was filed during a trial period, in which
case court approval is required to finalize the modification. It was noted that
in jurisdictions which do not typically require court approval, this court approval
would likely still be necessary based on the specific VA requirement in this
situation. Ford also noted that if the borrower is in an active Chapter 7 case
and applies for loss mitigation, VASP will not be an option until the case is
closed. However, it was noted that if the debtor files for bankruptcy during
the trial period, VASP finalization goes on hold until the bankruptcy case is closed. Emphasis was placed on the case having to be
closed and that having stay relief or the trustee filing a report of no
distribution would be insufficient. Ford also noted that caution should be
given about advising debtors to dismiss their cases based on the potential to
get VASP eligibility. A question asked
of the panel was how to proceed with VASP as it relates to bankruptcy court
mortgage modification/mediation orders, and it was surmised that these bankruptcy
court modification/mediation programs could not supersede the rules set by the
VA, and, as such, the court would be unable to force VASP as an option during
the case.
The FHA Partial Claim + Payment
Supplement Program – U.S. Federal Housing Administration
Maria Tsagaris, Partner at MRLP,
continued the presentation with an outline of FHA’s last chance waterfall
option known as the FHA Partial Claim + Payment Supplement program. Servicers
must implement this program by January 1, 2025. Tsagaris detailed that borrowers
will be eligible for an amount up to 30% of the outstanding balance of the loan
for a combination of a partial claim to bring the account current with the
remaining available balance divided over 36 months to act as reduction to the
monthly payment amount up to 25% of the payment. The remaining balance after
the partial claim piece is given to the creditor to bring the account current is
to be held by the servicer as a separate custodial account that cannot be
comingled with any other funds. The creditor is permitted to take funds out of
the custodial payment supplement account and apply them to the account when the
debtor pays the creditor the reduced monthly payment amount. The partial claim
plus the payment supplement amounts will become an interest free second lien on
the property pursuant to the recorded security instrument, which will come due
when the first mortgage is paid or refinanced or upon the sale of the property.
Tsagaris mentioned that for the
debtor to be eligible for this program, they had to indicate that they could
maintain the payment and had to sign a note, security instrument, and payment supplement
agreement. In addition to an annual accounting to both HUD and the borrower, 60
to 90 days prior to the end of the 36-month period, the creditor would need to
provide a detailed annual report as to the status of the payment supplement
account. It was also noted that at 36 months and 1 day, the program will
automatically terminate, and any remaining payment supplement funds had to be
refunded to HUD. The program would also terminate in the following scenarios: request
of the borrower, modification, foreclosure, short sale, or deed in lieu.
Tsagaris noted a couple of the mechanics
set forward by the program. The program requires 30-day default reports on each
of these accounts but failure to make an ongoing payment does not terminate the
program. The program also sets forth detailed instructions for the requirements
and responsibilities of servicers regarding the transfers of loans that are
involved in the program. Finally, Tsagaris also noted that servicers will receive
a $1,750 payment supplement incentive for completion of the program. Full
details of the program can be found in Mortgagee
Letter 2024-02.
Alice Whitten, Internal Legal
Counsel for Wells Fargo, when asked, stated that the incentive of $1,750 likely
did not cover the cost to fully implement this program, as it has been
described as one of the most complex programs to implement at the servicer
level. A discussion among the panelists then ensued about whether industry
members were getting too concerned about the impacts of these programs given
that these were last chance waterfall options only available if all other
waterfall options failed. The discussion focused on the fact that if interest
rates remain high, precluding other loss mitigation waterfall options from
being viable, these three programs and their impacts would likely be seen more
often than naught. Given that thought process, the Briefing turned to the
bankruptcy impacts of the FHA Partial Claim + Payment Supplement Program.
Patrick Hruby, Senior Associate at
Brock & Scott, PLLC, highlighted these impacts and many of the best
practices that creditors, creditor’s attorneys, and trustees have been working
together on to facilitate integration of this program into bankruptcy. Hruby presented
a proposed 410A with disclosures regarding the debtor being in the program, the
effects of the program on the ongoing payment, and the expiration date of the
program for the debtor. He also noted suggested revisions to Part 3 of the 410A
of the proof of claim for missed payments and corresponding unreceived monthly
principal reductions. He also suggested revisions to Part 4 to account for the
reduced ongoing payment amount due to the monthly principal reduction. Hruby
also noted that for jurisdictions utilizing GAP Payments or administrative
arrears, the payment supplement portion is going to want to be shown in Part 3.
Hruby also noted that post bankruptcy entrance into the FHA Partial Claim +
Payment Supplement Program would necessitate an amended proof of claim and a
payment change notice. Also, payment change notices will need to be carefully
drafted to note the full payment amount and the amount due from the borrower
due to the payment supplement.
The payment change notice
information issue brought to the forefront that communication needs to be as
clear as possible on all documents in bankruptcy with respect to this program
in order to avoid any unintended consequences and potential inquiries from the
trustees and U.S. Trustees/Bankruptcy Administrators. At the end of the 36-month
payment supplement period or if the program is terminated, it was noted that a
payment change notice will have to be filed to show the elimination of the
monthly payment supplement. On the topic of program termination, it was noted
that if the debtor modifies the loan, the program will be terminated. As a
result, it was noted that creditor’s counsel will need to look closely at the
plan for modifications or cramdowns that would terminate the program and object
appropriately. Consequently, debtor’s attorneys should also be aware if their
debtor client is in one of these programs and to shape the debtor’s plan
accordingly so as not to inadvertently terminate the program. Finally, it was also
noted that the handling of annualized payments in Chapter 12 cases would
present some interesting and unique situations with respect to default
reporting and payment supplement distribution.
Lance Olsen, Partner at McCarthy
Holthus, LLP, continued the discussion of the impacts of this program in
bankruptcy focusing on payoff statements, motions for relief, and consent
orders. As an initial note, Olsen mentioned that relief would, in theory, be
needed to record the second mortgage even though he had not seen a ton of referrals
for relief to record other standard partial claim mortgages, unlike creditor’s
attorneys in other parts of the country. Olsen continued by noting that under
the program, if the creditor is asked for a payoff involving a loan in the
partial claim + payments supplement program, the creditor will have to give a
payoff for both the original loan and the second position lien partial claim +
payment supplement balance. A discussion among the panelists explored whether
these two payoffs should be done in two separate payoff quote letters or
combined into one letter with the two separate payoffs included. In addition, Olsen noted that creditors with motions
for relief and in consent orders need to make sure to be very detailed and
clear with additional disclosures and information in those motions and consent
orders including, but not necessarily limited to, the total amounts owed, the
reduced payment amounts owed, and the payment supplement amounts owed to the
creditor as a result of the debtor failing to make the reduced payments to the
creditor.
The Payment Supplement Account
Program – U.S. Department of Agriculture
Ford finished up the Briefing by
giving details on USDA’s last waterfall option, the USDA Payment Supplement
Account Program. Ford stated that while this program is similar to FHA’s
Partial Claim + Payment Supplement program, the programs differ in that this program
utilizes an advance from the servicer and not a partial claim. As such, a
second lien is not placed on the property and an additional note and mortgage
are not signed. This program became effective July 24, 2024, with a goal to
achieve an ongoing payment reduction of 25% for up to three years and would
require three trial payments. Ford noted that no bankruptcy guidance has been
presented by the USDA and so, as a result, it does not appear that an active
bankruptcy would interfere with the implementation of this program.
The Briefing generated a
significant number of audience questions. One question related to the timing of
the recording of the partial claim. It was noted that the FHA instructions
required the partial claim to be recorded in five days, which the bankruptcy
practitioners noted would be difficult given motion timeframes in bankruptcy
court, and, as a result, the motions may need to be filed as soon as the partial
claim + payment supplement option is offered to attempt to comply with this
requirement. Another question raised was whether any of the participants had
faced any issues with a Trustee in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy saying the partial
claim cannot be executed or recorded by the debtor, as the property is not part
of the bankruptcy estate. Hruby indicated that he had courts in Ohio which have
refused to approve partial claims, as they felt it interfered with the
reaffirmation process, but none of the other panelists indicated they had any
similar issues.
Each of these three programs are
complex, with numerous details and nuances that will present challenges for debtors,
creditors, courts, trustees, and counsels to navigate within the tides and
winds of the bankruptcy process. Each bankruptcy practitioner and creditor should
familiarize themselves with these programs and the impacts on bankruptcy in
order to best insulate themselves from potential problems that could result if
details are not thoroughly thought through.
Watch a recording of this Briefing
and be sure to register for USFN’s next complimentary Briefing – Show Me,
Insurability & The Road Ahead for REO Properties – on Oct. 15 at https://www.usfnevents.org/briefings.html.
Copyright © 2024 USFN USFNews - Oct. 2, 2024 * Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient
Tags:
#Briefing
#lossmitigation
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Posted By USFN,
Wednesday, September 4, 2024
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By Brian Liebo, Esq.
Liebo, Weingarden, Dobie & Barbee, PLLP
USFN Member (MN)
Just over a year ago, the 8th Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that a subordinate lien held by the U.S. cannot be extinguished
by a non-judicial foreclosure sale in its Show Me State Premium Homes v.
McDonnell decision, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2410(c). However, that same statutory framework also gives
U.S. agencies the authority to release their liens.
In a highly anticipated development, HUD issued Mortgagee Letter 2024-17 providing for a work around following the Show Me State decision.
HUD, recognizing the adverse impacts of proceeding with judicial foreclosures
in states where non-judicial foreclosures are the preferred method of
foreclosure, has now established a process where mortgagees can seek releases
of subordinate Secretary-held liens.
Specifically, HUD established an optional, interim procedure where
mortgagees may request releases of subordinate Secretary-held liens, but only
in those instances where the nonjudicial foreclosure sale resulted in no
surplus funds. HUD defines surplus funds as any amount included in the winning
bid in excess of the amount required to complete the foreclosure sale, before
additional proceeds are applied to any subordinate lien.
Mortgage servicers must utilize HUD’s SMART Integrated
Portal to request these releases. The releases are available for multiple,
subordinate HUD mortgages beyond just partial claim mortgages.
The USDA previously went further than HUD by issuing an
announcement in July encouraging servicers to use the less expensive
non-judicial foreclosure method where available. It also put in place a process
for mortgage servicers to obtain releases regardless of whether there are
surplus funds after the foreclosure sale. Hopefully, HUD will soon follow the
USDA by also allowing releases in cases where there are surplus funds in its
final procedures for non-judicial foreclosures with Secretary-held liens.
Regardless, this change by HUD is a step in the right
direction to help mortgage servicers avoid the significant time and expense associated
with judicial foreclosures in those states where non-judicial foreclosures are otherwise
available. USFN’s advocacy committee had been in communication with FHA about
these concerns in the wake of Show Me and are pleased to see this
guidance in the matter. Copyright © 2024 USFN USFNews - Sept. 4
Tags:
#HUD
#ShowMeState
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Posted By USFN,
Thursday, August 8, 2024
|

Associate Member SGP
Advisors is hosting an open house from 5 to
7 pm EST, Thursday, August 29, at its Tampa, Florida office, 501 E. Kennedy
Blvd., Suite 1000, Tampa, FL 33602. Join them for drinks and hors d’oeuvres. 
Tags:
#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By Kristi Payne,
Thursday, August 8, 2024
Updated: Thursday, August 22, 2024
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Scott
& Corley, P.A. (USFN Member - SC) is pleased to announce that Reginald “Reggie”
P. Corley has been selected as one of eight South Carolina lawyers for
the South Carolina Lawyers Weekly’s Commercial and Consumer Litigation Power
List 2024.
Tags:
#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Thursday, August 8, 2024
|

Schneiderman
& Sherman, PC (USFN Member – MI, MN) is excited to welcome Indra
Pandiyaraj to our team of attorneys. She joins the firm as an associate
attorney and will play a crucial part in managing a caseload of complex
litigation matters while overseeing the attorney group to ensure efficient case
distribution and workload management.
Tags:
#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Thursday, August 8, 2024
|

Brittany Ivy has joined Affinity Consulting (USFN Associate Member) as a consultant, specializing in
NetDocuments implementations for law firms and corporate legal departments,
visual reporting, and supporting default services firms with CaseMax Case
Management System. Ivy holds a B.A. in Business Administration and Management
from the University of Arkansas at Little Rock and a certificate in Data
Science with SQL and Tableau from Cornell University. With more than 15 years
of experience in the accounting, legal, and technology fields, Ivy brings expertise
in process management, training, software implementations, impactful outcomes,
and innovative solutions to Affinity Consulting.
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#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Thursday, August 8, 2024
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The Mortgage Law Firm (USFN Member – AZ,
CA, HI, OK, OR, WA) is excited to announce that Caren Castle has joined the firm
as Managing Attorney of its California office. With over 35 years of experience
and leadership in the mortgage servicing industry, Castle brings a wealth of
knowledge and expertise to TMLF and its clients. Castle’s addition to the TMLF
team and her commitment to excellence will bring immense value to TMLF’s
clients and further strengthen the representation and service delivered across
all states TMLF serves.
Tags:
#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Thursday, August 8, 2024
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McPhail Sanchez, LLC
(USFN Member – AL, MS, TN) is proud to announce the celebration of the
firm’s 30th anniversary. Over the past three decades, what began as
a small creditors’ rights firm founded by two attorneys in Mobile, has grown
into a multi-state practice with six attorneys, a staff of 33, and a national
reputation in the default servicing industry. The firm was founded in 1994 and
has expanded its services and presence in the Southeast while maintaining its
cornerstone values of quality, integrity, and mutual respect.
Tags:
#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Thursday, August 8, 2024
|

McCabe, Weisberg
& Conway, LLC
(USFN Member – MD, DC, DE, FL, NY, PA, VA) is proud to announce the
promotion of Carie Anne Deal to Chief Operating
Officer. Throughout her 13 years with the firm, Deal has spearheaded the firm’s
technological innovations to improve our case management system, reporting,
invoicing, and overall performance. As COO, Deal will provide firm-wide
governance and vision, as she helps guide McCabe, Weisberg & Conway in the
execution of growth focused strategies. Additionally, McCabe, Weisberg
& Conway is pleased to announce
the election of Jamie
Krapf, Joseph
Foley, and Jose
Hasbun to shareholder status. Together they join a
team of dedicated and talented attorneys.

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#USFN #MemberNews
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Posted By USFN,
Friday, August 2, 2024
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Earlier this month, the FHA published its final rule in the Federal Register titled “Modernization of Engagement with Mortgagors in Default.” (Docket
No. FR-6353-F-02)
As USFN
has previously written, this final rule allows servicers to utilize electronic and other remote communication tools, among other things, to conduct interviews to satisfy the early intervention requirements. This final rule, which will become effective
on January 1, 2025, updates HUD’s current regulation (24 CFR 203.604) that requires mortgagees to meet in person with borrowers who are in default on their mortgage payments.
HUD’s updated regulation will align with advances in electronic communication technology and borrower engagement preferences while preserving necessary consumer protections. This final rule takes into consideration public comments received in response
to the proposed rule [Docket No. FR-6353- P-01], published on July 31, 2023, as USFN
reported in the August 9, 2023 USFNews.
On August 14, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) posted a draft Mortgagee Letter (ML), Modernization of Engagement with Borrowers in Default, on its Single Family Housing Drafting Table (Drafting Table) for review and feedback. The draft ML proposes policy that would align with the provisions outlined in the final rule, Modernization of Engagement with Mortgagors in Default published in the Federal Register [FR-6353-F-02] on August 2, 2024. Interested stakeholders are encouraged to review the draft ML and provide feedback through September 13, 2024. Instructions for viewing the draft ML and providing feedback are available on the FHA Single Family Drafting Table. As a reminder, this draft ML is not official departmental policy and cannot be used in connection with any FHA-insured mortgage until finalized. FHA’s existing policies remain in effect until amended.
The waivers permitting mortgagees to use electronic and remote means of communication during the COVID-19 pandemic remain in effect and were extended through January 1, 2025, unless the final rule amending 24 CFR § 203.604 and a ML
or Single Family
Housing Policy Handbook 4000.1 (Handbook 4000.1) update amending Section III.A.2.h.xii. become effective prior to that date.
Tags:
#FHA
#HUD
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Posted By USFN,
Friday, August 2, 2024
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By
Jordan Beumer, Esq., and Reggie Corley,
Esq.
Scott &
Corley, P.A. *
USFN Member
(SC)
On
June 28, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States, entered its decision in Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, which overturned the longstanding precedent set by Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.
This legal development is likely to have a significant impact on the regulatory
landscape in the mortgage industry surrounding federal agencies’ constitutional
authority to enact federal regulations.
The
longstanding Chevron doctrine held that if a federal question had not
been directly addressed by Congress, a federal regulatory body could interpret
the relevant statute(s), offer an official stance on the issue, and so long as
the guideline set by the regulatory body was reasonable, it would be upheld. In
other words, the Chevron doctrine, allowed broad deference to federal
administrative agencies’ reasonable interpretation of ambiguous federal
statutes. When the United States Supreme Court first issued the Chevron
decision, over 40years ago, the decision was not necessarily regarded as a
particularly consequential one.However,
since its inception. the Chevron decision has become prolific and is one
of the most important rulings on federal administrative law, cited by federal
courts more than 18,000 times.
The
Court’s recent decision under Loper Bright is based entirely on Section
7 of the Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”). Section 7 specifies that
courts, not agencies, will decide “all relevant questions of law” arising on
review of an agency regulation. The Court elaborated in the opinion as follows:
Section
706 directs that ‘[t]o the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or
applicability of the terms of an agency action.’ 5 U.S.C. Section 706. It
further requires courts to hold ‘unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be …not in accordance with law.’ Section
706(2(A).
The
APA thus codifies for agency cases the unremarkable, yet elemental proposition,
dating back to Marbury: that courts, not agencies, will decide ‘all relevant
questions of law” arising on review of agency action…even those involving
ambiguous laws — and set aside any such action inconsistent with the law as
they interpret it. And it prescribes no deferential standard for courts to
employ in answering those legal questions. That omission is telling, because
section 706 does mandate that judicial review of agency policymaking and fact
finding be deferential. See Section 706(2)(A) (agency action to be set aside if
“arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion); Section 706(2)(E) (agency
fact finding in formal proceedings to be set aside if ‘unsupported by
substantial evidence’).
In
the Loper Bright case, the Court
described the Chevron opinion as being at odds with the congressionally
authorized language in the Administrative Procedure Act (the federal law that
sets out the procedures that federal agencies must follow, as well as the
instructions for courts to review actions by those agencies). The Court highlighted that
the Administrative Procedure Act directs courts to, “decide legal questions by
applying their own judgment” thereby “mak[ing] clear that agency
interpretations of statutes — like agency interpretations of the Constitution —
are not entitled to deference. . .” The Court further stated
that “it thus remains the responsibility of the court to decide whether the
law means what the agency says.” Emphasis
added. Additionally, the Court criticized
the Chevron doctrine, noting that the doctrine allowed federal
agencies “to change course
even when Congress has given them no power to do so.”
In
practice, The Chevron doctrine utilized a two-stage approach. First, the
court would determine whether a particular statute was clear and unambiguous
regarding an issue. If the statute was clear,
then the court would follow it. If, however, the court
found the statute was ambiguous, or silent on the issue, then the court
would proceed to step two. At this step, the court
would determine whether a federal agency’s interpretation was a permissible or
reasonable construction of the statute. If so, the court would
uphold the agency’s interpretation. This framework required
courts to defer to an agency's interpretation of laws passed by Congress, if its
interpretation is reasonable. A major rationale behind
this framework was that agencies were thought more likely to have the specific
knowledge and expertise required to interpret complex laws and issues above and
beyond the court’s ability. The Court stated in Loper
Bright that, “Perhaps most fundamentally, Chevron’s presumption is
misguided because [federal] agencies have no special competence in resolving
statutory ambiguities . . .[c]ourts do. The Framers, [] anticipated that courts
would often confront statutory ambiguities and expected that courts would
resolve them by exercising independent legal judgment.”
The
legal framework set by Chevron may have significant implications on the
mortgage industry regulatory bodies, such as the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (“CFPB”), the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”), the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (“OCC”), and their constitutional authority to enact federal
regulations.
Before
Loper Bright, the CFPB relied on the Chevron doctrine to mandate
federal regulations, not prescribed by Congress, in an effort to police the
mortgage industry. Per the CFPB’s official website, the CFPB is “a U.S.
government agency dedicated to making sure you are treated fairly by banks,
lenders and other financial institutions.” Again, per the CFPB’s
website the CFPB “provides different forms of guidance and compliance resources
to help you understand and comply with our rules and the statutes we
implement.” Emphasis added. Notably, under the CFPB’s language on their
website, the CFPB admittedly provides its own statutes and rules. Likewise, the
FHFA states on its website that the organization, “is responsible for the
effective supervision, regulation, and housing mission oversight.” The website further
describes the banks that the FHFA will regulate and details how it regulates those
banks.
This
new precedent may also have an impact on HUD’s use of the Fair Housing Act,
which is a broad statute, to gain much of its authority. HUD, like the FHFA and
CFPB, has traditionally been given substantial discretion, where it has taken
great liberties, in setting guidance and taking enforcement actions against
those who are not in strict compliance. Similarly, the OCC states
openly on their website that “[b]y maintaining a strong local presence, honing
a unique national and international perspective, and seeking stakeholder feedback
when setting policy, we can secure clear benefits for OCC-chartered
banks and lead on bank supervision.” Emphasis added. The public statements
above show a clear understanding of the regulatory authority these
organizations perceive to hold under the Chevron doctrine.
Although
not yet argued under the recent precedent set by Loper Bright, the
statutes and rules implemented by the mortgage industry’s regulatory bodies, using
the Chevron doctrine framework, may no longer be upheld by federal
courts. They, like all other federal agencies, are now facing a similar and
significant dilemma regarding rules and regulations they may implement
regarding the authority and power they may or may not have following this new
United States Supreme Court decision.
Copyright © 2024 USFN USFNews - August 7, 2024 *Denotes firm is a 2023 Award of Excellence recipient
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, Nos. 22-451, 22-1219, 2024 U.S. LEXIS
2882 (June 28, 2024).
Tags:
#Chevron
#SupremeCourt
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Posted By Kristi Payne,
Wednesday, July 17, 2024
Updated: Tuesday, July 23, 2024
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By Robert D. Forster, II, Esq.
Barrett Daffin FrappierTurner & Engel, LLP *
USFN Member (TX,
AZ, CA, CO, GA, NV)
The Texas Supreme Court recently addressed
the 5th Circuit’s certified question regarding whether simultaneous rescission
and reacceleration can reset the limitations period under Texas law. It
concluded that "a rescission that complies with the statute [Tex. Civil
Practice and Remedies Code Section 16.038] resets limitations even if it is
combined with a notice of reacceleration” (Moore
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 683 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. 2024)).
Acceleration and Rescission Under Texas Law
Texas law holds a four-year limitations period applies to both judicial and
non-judicial foreclosures, starting the day after the cause of action accrues
(Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.035(a), (b), (d)). Typically, this
accrual date is the loan's maturity date. However, if the loan includes an
acceleration clause, the statute of limitations starts at the time of
acceleration (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.035(e); Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 566,
Tex. 2001).
To accelerate a loan, the debtor must receive clear notices of both the
intent to accelerate and the actual acceleration (Ogden v. Gibralter Sav. Ass’n, 640 S.W.2d 232 (1982)). The
four-year clock starts when these notices are sent.
Circumstances such as loss mitigation or servicer changes can occur while
the limitations clock is running. To reset the clock and prevent foreclosure
bars, lienholders may choose to rescind acceleration. Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code §16.038, effective June 2015, allows lenders to unilaterally rescind
acceleration via written notice.
Per this statute, if the lienholder, servicer, or their attorney sends a
written notice of rescission or waiver of acceleration to each debtor via first
class or certified mail before the limitations period expires, the acceleration
is considered rescinded (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.038). This does
not affect the lienholder's right to accelerate the loan again in the future or
waive past defaults (§16.038(d)).
Background
In Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the Moores secured a note with a
deed of trust in 2004. They subsequently defaulted and, by October 2015,
received a notice of intent to accelerate, followed by an acceleration notice
in February 2016. In August 2020, the Moores filed a lawsuit in state court for
a declaratory judgment alleging that the limitations period had expired four
years after the February 2016 acceleration. After removing the case to Federal
Court, the servicer and mortgagee argued for an effective rescission of
acceleration under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.038, leading to summary
judgment in their favor, which the Moores appealed to the 5th Circuit Court of
Appeals of the United States (“5th Circuit”).
The 5th Circuit queried the Texas Supreme Court on whether a lender could
rescind a prior acceleration and re-accelerate the loan simultaneously under
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.038. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed this
possibility, thus negating the need to answer whether such an attempt voids
both rescission and reacceleration.
In October 2016, the mortgage servicer issued a notice rescinding the
previous acceleration and re-accelerating the loan, specifying that such
rescission did not waive any rights or claims. Subsequent notices in 2016 and
2017 updated the Moores on their debt and the opportunity to cure defaults.
A final notice in March 2019 confirmed rescission per Tex. Prac. & Rem.
Code §16.038, prompting the Texas Supreme Court to determine if such notices,
combining rescission and reacceleration, were valid under the statute.
Texas Supreme Court’s Interpretation
The Court ruled that Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code § 16.038(d) does not mandate a waiting period between
rescission and reacceleration, thus allowing them to occur in the same notice (Moore, 683 S.W.3d 843, 847). The
decision emphasized that this reset does not harm the borrower, as it restores
the original loan terms and offers another chance to cure defaults.
Implications for Mortgage Servicers
While the Court upheld the validity
of a single notice for rescission and reacceleration under Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code § 16.038, it did not address the proper reacceleration notice
requirements. The opinion expressly states the holding remains consistent with Wilmington Trust v. Rob, 891 F.3d 174,
177 (5th Cir. 2018), which suggests separate notices for intent to accelerate
and acceleration might be necessary.
Thus, lenders should ensure
compliance with proper notice requirements for acceleration, as specific
determinations on validity may be fact-dependent, particularly when express
waivers of notice are involved (Shumway
v. Horizon Credit Corp., 801 S.W.2d 890, 893–94, Tex. 1991). Copyright © USFN 2024 USFNews - July 24, 2024 * Denotes firm is a 2023 Award of Excellence recipient.
Tags:
#SupremeCourt
#TX
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Posted By USFN,
Monday, July 8, 2024
|
By Ben Paden
Doyle &
Foutty, PC *
USFN Member (IN,
KY)
In May, USFN held a discussion on Artificial Intelligence
(AI), and I was thrilled to serve as the moderator, which, for my part,
involves not being an expert
and asking questions when something is mentioned that I do not fully
understand. A perfect position for me that fit like a glove! Our experts included
Michael Merritt at BOK Financial, Sally Garrison with The Mortgage Law Firm,
Zack Glaser with Lawyerist, and Brian Nicholas with McCalla Raymer Leibert
Pierce, LLC. I extend my sincere thanks to them for their expertise and for leading
interactive breakout sessions on this important topic.
I learned that Artificial Intelligence, besides being
Spielberg’s worst movie (don’t @ me), is already prevalent in our industry. If
you are as I was, you may have thought that there was still time to prepare for
“the future” and that we would be able to slowly implement AI processes with
carefully prepared and tested safety measures to protect ourselves. However,
the reality is that it is already here and we may be very late to the party. So
this discussion was not only eye opening, but also crucial to understanding
what AI is, what it is not, how to use it properly in our jobs, and what its
future use may look like.
Based on the USFNgage conversations had, let us clarify what
Artificial Intelligence is and is not. AI is fundamentally technology that
enables computer software to mimic human intelligence and problem-solving
abilities. However, right now, we are mostly seeing what is called generative
AI, machine learning and natural language processing specifically designed to
create things, identify patterns, and interact with prompts. Generative AI is mostly
affecting music, art, and writing at this moment. Machine learning appears in
number crunching businesses, email filtering, medicine, and prepping that
Amazon product for shipment once you have put it in your cart because it knows
you need toilet paper and new tennis shoes just as well as you do, so why fight
it? Natural language processing are your chatbots, your Clippy in Word (man, I
miss Clippy), and your “Stephanie” with Visa who wants to understand why you’re
calling today, but you don’t want to talk to “Stephanie,” you want a
“REP-RE-SENT-ATIVE!!!”
AI is not Skynet, HAL 9000, or one of those evil robot
overlords seen in a Hollywood blockbuster. At least not yet… It is more a
highly sophisticated series of programs that piece together portions of the
hodge-podge of humanity’s existence up until this point in order to fulfill a
prompt or interaction it is given. Generative AI, for example, is solely based
on material and content we have already created. It and other programs “learn” based
on what we provide it. AI can draft a paper on ‘The Great Gatsby’ or generate a
novel reminiscent of it, but it cannot produce wholly original creations. Moreover,
it lacks true cognitive abilities – like thinking, feeling, or loving.
Having finally obtained an understanding of what AI is, I
was ready to learn how it is being deployed in our workspace. We have already
seen lawyers get in trouble for using generative AI in brief writing as the
program “hallucinated” or made-up source material, so there are definitely
misuses we need to be aware of. The consensus of the four breakout groups
seemed to point to AI being used to assist in work, but requiring constant
human oversight, interaction, and quality control of the outgoing product. For
example, using AI to help write summarizations of large amounts of material to
point an individual in the right direction for research, having AI generate a
good starting point for a policy or procedure that staff then complete, or
allowing AI to make simple decisions on situations to help downstream processes
for employees would all be suitable uses for AI in the workplace.
You can use AI to take something you have written and rewrite
the material differently, more eloquently, or more simply. I am often a
terrible writer (see this article for examples), so I probably should have used
AI to help me write this to make it easier and more enjoyable to read. You can
have AI add an authoritative tone or, if you are too authoritative, make your
writing less abrasive. AI can also be used to discover patterns or
inefficiencies and reveal strengths or flaws within your own work processes. Someone
can employ AI to help with audits, audit prep, or reporting. The options are
almost literally limitless.
However, the danger for us still looms. Any product or
procedure put in place will still be our responsibility. No one will accept the
excuse of “the computer did it,” whether that is the boss, a judge, an
investor, or an oversight body. It will still be our fault. Moreover, turning
our thoughts outside of ourselves, it opens the door for an incredible amount
of bad acting in our industry and others. Everyone has access to this
technology. Fraud attempts will improve. Pro se litigant filings may be more on
point and harder to dismiss or strike. Cybersecurity traffic will increase and
intensify, and phishing schemes may become more successful.
Lastly, we come to the future. Here is where we envision mushroom
clouds and humans living underground – a barren wasteland and bleak existences.
Right? Or do we see a Star Trek-like future of blindingly fast calculations,
space exploration, and elevated human existence? I am ever an optimist, so I at
least hope for the latter. Generative AI, machine learning, and natural
language processing programs can all be incredibly helpful, and I am not sure I
necessarily see a reason to stop using them.
We do, however, need to be very careful about their
oversight. The human quality control previously mentioned must continue and
become even more robust. Additionally, the use of AI should be limited to
non-mission-critical tasks. Money will have to be spent on staff and technology
guardrails to properly utilize this kind of software. What AI is “fed” or
trained on has to be carefully curated and monitored. And tested. Lots and lots
of testing.
We believe we will see new roles created within companies
for AI Trainers and AI Quality Control Testers, as well as some companies
employing a Mathematician or Data Scientist to help control these processes.
Regulations will also begin to include AI oversight, so we will have to be
prepared to answer those questions. We will also probably have to train some of
the regulators, as they do not always fully understand the things they
regulate. Not that we have ever experienced that, right? We will have to
incorporate AI oversight of our vendors, too. Just because you might not
utilize AI yourself does not mean your vendors do not, and we’ll have to be
aware of that as we move forward. And privacy! What to do about privacy?! An AI
model can’t exactly “unlearn” something, so what do we do about data it gets hold
of that we did not intend? How do we solve for an AI model that obtains PII for
example?
While we could not solve for all the problems presented, I
think a great job was done and the level of interest and interaction on this
topic was incredible. I look forward to continuing the discussion as we move
forward, both as individual companies and together as an industry. If you missed
this discussion, I hope this article helped catch you up. I highly recommend
being part of the next one. Be on the lookout for more USFNgage events on this and
other topics in the future. It is a fantastic opportunity to come together and
have an interactive discussion on a specific topic. And don’t worry, the
USFNgage series is not recorded, so there’s no proof that I had no idea what I
was talking about or what I was asking, which also means you too can
participate freely. Thanks and we hope to see you next time! Copyright © 2024 USFN USFNews - July 10, 2024 * Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient.
Tags:
#ArtificialIntelligence
#USFN
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Posted By USFN,
Wednesday, June 19, 2024
|
By Kevin Dobie, Esq.
Liebo,
Weingarden, Dobie & Barbee, PLLP
USFN
Member (MN)
With the rise in home prices in the past several years, many
servicers and investors have begun foreclosing junior mortgages. Some of these
mortgages were charged off, sold, or left for dead many years ago, and
borrowers are often surprised when the mortgage rises from the ashes and a
servicer or investor mails a default letter or files a foreclosure action. The
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issued an advisory opinion on these loans
in April 2023 highlighting issues surrounding “zombie” mortgages, and lately, news
organizations and foreclosure defense attorneys have also taken an interest in
these “zombie” mortgage loans. A recent court of appeals decision in Minnesota
highlights a few issues to avoid liability in enforcing a so-called zombie
mortgage.
In the recent case, Reed
v. Westgate Investments, the Minnesota Court of Appeals determined that
the state’s 15-year statute of limitations to foreclose a mortgage was not
extended by the mortgagors’ prior bankruptcy filing. 2024 WL 2716034, __ N.W.3d
__ (Minn. App. 2024). The Reeds filed bankruptcy in 2005 and obtained a
discharge in 2010. The loan matured in 2006. The servicer sent pre-foreclosure
collection letters and commenced a non-judicial foreclosure in 2022, 16 years
after the maturity date. Meanwhile, the Reed’s loan balance ballooned from
$19,735 to over $62,000. The Reeds filed a lawsuit to stop the foreclosure and argued
that the foreclosure was time-barred by the 15-year statute of limitations. At
the district court, the servicer successfully argued that a Minnesota tolling
statute extended the limitations period for five years because of the
bankruptcy filing.
The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the statute of
limitations was not tolled as a result of the automatic stay in the Reeds’
bankruptcy case. More specifically, the Minnesota statute of limitations
provides that no action to foreclose a mortgage shall be maintained unless
commenced within 15 years from the maturity date and this limitation shall not
be extended by “reason of any disability of any party interested in the mortgage.”
Minn. Stat. § 541.03 subd. 1. The Court of Appeals explained that this “disability”
language in the statute specifically applied to the servicer’s bankruptcy
tolling argument and that the 15-year statute of limitations was not extended
by the automatic stay in the Reeds’ bankruptcy case.
The obvious take-away is that servicers and their counsel
must closely review the maturity date in the mortgage to ensure that any
foreclosure activity is not prohibited by the 15-year statute of limitations. In
Minnesota, it is not enough, however, to simply look at the maturity date in
your system of record or on the promissory note and add 15 years to the
maturity date. In Minnesota, the maturity date must be listed on the recorded
mortgage. If the maturity date is not listed in the recorded mortgage,
the 15-year statute of limitations begins to run on the date of the origination
of the loan. Minn. Stat. § 541.03 subd. 2. The maturity date or a statement
that the term is, for example, 30 years is sufficient. A reference to the term
listed in the promissory note is not sufficient because the promissory note is
not part of the recorded document.
Foreclosure defense attorneys are now focused on the statute
of limitations issue and have recently filed a number of class action cases in
Minnesota targeting servicers and counsel who run afoul of the statute. This most
often arises where a promissory note has a 30-year repayment term, but for
whatever reason, the mortgage template used by the originating lender did not
include a place to list the maturity date or the term. In those situations, if
the maturity date is not listed or cannot be easily ascertained from the
recorded mortgage, the mortgage can become unenforceable before the maturity
date listed in the promissory note.
Because many of these older loans are secured by second
mortgages that were charged off, servicers of charged off loans must also heed
caution when adding interest and other charges. After a loan is charged off, a
servicer may stop sending monthly statements. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.41(e)(6). A
servicer may not, however, add interest or other charges to a charged-off loan
unless the servicer resumes sending monthly statements. And even if the
mortgage remains enforceable under the statute of limitations, a servicer may
not retroactively assess fees or interest on the account for the period of time
during which the loan was charged off. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.41(e)(6)(ii)(B). In
other words, the servicer must foreclose using the balance at the time the loan
was charged off.
As a practice pointer, servicers and their counsel should
take care to review the mortgage document itself for these Minnesota-specific
issues regarding the 15-year statute of limitations as well as the allowable
interest and charges the servicer may recover when enforcing a charged-off “zombie”
mortgage that has risen from the dead.
Tags:
#Foreclosure
#MN
#zombie
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Posted By USFN,
Thursday, June 6, 2024
|
By Blair Gisi, Esq.
SouthLaw, PC *
USFN Member (IA, KS, MO, NE)
Recently,
there has been an effort to address concerns with the lack of mortgage lending
in and around Native American tribal lands along with a rise in referrals for
loans subject to the regulations of the Section 184 Indian Housing Loan
Guarantee (“Section 184”) program. As a brief history, Section 184 is designed
to increase opportunity and access for certain Native American families to
achieve home ownership. Per HUD’s website:
The
Section 184 Indian Home Loan Guarantee Program is a home mortgage product
specifically designed for American Indian and Alaska Native families, Alaska
villages, tribes, or tribally designated housing entities. Congress established
this program in 1992 to facilitate homeownership and increase access to capital
in Native American Communities.
With
Section 184 financing borrowers can get into a home with a low down payment and
flexible underwriting. Section 184 loans can be used, both on and off native
lands, for new construction, rehabilitation, purchase of an existing home, or
refinance.
Section
184 is synonymous with home ownership in Indian Country.
See https://www.hud.gov/section184.
While
expanding, there are currently 38 states
in which a Section 184 loan can be used, and since 2012, there have been over
15,000 loans totaling over $2.4 billion (https://www.1tribal.com/section-184-home-loan-explanation/). A full list of participating
tribes and the associated state(s) is also available on HUD’s website.
An important pre-foreclosure consideration
when reviewing Section 184 loans is whether the property sits on tribal or
allotted land or whether it is fee simple property. Generally speaking,
foreclosure and sale of fee simple properties can follow the standard procedure
per the terms of the loan documents and pursuant to state guidelines.
For
trust or allotted land, the leasehold interest will need to be incorporated to
collateralize the loan, which brings along additional regulations. The two
primary considerations involve the potential sale of the property via the
foreclosure action and may include a right of first refusal to an eligible
tribal member, the tribe itself, or the Indian Housing Authority serving the
tribe. There are also limitations on who may purchase the property in the event
of foreclosure.
Section
184 has a rich history of supporting Native American and Alaskan Native housing
initiatives. Its regulations on rights upon default aim to provide a framework
for addressing defaults in a manner that balances the interests of borrowers
and lenders while promoting access to affordable housing in Native American
communities. The distinction with how the property is held and where the
property sits is paramount to proceedings involving Section 184 loans, and
there are many resources online to help guide lenders, servicers, and attorneys
in these situations. Copyright © 2024 USFN USFNews - June 12, 2024 * Denotes firm is a 2023 USFN Award of Excellence recipient
Tags:
#foreclosure
#Section184
#triballands
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Posted By USFN,
Monday, May 13, 2024
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Diaz Anselmo & Associates, PA (USFN Member – FL, IL, IN, KY, OH, WI) welcomes Gina N. Daya to the firm as director of client services. Her primary focus will be on ensuring exceptional service delivery to our servicer and investor clients. With over a decade of experience that includes both servicing and legal, she brings a wealth of knowledge, expertise, and a unique perspective and understanding to the firm. Daya will be based in the firm’s Naperville office. 
Spring 2024 USFN Report
Tags:
#USFN #MemberNews
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