By
Geoffrey Milne, Esq. and Victoria Forcella, Esq.
McCalla
Raymer Leibert Pierce, LLC *
USFN
Member (AL, CA, CT, FL, GA, IL, KY, MS, NV, NJ, NY, OH, OR, TX, WA)
Servicers
and their counsel will want to follow closely the decision of the Connecticut
Supreme Court which granted Certification on November 23, 2021 in KeyBank,
NA v. Yazar, PSC-210159,
to address two key issues under the Emergency Mortgage Assistance Act (“EMAP”).
The Court granted the Petition as to whether the EMAP statute involves subject
matter jurisdiction and whether a servicer can rely upon an EMAP notice issued
in a previous foreclosure, which was then dismissed. Litigation regarding EMAP
notices has become rampant over the past few years, pausing foreclosures under
the argument that a defective notice implicates subject matter jurisdiction. It
is certainly possible that the law is about to change in this area based on the
Court’s order granting Certification.
EMAP’s
goal is to provide eligible borrowers with mortgage assistance during the
pendency of a foreclosure. The EMAP program requires that its loans be repaid
by consumers, and consequently, is not often used by borrowers. When it is
used, the statutory framework allows a borrower to obtain EMAP assistance while
a pending foreclosure is effectively placed on hold. Regardless, the statute
requires a written notice prior to the commencement of a consumer foreclosure.
In
2020, the Connecticut Appellate Court held in MTGLQ Investors, L.P. v.
Hammons that a
foreclosing plaintiff’s failure to provide the defendant mortgagor with the
notice required by § 8-265ee (a) of EMAP constituted a jurisdictional defect
requiring dismissal of the action. This means that a foreclosure judgment is
subject to dismissal because the Court never had the power to hear the case due
to the defect in the notice. The issue can be raised years after a case is
filed and even after judgment enters. The
impact of the Hammons decision on servicers is substantial. If the EMAP
notice was defective for any reason, such as failure to send by certified mail
to the property address, then the foreclosure judgment was fatally defective,
the case was dismissed, and a borrower could seek attorneys’ fees under
Connecticut’s consumer fee statute, CGS 42-150bb. After Hammons,
servicers saw a flurry of motions to dismiss claiming defective EMAP notices,
delaying their cases.
In 2021,
the Connecticut Appellate Court was faced with another case involving a
challenge to an EMAP notice in KeyBank, NA v. Yazar.
In Yazar, the borrower
executed a note and mortgage payable to First Niagara Bank, N.A. The loan
became delinquent in 2016, and First Niagara issued separate default and EMAP
notices to the borrower. About two months later, KeyBank acquired First Niagara
by merger. In January 2017, KeyBank commenced a foreclosure which was dismissed
for failure to provide mediation notices. About eight months later, KeyBank
re-filed an action for foreclosure relying upon the prior EMAP notice sent in
2016. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on liability only,
which was granted by the trial court, over an objection that the borrower had
not received
an EMAP notice. After entry of a judgment of strict foreclosure, the
borrower filed an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the EMAP notice. The
borrower argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because
the plaintiff failed to comply with the EMAP notice requirement of § 8-265ee
(a). The plaintiff argued that the 2016 EMAP notice, sent prior to the first
foreclosure, satisfied the statute. The Appellate Court reversed, finding that
the EMAP notice was not sufficient, and remanded to the trial court to dismiss
the case for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fortunately, the bank filed
a Petition for Certification, which was granted by the Connecticut Supreme
Court.
The argument
advanced by KeyBank on the Petition for Certification through its counsel,
McCalla Raymer Leibert Pierce, LLC, was that a mortgage foreclosure is not a
creature of statute; rather, its origins are deeply rooted in over two
centuries of Connecticut common law. The common law right of foreclosure has
existed in Connecticut since prior to 1825.[4] Recognition that a
mortgage foreclosure is a common law cause of action is critical to an analysis
of whether strict compliance with the EMAP’s notice requirements is
jurisdictional. When the legislature intends to modify or restrict a common law
cause of action, it is required to state expressly that it is doing so because
such rights are being modified or limited. Statutes change common law rights
“only if the language of the legislature plainly and unambiguously reflects
such an intent.”[5] When the legislature is
modifying or changing common law rights, it must state explicitly that it
intends to abrogate them.[6]
There is nothing in the legislative history of EMAP, as well as its 2009
amendments, to demonstrate that the legislature intended to abrogate common law
rights as part of its enactment. The original act did not expand or limit the
ability to file a mortgage foreclosure; neither did the 2009 amendments address
limitations on subject matter jurisdiction.
The second issue
which the CT Supreme Court granted Certification on is whether an EMAP notice
sent by a mortgagee in a prior mortgage foreclosure (which was dismissed) can
be relied upon in connection with a second foreclosure action commenced against
the borrower based on the same default under the same mortgage. This issue is equally
important to servicers, in that the EMAP notice relied upon by the lender in Yazar
had been issued by a predecessor in interest, which had subsequently merged
with KeyBank. Normally, a surviving bank
after a merger can rely upon the actions of the predecessor in interest. This
issue has another practical benefit to servicers. Sometimes, a foreclosure is
administratively dismissed based on the dormancy program. When the suit is
re-filed, the lender has to address whether a new EMAP notice is required, even
if the new suit is based on the same default as the prior case.
It
is likely that the Yazar case will be argued in 2022 before the
Connecticut Supreme Court. It will be the first time that Court has addressed
EMAP. It presents an excellent opportunity to clarify the law under EMAP, possibly
to the benefit of servicers.